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ABSTRACT 
Increasingly, researchers on strategy are turning away from the highly abstracted and de-
humanized components that seem to typify the macro approach to strategy. This movement 
is at least partially brought about by a philosophical recognition that the emergent and 
unpredictable nature of organizational life is fast exposing the constraints of an approach to 
strategy that is based on the values of rationality, predictability and control. 
 
In this thesis I argue that organizational change in general and the act of strategizing in 
particular can be thought of as a social, transformative and emergent process as opposed to 
the overly orderly, rational, formative and/or humanistic views on strategy presented by 
systemically oriented theorists. I draw on the theory of complex responsive processes of 
relating as espoused by Stacey, Griffin and Shaw (2000) and specifically on Stacey’s 
(2003, 2007) substantial contribution to the field of strategic management. By utilizing a 
reflexive research methodology I describe the arduous social and emergent process of 
transformation in my practice and identity (observable in subtle changes in disposition, 
language and assumptions) as I begin to act into the understanding of strategizing as an 
ongoing, incomplete, social process. In doing this, I am suggesting that the narrated 
accounts of our shifts in practice due to us knowing differently are important contributions 
in the process of transforming our theories on and beliefs around strategy. These accounts 
should not be seen as premature attempts at methodological frameworks, but rather as 
explorative participation in the emergent transformation of a radical, social approach to 
strategizing. 
 
I engage critically with the notion of strategy-as-practice and suggest a review of the 
fundamentally rational and formative assumptions still prevalent in the work of researchers 
like Johnson, Melin and Whittington (2003) and Samra- Fredericks (2003). Whilst 
acknowledging the role of culturally mediated dispositions in the ongoing transformation of 
organizations advocated by Chia and Holt (2006) and Chia and MacKay (2007), I argue for 
the paradoxical and therefore simultaneous occurrence of habitual and mindful actions by 
people strategizing as opposed to the authors’ suggestion of a predominantly mindless 
experience of organizational change. 
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 Finally, I turn to Stacey’s (2007) question as to why people continue to make long-term 
forecasts if their usefulness is so obviously limited. Whilst understanding his frustration, I 
argue that there is value nevertheless in engaging in strategy making albeit not for the 
rationalist reasons usually stated. In my view the real value of strategising is to be found in 
two areas: first in the social activity that goes into creating these documents, and second: 
the documents not only serve as markers in an ongoing process of strategising; they also 
give us a way of ‘going on’ and taking the next step..  
 
Keywords: Strategy, strategizing, strategic management, strategic transformation, 
complexity, emergent, intention, Stacey, strategy-as-practice, sociology, complex 
responsive processes of relating, organizational development, organizational dynamics. 
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INTRODUCTION 
In this thesis I apply the theory of complex responsive processes of relating (Stacey, Griffin 
and Shaw, 2000 and Stacey, 2003) to my practice as a strategist. In this regard, the scope 
and depth of Stacey’s (2003, 2007) arguments on strategy make this a worthwhile project 
in its own right. (Paraphrasing Rorty’s comment on Hegel, it was as if I found Stacey 
waiting patiently at the end of most of the arguments that I explored.) I will then argue that, 
in proposing a radical social view on strategy and organizational change, Stacey presents 
theorists and practitioners with an important alternative view on the field currently 
dominated by the overly lifeless and aggregated, macro views prevalent in mainstream 
literature. I consider this then my first contribution to the field of strategic management: a 
detailed account of the emergent and social transformation of my practice from viewing 
strategy as a rational and formative process to understanding strategizing as emergent 
practice. 
 
With the term strategizing I am deliberately not opting for the noun, strategy, as would be 
favoured by main stream theorists like Porter (1985, 1996) or Prahalad and Hamel (1990, 
1994). Rather I am drawing on the work of theorists opting for a ‘sensibility of verbs rather 
than an assumption of nouns’ (Johnson, Melin and Whittington, 2003: 7) to add weight to 
the arguments promoting the social primacy of organizational experience. Furthermore, 
with strategizing I am drawing a distinction between work of a strategic nature and the day-
to-day managing and operating of a business. In this respect, Hendry and Seidl (2003) 
argue that those strategic episodes are characterized by a reflexive discourse during which 
‘organizational routines are viewed and acted upon’ (Hendry and Seidl, 2003: 177). 
Similarly, Chia and Holt (2006) argue that the ordinary, practical coping of organizational 
members (referred to by the authors as a Heideggerian form of dwelling) should be 
differentiated from the non-habitual, building mode when we are deliberately attending to 
important equipment or processes as conspicuously absent, obstructive or broken. Thus, I 
will attend to strategizing as the social processes people in organizations participate in 
during episodes in which they attempt to bring about significant changes to the existing 
order. 
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 As a second contribution to the field, I deconstruct what Stacey means when he argues that 
’organizational strategies emerge unpredictably in the interplay of many different 
intentions’ (Stacey, 2007: 250; italics added), and ‘[The] movement of human action is 
toward an unknown future’ (Stacey, 2001: 162 – 163; italics added), and ‘Strategic 
direction is not set in advance but understood in hindsight’ (Stacey, 2003: 423; italics 
added) and finally, ‘Why do people prepare long-term forecasts if it is impossible to make 
useful long-term forecasts?’ (Stacey, 2003: 421; italics added). As a practicing strategist, 
his apparent negation of the value to be derived from people’s efforts to anticipate the 
future evokes a sense of hesitancy, skepticism and even futility in me. I say ‘apparent’ 
because, while Stacey argues consistently and compellingly for an unknown future, the 
unpredictable emergence of strategies or the impossibility of useful forecasts, I also 
understand him to ascribe fully to the importance of people’s tendency to present to 
themselves what is going to happen (Mead, 1934). He has then also argued extensively on 
the prevalence of intentions and intentional themes and has pointed to how strategies 
emerge from the interplay of intentions (Stacey, 2007). With my comment I am pointing to 
two observations: one, Stacey does not explicitly negate the value of plans and strategies – 
rather, it is by not affirming their value outright that his statements create the appearance 
that it is futile to plan for the future.  Two, after coining the phrase ‘interplay of many 
different intentions’ Stacey leaves the particularization of the phrase hanging. In other 
words, he does not explore what this interplay will look like and how it may manifest in 
ordinary organizational life; for instance, in someone documenting some of these intentions 
in a plan. I aim to explore then the sensibility (if any) of our references to the future and if 
indicated, rehabilitate the practice of strategizing within the context of an essentially 
unpredictable and socially constructed future. 
 
As a third contribution to the field, I aim to take up Stacey’s assertion that the perspective 
he is offering (merely) invites people to explore ‘a way of thinking about what we already 
do’ (Stacey, 2007:270). I will argue that his statement reflects a thinking-doing dichotomy 
that does not corroborate a social and transformative view of practice. In taking up this 
argument I aim to explore the shifts in practice that I experienced and that I have come to 
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view as inescapable due to the act of knowing (Spencer and Krauze, 20006, drawing on 
Hegel). In doing this, I hope to add a pragmatic texture to the theory of complex responsive 
processes of relating which Zhu (2007) accused of being overly theoretical. ‘I am not 
saying that there is all theoretical sophistication and no practical concern, I am saying that 
there is an imbalance. Stacey’s theorising is rigorous and forceful; I just wish to see it 
making real, practical differences’ (Zhu, 2007: 10). I subscribe to the transformative and 
emergent quality of our efforts to apply Stacey’s insights to our practice. I am thus not 
attempting to turn my unique experiences into a repeatable methodological framework. 
What I will aim to do is to, by articulating the shifts in practice, contribute to the emerging 
nature of a radical approach to strategizing. 
 
In the next section, I describe the research methodology followed during the course of the 
Doctorate in Management Program. Epistemologically, my approach is based on the 
hermeneutic preference of penetrating dialogues with the text as well as the 
phenomenological aspiration to directly capture my experience. Methodologically, I 
followed a reflexive approach to research. My focus is on the emergent and exploratory 
interpretation of and reflection on my own experience as well as the traditions of thought in 
which I locate the way I am making sense of things. I will reflect on my experience of four 
episodes at work, captured as four projects. My reflections and interpretations of that 
experience were continuously scrutinized and challenged by primarily the members of my 
learning set, comprising of two fellow students and two supervisors.  
 
In Project 1 I reflect on the cultural, educational and professional influences that had 
shaped the way I viewed the world at the onset of the Program. It is evident how my view 
on organizational life drew strongly on various applications of systemic thinking. 
 
In Project 2 I turn to those very systemic influences and focus on some of the core 
assumptions underpinning Strategic Choice theory. I reflect on a specific strategic episode 
at work and, drawing on the theory of complex responsive processes of relating (Stacey, 
Griffin and Shaw, 2000 and Stacey, 2003), critique the overly realist, cognitivist and 
humanistic assumptions held by key exponents of Strategic Choice theory (Porter, 1985, 
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1996; Prahalad and Hamel, 1990, 1994). The project is important for two reasons: one, it is 
through the process of critiquing Strategic Choice theory that my broader argument against 
rational and formative approaches to strategy begins to take shape and two, I utilize the 
process of critiquing to begin assimilating the theory of complex responsive processes of 
relating. 
 
In Project 3 I engage critically with Stacey’s (2003) comments on the apparent futility of 
attempts at long-term forecasts whilst also arguing that ‘… strategies emerge unpredictably 
in the interplay of many different intentions …’ (Stacey, 2007: 250). As a practising 
strategist I found these comments unsettling when, in my daily practice, I am constantly 
dealing with attempts at anticipating the future. My subjective experience of life is in any 
event also one of a pervasive tendency to present to myself what is going to happen next. 
By exploring the notions of the time structure of the living present (Mead, 1934; Shotter, 
1994; Stacey, Griffin and Shaw, 2000; Stacey, 2001, Shaw, 2002 and Griffin, 2002) as well 
as intention and intentionality (Mead, 1934; Searle, 1983; Joas, 1996; Dalal, 1998;Stacey, 
2003, 2006 and Griffin, 2002) I propose a shift in focus to understand that sensing of the 
future as important social material used by people to evoke, inspire and/or coerce human 
action from living moment to living moment.  
 
In Project 4 my attention shifts to the idea of strategy-as-practice as taken up by Johnson, 
Melin and Whittington (2003), Samra-Fredericks (2003), Regnér (2003), Maitlis and 
Lawrence (2003) and others. They introduced the notion of micro-strategizing as part of a 
movement to escape the trappings of ‘high abstraction, broad categories and lifeless 
concepts’ (Johnson et al, 2003: 6) employed by macro strategy theorists and practitioners. 
Anticipating a corroborating view on the argument I developed in Projects 2 and 3, I 
engage with their work whilst reflecting on my experiences of the micro events evident 
during a particular episode at work. I argue that their work, though refreshing, remains 
steeped in rational and formative assumptions. After initially experiencing an ideological 
stalemate with the authors, I suggest a way ‘to go on’ (drawing on Wittgenstein, 1953) so 
that others would find what I am doing, intelligible. 
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In the Synopsis and Critical Appraisal I take another reflexive turn on my work done 
during the four projects. Drawing on Projects 2 and 4, I argue that the rational and 
formative approach to strategy favoured by mainstream theorists and overwhelmingly 
applied by strategy practitioners today carry the hallmark of a well-established ideology. I 
argue that rationality, control and predictability appear as unquestioned cult values (Mead, 
1923) at the core of this ideology. The work of theorists like Stacey (2007), Johnson, Melin 
and Whittington (2003), Samra-Fredericks (2003), Regnér (2003), Maitlis and Lawrence 
(2003), Chia and Holt (2006) and Chia and MacKay (2007) pose refreshingly radical 
challenges to this orthodox approach to strategizing. I deepen my allegiance to Stacey’s 
view of strategizing as a complex responsive process of relating, in which attention is 
shifted to ‘… how intention emerges in local interaction … between people’ (Stacey, 2007: 
450). Yet, I take up the argument that, instead of simply ‘thinking about what we already 
do’ (Stacey, 2007: 270) we cannot but act differently. I note various shifts in my own 
practice, drawing on notions explored in Projects 3 and 4, e.g. intention and intentionality; 
the micro temporal structure of time and micro instances of significance. Finally, I engage 
with the practices of documenting strategies and plans and argue for their role and function 
as important social artifacts in the incomplete, emergent and transformative process of 
social organization. 
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METHODOLOGY1 
INTRODUCTION 
Traditionally research has been conceived as the creation of true, objective knowledge, 
following a scientific method. 
Alvesson & Sköldberg, 2000: 1. 
 
Quantitative Research has its roots in the natural sciences and aims to discover generalizable 
laws aimed at prediction and control as determined from an external, objective position. 
Criticism against this approach to research, specifically as a research methodology in the 
social sciences, gained momentum during the 1960’s, leading to the development of a 
Qualitative approach to research. Although no single definition for Qualitative Research 
exists, authors (Lofland & Lofland, 1984; Berg, 1989; Adler & Adler, 1987 and Myers, 
1997), attempting to define the approach, regularly refer to the method of data collection and 
analysis that focuses on the qualitative essence of the subject (e.g. the meaning, the context 
or the image of reality held by people). Those authors will also acknowledge the subjective 
involvement of the researcher in the research as the researcher attempts to interpret, explain 
and understand the particular social and institutional context of the related incident or 
episode. The approach to research followed by participants in the Doctorate in Management 
Programme can be located broadly in the field of Qualitative Research.  
REFLECTING ON MY EXPERIENCE OF METHODOLOGY 
In embarking on the Doctorate in Management Programme, I understood the approach to 
research to be a process of iterative conversations with various agents (e.g. the learning set 
members, my supervisor/s, other members of the programme and ultimately the evolving text 
itself) around narrative episodes from my own ordinary, everyday experience. In narrating 
                                                 
1 In opting to start this thesis with a reflection on my epistemological and methodological approach to research, 
I hope to save the reader any initial confusion about the nature and logic of the projects that follow. By 
positioning this section upfront, I am not suggesting that I started this thesis with a clearly defined and 
understood approach to research. As with the projects to follow, this section on methodology and the positions I 
arrived at was (in and of itself) a reflexive process that was shaped over the full course of writing the thesis. 
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my experiences of the activities of people (including my own) at a local level, I would 
formulate a research question aimed at interrogating an intriguing but obscured observation 
in the narrative. Through an iterative process of writing, reading and conversing around the 
question and my emerging hypotheses, I will eventually arrive at an argument that would 
postulate a sustainable argument. This process would imply an unashamedly subjective 
account of proceedings, precisely because it is in taking my own experience seriously that I 
should find the strength of my argument. 
 
Central to the research method proposed by Stacey and Griffin (2005), is the reflexivity 
required of the researcher as I narrate an episode in which both the way I am thinking as well 
as the specific traditions of thought in which my way of thinking is located, are made 
explicit. Through iterative reflections on the meaning of the narrative, I will experience 
movement in my thinking as I develop the skill to ‘[pay] attention to the complexity of the 
local, micro interactions [I am] engaged in because it is in these that wider organizational 
patterns emerge.’ (Stacey & Griffin 2005: 24). The authors suggest that through this 
approach to research, the researcher/practitioner engages iteratively with questions pertaining 
to and therefore potentially transformative of identity (Stacey et al, 2005). 
 
In his comments after reading my first draft of my first project, my supervisor responded as 
follows: 
 
What is required now is critical reflection: How do I come to think about the world and my 
professional life in the way that I do? The hope is that through the inquiry, you will discover 
something about yourself and your journey that you did not know before. 
I would say that you need to make yourself more central in your narrative. What I mean is 
that the centre of gravity of the narrative should primarily (but not exclusively) be your 
person – your experiences of things and events.  
Feedback comments from Dr. Farhad Dalal, February 2005. 
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At first glance, these directives appeared sufficiently clear to follow. In practice, the 
suggested approach turned out to be extremely difficult. My struggle is accurately pinpointed 
by the comments made by my supervisor, namely, firstly to critically reflect deeper on 
assumptions and/or conclusions that I would have considered to be either unproblematic or 
already dealt with sufficiently and secondly, to move the focus of my inquiry from 
interpreting the experiences of other people to interpreting my own experiences. 
 
Thus, my initial drafts would reflect assumptions which I left largely unchallenged. As an 
illustration, in the initial drafts of Project 2, I came to an early conclusion that strategy could 
be understood as people’s concern with ‘foresight’ and ‘intentions’ – concepts that I did not 
take up in any meaningful way. Through numerous challenges from learning set and faculty 
members the problematic nature of ‘intentions’ eventually proved to be significant enough to 
warrant a substantial inquiry in Project 3. In this way I can today reflect on my growing 
mindfulness of how problematic generally accepted concepts might be if interrogated 
critically, e.g. cause-and-effect; intentions, mind, society and time.   
 
The second issue was proving to be even more challenging and for two related reasons: One, 
I would on numerous occasions pose conclusions on my observations of people’s experience 
without owning my subjectivity. In other words, I would draw conclusions on what people 
were intending as if they were fact and not merely my opinion. Two, I had great difficulty to 
acknowledge my own experience – e.g. my own contribution, my own approach – in the 
narratives. In keeping with my clinical training and systems thinking background I was 
struggling to not see myself as the objective observer/facilitator, looking on and commenting 
as others engage in the ordinary activities of organizational life. In reflecting on the intensity 
with which a number of the protagonists featuring in the different narratives seem to pursue 
their convictions I could not find a reciprocal intensity with which I would relate my own 
convictions. Through the process of research (inclusive of the iterative conversations with 
learning set members, members of faculty and other participants on the programme) I came 
to acknowledge that I have become numb to my own experience. My reaction to this 
acknowledgement was one of being startled and feeling deeply impeded at the same time. 
Startled, because I have always thought of myself as reflective and serious about my practice; 
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impeded, because, rather abruptly, I recognized the protracted emergence of this pattern 
emanating from almost twenty years of committed application in a specific tradition of 
thinking. I consider this realization as perhaps the single most important factor that 
contributed to a shift, not only in my practice but in how I think about myself, i.e. my 
identity. This shift became evident during the course of Projects 3 and 4 and culminated in an 
important argument I proposed in my final synopsis – the shift in identity from rational, 
formative strategist to that of an absorbed participant.  
LOCATING THIS APPROACH IN EPISTEMOLOGICAL AND 
METHODOLOGICAL TERMS 
How would one then locate this approach to research amongst the various traditions and 
methods referred to in the literature? As a general critique leveled against traditional 
approaches to research, Stacey and Griffin (2005) argue that those approaches ‘largely 
preserve something of the stance of the objective observer’ (Stacey & Griffin, 2005: 2) whilst 
also viewing the object of research as a system. In the next section I aim to reflect briefly on 
some of the philosophical and methodological traditions in research to reflexively locate my 
approach in this field of approaches.  
Epistemology 
To approach the vast domain of literature on research, I will, by drawing on Myers (1997), 
propose a brief overview of some of the key epistemologies (the philosophical assumptions 
about the nature and possibility of knowledge) and associated methods evident in the various 
approaches to research. As a departure point, Myers (1997) suggests three categories of 
research, based on their underlying epistemologies, namely positivist, interpretive and 
critical. 
Positivist Research 
Emanating from positivist philosophy as forwarded by, amongst others, Auguste Comte 
(1798 – 1857), positivist theory holds that all knowledge is ultimately based on sense-
experience. Accordingly, all genuine inquiry is concerned with the description and 
explanation of empirical facts, that is, facts, statements, beliefs and/or theories that originate 
in, are derived from or can be confirmed by sensory observation (Mautner, 1996). Some 
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qualitative approaches to research still adhere to the positivist requirements of data-rich, 
empirical techniques and procedures. Specifically, grounded theory is positioned as an 
inductive methodology aimed at the discovery of theory through a continuous interplay 
between data collection and analysis (Myers, 1997). The inductive approach is specific in 
that researchers will first focus deeply and with much empathy on the data in single cases 
(rather than a nomothetic analysis of many) and then turn to comparative studies with several 
other cases (Alvesson & Sköldberg, 2000).  
Interpretive Research 
The philosophical foundations of interpretive research are hermeneutics and phenomenology. 
Mautner (1996) defines hermeneutics as a theory of interpretation of all bearers of meaning, 
e.g. texts, human action, culture and society in an attempt to understand. By approaching 
research from a hermeneutic stance, researchers enter into a penetrating dialogue with the 
text: attending to, listening to and questioning the text rather than analytically breaking it 
apart as would be the case in grounded theory. This dialogue will continue until the 
researcher finds him-/herself at the ‘edge of something that at worst can be described as 
arbitrariness or wilfulness, but at best succeeds in bringing forth the underlying yet hidden 
problematic of the text’ (Alvesson et al, 2000: 87).  
 
Earlier references to phenomenology can be found in the work of philosophers like Hegel 
(1770 – 1831) and Brentano (1838 – 1917). However, in the twentieth century the term is 
used almost exclusively to refer to the work of Edmund Husserl (1859 – 1938) and his 
attempt to describe our experience directly, independent of its origins, development or 
historical causalities. To overcome the preconceptions of science and common sense, he 
applied different kinds of reduction in an attempt to simply describe the contents of 
consciousness (Mautner, 1996). His ideas were subsequently taken up by philosophers such 
as Merleau-Ponty (Merleau-Ponty, 1945). 
 
Thus, researchers that approach their work from an interpretive stance, attempt to understand 
phenomena through the careful interpretation of the meaning that people assign to those 
phenomena by means of social constructions such as language and shared meanings. The 
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contribution of this tradition to the Complex Responsive Processes of Relating approach 
should be clear although Stacey and Griffin (2005) are at pains to point out that the notion of 
the autonomous individual is prevalent in the work of those philosophers.  
Critical Research 
With their philosophical roots in the Critical Theory of Adorno (1903 – 1969) and 
Horkheimer (1895 – 1973) and the subsequent Critical Social Theory of Habermas (1929 – ), 
critical researchers assume that a rational form of social existence is a task yet to be 
achieved in the quest for human emancipation. Central to this task is the identification and 
suspension of all oppressive and exploitative power relations, resulting in a society based on 
human freedom and responsibility through unconstrained consensus (Mautner, 1996). 
Habermas’ notion of communicative rationality is central to this approach to research, i.e. the 
reflective experience of unifying, unconstrained, argumentative speech/dialogue, resulting in 
statements which are intelligible, honest and sincere, true or correct and in accord with the 
prevailing norms (Alvesson et al, 2000). Habermas’ insistence on consensus and 
understanding to be inherent to communicative action has attracted criticism from 
specifically post-modernists like Lyotard (1924 – 1998) in that this position negates the value 
of dissensus and conflict (Alvesson et al, 2000). 
 
As the critical theorists introduce the notion of radical social change and human 
emancipation from exploitative power relations I am reminded of the emancipatory concerns 
of the exponents of Action Research, specifically in the work of Peter Reason as commented 
on by Stacey and Griffin (2005). References to human emancipation and equitable 
relationships are quite evident in their proposed ideology (Stacey et al, 2005) and they are 
committed to, through Action Research, contribute to the well-being of people and their 
communities.  
Discussion 
My term as a student on the Doctorate in Management program provided me with the luxury 
of a prolonged period during which I could actively ponder and mull over how it is to begin 
to practice from a very different perspective. This perspective appeared to arise from a social 
assimilation of the thoughts and ideas of various authors that I would now consider to 
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represent a personalized ‘tradition of thinking’. This ‘personalized tradition’, however fluid 
and full of potential contradictions it may appear, includes the names of authors and 
‘thinkers’ that I have come to recognize with a gratifying sense of affirmation, as if, in taking 
up their work, I sense the possibility of the confirmation or transformation of meaning I take 
from things. This line of authors and philosophers extends from the likes of Brentano, 
Husserl and Hegel to Merleau-Ponty, Dewey and Joas; from Mead and Elias to Burkitt, Dalal 
and Gergen; from Vygotsky to Bourdieu and Shotter; from Mintzberg, Pettigrew and 
Johnson to Stacey, Griffin, Shaw, Chia, Holt and MacKay. It is then from my evolving 
understanding of the respective contributions from this rather messy mix of thinkers and 
practitioners that I am also considering my approach to research. Thus, I cannot claim to be 
in any way consciously and actively subscribing to any of the epistemological positions 
referred to above, nor that, due to my very recent exposure to these traditions, I am now 
adhering to one type of epistemology rather than to another. What I can claim, however, is 
that, by way of the unique and complex responsive processes of relating that constitute my 
experience and life, I have come to resonate with and consequently assimilated more of some 
of the epistemological approaches to research than with other. 
 
I certainly am not enthusiastically positivist – my skepticism to positivist, data-orientated 
research stems from the multiple assumptions that usually accompany the categorization and 
subsequent analysis of social phenomena, but are rarely acknowledged or sufficiently 
interrogated. In this way, positivist researchers often appear to me to be arbitrarily, wilfully 
and/or naïvely obscuring the trade-offs they are forced to make in order to adhere to the 
principles of nomothetic generalizations. Emanating from this tradition though is the more 
problematic issue of researchers in the social sciences assuming that any piece of credible 
research should axiomatically conclude with the law-like generalizations that are traditionally 
associated with the natural sciences. As MacIntyre (1981) points out, despite the best efforts 
of the social sciences, ‘… the salient fact about those sciences is the absence of the discovery 
of any law-like generalizations whatsoever’ (ibid: 88). 
 
The hermeneutic approach to research does reflect more closely my experience of the past 
three years. From the start of the program, I found the grasping for the possible hidden 
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message, albeit potentially ‘arbitrary and wilful’, of the hermeneutic interpretation so much 
more alluring than the methodical analysis of empirical data. Key to the way in which I 
ultimately found myself questioning and attending to the respective narratives, was the way 
in which both learning set members, supervisors and fellow students prompted me to inquire 
more closely to incidences and assumptions that otherwise might have escaped superficial 
scrutiny. A telling example of those instances is the insight that I was ‘numb to my own 
experience’. Pursuing this insight led me to the shift in my practice that I described as the 
rational, formative strategist becoming an absorbed practitioner. The arguments posed by the 
exponents of phenomenology and their call to describe our experience directly remained a 
constant alert in recognizing the ‘de-humanized’ way in which we have come to think about 
human activities and institutions. 
 
Turning to critical epistemology, I recall instances since my early youth where I reacted 
strongly against inequalities amongst people. Equally, I was attracted to theories and 
processes promising liberating possibilities for people from inter- and intrapersonal 
constraints, hence my interest and subsequent studies in psychology. Do I now aim to, in 
accordance with critical research, contribute in some way to the emancipation of 
(organizational or managerial) communities? Perhaps I do. Perhaps, in my approach to 
research I am attempting to contribute to my own emancipation from positivist management 
and strategy theories. I have also come to recognize and challenge my deep held belief in the 
value of unconstrained dialogue and consensus. The confrontational nature of supervisory 
comments and the prolonged, continuing dissensus that seemed to prevail in some episodes 
during the process of research has however alerted me to the possibility of a different, open-
ended form of emergent dialectic. 
 
Finally, as a congruent reflection on the dominant epistemology prevalent in my work today 
and at the risk of sounding parochial, I have to acknowledge the profound influence of 
thinkers like Stacey (2001, 2007), Griffin (2002), Shaw (2002) and Dalal (1998) as well as 
the work of seminal thinkers like George Herbert Mead (1934) and Norbert Elias (1939) on 
the way I am currently making sense of my approach to research.  Based on their work I 
recognize in my approach an attempt to respond coherently to the principles espoused in the 
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theory and method of complex responsive processes of relating (Stacey & Griffin, 2005). 
Accordingly, it is also in the act of research that I experience (reflexively) mind arising in 
social interaction; individual and social paradoxically forming and being formed by each 
other at the same time and finally, the idealization of the paradoxical nature of human 
interaction – cooperation and conflict, difference and similarity – and the particularization of 
that idealization in the ordinary, local interactions between people. 
Methodology 
Whilst being informed by these epistemologies, the research method adopted by the 
researcher can vary. Accordingly, a researcher that approaches his/her work as a form of case 
study research may do so from a positivist, interpretive or critical point of view. In a series of 
articles reflected in Project 4, Johnson, Melin and Whittington (2003) and their co-
researchers focused their attention on the issue of micro-strategy and strategizing. In 
exploring the ‘detailed processes and practices which constitute the day-to-day activities of 
organization life and which relate to strategic outcomes’ (Johnson et al, 2003: 14), the 
contributors utilized various qualitative methods, amongst others case study research, 
ethnography and action research. As frequently used methods in the course of qualitative 
research endeavours and because of the interest I have in a social perspective on strategizing, 
I will briefly reflect on how these researchers went about their respective projects as 
examples of these three methods. 
Case Study Research  
According to Myers (1997), case study research is an empirical inquiry that investigates a 
contemporary phenomenon within its real-life context, especially when the boundaries 
between phenomenon and context are not clearly evident. In a longitudinal case study of the 
strategizing activities of members of an orchestra, Maitlis and Lawrence (2003) were 
particularly concerned with the way in which organizational politics and discourse may lead 
to a breakdown in strategic processes. The researchers collected data by directly observing 
meetings, interviewing orchestra members as well as conducting extensive documentary 
analysis. The researchers then analyzed the data during three phases: one, the development of 
a story that chronicled the process; two, the analysis of the story during which they attempted 
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to identify possible reasons for the failure of the strategy process and lastly, a highly iterative 
process of working back and forth between the data and the emerging patterns in order to 
arrive at a conceptual framework as the conclusion of the research. In a reflexive turn, not 
observed in the work of the other contributors to this series of publications, the researchers 
acknowledged their theoretical biases as it pertained to, amongst others, strategy, power and 
discourse. 
Ethnography  
Myers (1997) locates the origin of ethnographic research in the discipline of social and 
cultural anthropology. In this field, researchers immerse themselves in the lives of the people 
and communities that they are studying and so spend significant amounts of time in the field. 
Through extensive and detailed note-taking, often in the role of a silent, invisible observer, 
the ethnographer will, through interpretation of his/her data attempt to infer cultural meaning 
from these observations. In her study of a number of strategists going about their interactive 
routines, Samra-Fredericks (2003) combined an ethnographic approach with that of an 
ethnomethodological/conversation analysis approach. (The latter would imply a recording of 
‘talk-in-interaction’ to be meticulously recorded in transcripts down to the ‘uhm’s’ and ‘ah’s’ 
for purposes of ‘fine-grained’ analysis). She focuses her research on the linguistic skills and 
forms of knowledge of the respective strategists she observed in their ‘naturally occurring 
talk-based interaction’ (Samra-Fredericks, 2003: 145).  
Action Research 
Action researchers have two concurrent aims: firstly, to, through the collaborative act of 
research, contribute to the practical concerns of people (usually those collaboratively 
involved in the research itself) and secondly, to enlarge the stock of knowledge amongst the 
community of social scientists (Myers, 1997). Balogun, Huff and Johnson (2003) utilized 
three approaches to work with organizational members as research partners in gathering data. 
These approaches were interactive discussion groups (dialogue-based group level data 
gathering, ranging from group interviews to highly experiential encounter groups), self-
reports (e.g. structured questionnaires and unstructured diaries) and practitioner-led research 
(in which researchers invite practitioners to research their own practices). The researchers 
would then engage their organizational collaborators to collect and interpret the various types 
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of data. By following these approaches, researchers gain access to the formal and informal 
micro instances of organizational life as well as the practitioners’ understanding of their own 
working practices. The researcher’s commitment to collaboration and involvement with the 
organizational members introduces a very different approach to the nature of data, data 
collection and data interpretation than is the case in both traditional ethnography and case 
study research.  
Reflexive Methodology 
The authors referred to in the paragraphs above arrived at interesting and potentially valuable 
insights on the micro-activities of people in the act of strategizing. Also, by introducing novel 
approaches to the field of strategic research, they contribute to a movement in the debate on 
strategy that builds on the earlier work of authors like Mintzberg (1994) and Pettigrew (1973) 
arguing for the recognition of the social and political dimensions of strategizing. 
 
The key difference in approach between these authors and the approach I used over the past 
three years points to a difference in vantage point. In commenting on what they understand to 
be ‘reflexive methodology’, Alvesson and Sköldberg (2000) identify two basic 
characteristics, namely interpretation and reflection. With ‘reflection’ they mean that the 
researcher ‘turns the attention inwards’ (Alvesson et al, 2000: 5) to the researcher him-
/herself, the researcher community, even society in general. Stacey and Griffin (2005) view 
knowledge as emerging and evolving ‘in a history of social interaction’ (ibid: 10). 
Accordingly, a reflexive approach to research then implies to them a methodology that is 
essentially emergent and exploratory while the researcher first reflect on his/her life history 
and then, secondly, engages a broader social reflection in critically locating his/her way of 
making sense in the wider traditions of thought. The extreme sense in which I have applied 
this reflexive approach (in other words the inward turning of attention) during the course of 
the four projects and synopsis stands in sharp contrast to the vantage point of objective 
observer implied by the respective researchers in the paragraphs above. In none of those 
accounts did the researchers acknowledge their own presence and potential influence on or 
their being potentially influenced by the observed parties or events. Although they do attend 
to micro events and in one instance (Maitlis & Lawrence, 2003) acknowledge the effect of 
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their own interests on their observations, they consistently portray these events as the 
empirically observed behaviour of other parties. In other words, by not turning their attention 
to themselves, they never get to acknowledge and explore the potential transformation or 
continuation of their own identity through the process of research. 
CONCLUSION 
Epistemologically, I would then locate my approach to research in the principles espoused by 
the hermeneutic and phenomenological traditions. Concurrent with that position, I will add 
the sociological perspectives offered by Mead (1934) and Elias ([1939] 2000), subsequently 
integrated and expanded upon by Stacey, Griffin and Shaw (2000) as well as Stacey (2001) 
with analogies from the complexity sciences in proposing the radically social and emergent 
perspective known as complex responsive processes of relating. 
 
Methodologically, I have experienced the process of reflexive research (as espoused by both 
Alvesson and Sköldberg [2000] as well as Stacey and Griffin [2005]) as immensely 
enriching. I cannot but recognize the extent to which my approach to my practice has 
changed during this process of interpretation and reflection. 
 
Finally, I will consider the extent to which my work can be considered generalizable, valid 
and reliable. As to the generalizability of the work, I am reminded of Macintyre’s (1981) 
opinion that law-like generalizations are probably misplaced in the social sciences. Drawing 
on Machiavelli, Macintyre (1981) holds the belief that ‘…given the best possible stock of 
generalizations, we may on the day be defeated by an unpredicted and unpredictable counter-
example’ (ibid: 93). Along a similar line Stacey invites us to recognize ‘the uniqueness and 
non-repeatability of experience’ (Stacey, 2003: 415). So if, as social scientists we subscribe 
to the unpredictability of human and social affairs and that no social process can ultimately 
be replicated, then at best, researchers in the social sciences may strive to pose findings with 
probabilistic qualities. Would then the fact that a subjectively selected narrative sit at the 
heart of my findings make them less probable to be of interest to other people? To this I will 
answer that with the narrative I aim to represent the ordinary, local, emergent experiences of 
my life. I am specifically not trying to present the narrative as a grand script within a globally 
important setting. In this way the focus on an ordinary narrative affirms the importance of 
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ordinary, local, emergent human action in the living present. Would my subjective 
assumptions and speculations about what the narrative might point to make it less 
probabilistic? In my view the iterative inquiring and critiquing of the learning set and 
supervisors provide a substantial test for the plausibility of the arguments that I forwarded. 
Would it be possible that the conclusions I arrive at can be of value to practitioners working 
in the field of business strategy? I would expect that such an assessment will be influenced 
more by the quality and originality of my insights than by my approach to research.  
 
In the tradition of research it is usual to inquire to what extent one can consider the research 
to be valid and reliable. I consider research to be a social process, where, through the 
continual gesturing and responding between parties, we are also responding morally to each 
other and by implication to the work. Accordingly, I am challenged (in the joint act of 
iterative interpreting and reflecting with members of my learning set and supervisors) to 
make explicit again and again the assumptions underpinning my observations and arguments 
in the narrative and the reflections on the narrative. But it is not only in the direct interactions 
with those parties that I find myself continually evaluating the validity and truthfulness of the 
research; it is also in the act of narrating and interpreting that I am silently and continually 
negotiating with the generalized other (e.g. my colleagues featuring in the narrative or a 
known and unknown community of strategists) my account and conclusions that should also 
hold ‘true for us’ (Stacey et al, 2005). Therefore, as opposed to the attempts by the authors 
cited above to prove the validity and reliability of their findings by arguing the empirical 
status of their approach and conclusions, I have to rely on the recognizable moral integrity of 
the interpretation and reflection on the narrative. Accordingly, factors that may adversely 
affect the integrity of my work will be a parochial reflection of the events portrayed in the 
narrative, a too narrow theoretical interrogation of my argument and leaving problematic 
assumptions unexplored. It is in this respect that the recurring questioning and critiquing by 
my learning set members and supervisors proved to be indispensable. 
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PROJECT 1: THINKING THE WAY I DO 
FINDING MY VOICE 
I was born into an Afrikaner community, a people that ultimately came to personify the 
worst of racist ideologies – apartheid. These doctrines spilled over me from babyhood, 
leaving me quite oblivious to the hardships endured by the majority of the people sharing 
our country. At that time, to me, differentiation on the basis of race was not only useful, it 
was ordained by God. 
 
The Afrikaner culture was one characterized by a number of deep seated contradictions. 
Cornelius de Kiewiet, a noted historian, described the early Afrikaner thus: ‘Their tenacity 
could degenerate into obstinacy, their power of endurance into resistance to innovation, and 
their self-respect into suspicion of the foreigner and contempt for their inferiors.’(Quoted in 
Giliomee, 2003, p. 34, 35) 
 
Manifestations of these traits were prevalent all around me: family, school, and in 
particular my military training immediately after school. My own response to these 
influences was one of acceptance rather than resistance. I accepted unquestioningly the 
positions expressed by figures of authority.  Specifically, the threat that a black, communist 
regime might pose to a white, Christian South Africa, was not negotiable. Fear of rejection 
silenced the inconsistencies I started to notice between the seemingly loving philosophy of 
the Christian religion and the harsh and brutal treatment of fellow humans. 
 
As my tertiary development took shape, jarring challenges stirred these old discomforts. 
Student friends seemed to have opted differently than I did, choosing to speak out and 
challenge what they deemed to be wrong. In time, my own challenge became clearer, 
namely to systematically come to see and understand the confines of long held 
assumptions. This challenge would hold for all the socialized assumptions I’ve adopted 
over time, from religious, racial, social, psychological, organizational and other and would 
become one of the primary features people (my family, friends and colleagues) would 
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associate with me – a persistent questioning of the prevailing order by finding, assimilating 
and then introducing novel and seemingly more informed perspectives and frameworks. 
 
I was, at the time, enrolled as a student of religion, destined to become a minister of 
religion in the Dutch Reformed Church. Through my pre-graduate studies in psychology, I 
was waking up to alternative views on the world, views that challenged most of my deepest 
assumptions about life. These psychological theories started to rip apart my sheltered world 
view of human behavior as either holy or sinful. Looking back on those early forming years 
before university, I have difficulty recalling any significant influence other than religion 
that shaped the way I thought about the world. People reacted either from a position of 
wanting to serve and please the Christian God or were willfully or involuntarily 
succumbing to temptations generated by the devil. As a result, Pavlov’s theory on 
conditioned reflexes and the role environmental factors play on the formation of 
personality were dramatic interventions on my naïve view of life. Thus, previous religious 
experiences were suddenly demystified and explained via physiological and psychological 
constructs, leaving me extremely doubtful about the experiences and motives that led me to 
embark on a career in religion. 
 
My final examinations during my third year proved to be the final straw. I remember 
working through the texts on personality development as if it was an intriguing novel. I felt 
the intensity with which the theory resonated with my own experience of life, albeit from a 
completely new perspective, and one that was at odds with my religious world view. My 
decision to stop my theological studies was my first real test of conviction. The relational 
implications of what I was doing were perhaps best reflected by my mother’s reaction on 
hearing my intentions to stop my theological studies. She broke down crying and has to this 
day failed to understand what motivated me from turning my back on ‘God’s calling.’ As 
in so many other instances, this reaction represented a primary family pattern that to this 
day continues to influence me in the way I engage or disengage from challenging moments. 
Suffice it to say that, deciding not to continue with my theological studies represented a 
radical break from my hitherto unchallenging nature. In doing this, I was questioning a core 
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set of Afrikaner beliefs and embarking on the beginning of a long trek to finding my own 
voice.  
SEEING DIFFERENTLY 
I left the student town of Stellenbosch rather abruptly and spent the next three years in 
television production. I remember feeling slightly overwhelmed by all the options the 
world suddenly seemed to offer. From all these options, I intended to qualify myself in a 
profession that would make me more money than any preaching job could ever achieve. As 
a result I tried my hand at studying first accounting and as a second attempt, law. Neither of 
those options worked for me. All along, I shied away from furthering my studies in 
psychology despite my passionate encounter with the subject during my pre-graduate years. 
I was convinced that psychologists all eventually turn out to be weird and deranged, mostly 
because psychiatric hospitals seemed to be the dominant, if not only, career choice. It took 
me another year to gain fresh and balanced views on what a career as a psychologist might 
entail.  Relieved, I gave up on the money making idea and, in 1985, went back to 
Stellenbosch to complete an Honors degree in psychology followed by a Masters Program 
in Clinical Psychology. 
 
In many ways, the Rand Afrikaans University’s (RAU) Masters Program in Clinical 
Psychology (1986 to 1987) introduced me to new and exciting ways of understanding 
human behavior, reinforced by the sense of relief and widening of scope I was experiencing 
since pulling out of theology. We were a small group of seven students, being challenged 
by a faculty of very different lecturers to what we were used to. Firstly, experience and 
‘objective’ observation seemed to take precedent over theory, or so it seemed at first. 
Secondly, change seemed to be a very elusive phenomenon, brought about much sooner in 
unexpected, non-linear ways than in following some prescriptive, linear recipe. Thirdly, the 
notion of all things being inter-connected and causality to be a multi-directional 
phenomenon suddenly provided us with powerful new lenses to understand why things 
happened the way they do.  
 
The theoretical foundation of the program comprised works of authors tackling the 
traditional psychiatric disorders from a very different perspective. Practitioners and authors 
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like Paul Watzlawick, John Weakland and Richard Fisch (1974), Mara Palazzoli, Luigi 
Boscolo, Gianfranco Cecchin and Giuliana Prat (1978), Jay Haley (1976) as well as 
Bradford Keeney (1983, 1991) introduced me to perspectives on clinical conditions that 
were certainly more novel, exciting and empowering than anything I expected when I 
initially applied for the program. Up to and including my Honors studies, the psychological 
theories reflected a very traditional, medically inspired view of human behavior. Symptoms 
were treated as intra-personal and the most powerful interventions were derived from the 
rather mechanistically inspired realm of Behavior Therapy. Unable to articulate my 
skepticism at the time, I felt quite disheartened at the prospect of spending my life 
designing Pavlovian type interventions for people trying to eat less, control their anger or 
stop wetting their beds. Now, through the thinking of these authors, things suddenly took 
an unexpected turn for the better.  
 
In his foreword to Watzlawick, Weakland and Fisch’s book, Change, principles of problem 
formation and problem resolution (1974), another great mind, Milton Erikson, reflects on 
how the authors’ work coincides with his own work of ‘…expediting the currents of 
change already seething within the person and the family – but currents that need the 
“unexpected,” the “illogical,” and the “sudden” move to lead them to fruition.’ 
(Watzlawick, Weakland and Fisch, 1974:.ix) The primary shift that these authors, together 
with their close associate, Jay Haley (1976), brought about was the notion that it is possible 
to describe classic psychiatric symptoms (like schizophrenia) as communicative acts which 
have a function within an interpersonal network. Not only did this move the focus of 
therapy to a broader audience (from the identified patient to the family or important others), 
but also immediately introduced the therapist as an active and reciprocal role-player within 
the client’s network. This opened up a new perspective on what was possible in the 
psychotherapeutic situation. 
 
The authors (Watzlawick et al, 1974) positioned their view of therapy as an attempt to 
bring about second order change. Aiming to explain the notion of second order change, or 
‘… change of change …’ (ibid: 11), they developed a complementary view of the Theory 
of Logical Types and (mathematical) Group Theory as the basis of their theory. According 
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to this view, Group Theory provided us with a framework to understand changes that occur 
within a system without the system itself changing, e.g. the different options one exercises 
in a nightmare to escape the prevalent danger, like running away, hiding and so forth. The 
Theory of Logical Types on the other hand, suggested a framework to think, not about what 
goes on inside a logical class (like the nightmare), but rather about the shifts in relationship 
that occur between a member and its class when the member moves from one logical level 
to the next higher, e.g. waking up from the nightmare constitutes a shift to an entirely 
different state or logical level. Change then can be understood as either manifesting as First 
Order Change (changing within a certain class) or Second Order Change (changing from 
one class to the next higher class). Based on this departure point, the authors then 
introduced a number of perspectives on problem formation, e.g. when the solution becomes 
the problem, when people see no problem when there clearly is one and when people see 
solutions where there clearly is none. Leading on from those perspectives, the authors then 
introduced a number of approaches to problem resolution that would aim to bring about 
Second Order Change. Typically, those interventions may appear to be ‘…weird, 
unexpected and uncommonsensical …’ (ibid: 83), especially if the observer of the 
interventions attaches value to first understanding a problem before being able to arrive at a 
solution. The authors allied themselves with the likes of Wittgenstein (1953) in taking a 
strong stand against explanations and their limitations. This approach stood in stark 
contrast with the more rationalist approach of the traditional behaviorists or intra-personal 
disciplines.  
 
Similarly controversial was the work done by the Milan-based team of Mara Palazzoli and 
her colleagues (1978) with young patients diagnosed as schizophrenic. Instead of 
approaching the disorder as intrinsic to the patient, Palazzoli’s team would view the patient 
as part of a family with well-established patterns of interaction. Usually, the identified 
patient’s symptoms would be of strong metaphorical importance to the dilemma the family 
is trying to deal with. By deploying elegant counter-paradoxes to the double-binds imposed 
by the family on itself, sudden changes in the family towards more constructive patterns of 
interaction would emerge. The team was soon able to repeat their successes on a regular 
basis. 
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 Engaging with the work of family therapy theorists like Salvador Minuchin (1974), my 
emerging theory of psychotherapy also started to touch on approaches put forward by 
systemic therapists like Bradford Keeney (1983, 1991). Keeney was, in my view, a true 
anarchist, pushing the boundaries around classical psychotherapy further and further back. 
Illustrative of his radical approach to therapy, was the Zen Diet Koans he introduced as a 
counter to the ‘… common sense attitude of using willpower …’ (Keeney, 1991: 3) to 
combat problematic eating habits. Through these koans, he attempted to combine three 
bodies of knowledge: Japanese management orientations (which accentuated ambiguity, 
riddles and absurdity), cybernetics and systemic therapy, aimed at changing the context of 
one’s action. The koans built on the principle of focusing on what is going on rather than 
trying to understand why something is going on and therefore introduce immediate, radical 
action. The next therapeutic move should be determined only after reflection on the 
outcome of the previous move. Examples of these koans are: 
Take a friend to lunch. Order something you hate to eat, but pretend you’re excited 
to order it. When it arrives, do not eat it at all. Explain that you decided you didn’t 
want it. Give no further explanation. 
Keeney, 1991: 7. 
Prior to a meal, fill a small bowl with warm water. Place it next to your plate and 
place your smallest finger in it. Now eat with your other hand. Try to focus on the 
temperature of the water. Notice when it is no longer warm. 
(Keeney, 1991: 9)  
 
I cannot overemphasize the importance and relevance that these perspectives on human 
behavior had on my life and practice. As novel vantage points, the theories presented me 
with a radically different and to me more appropriate view on human behavior (i.e. my first 
non-religious philosophical framework on why and how change happens). I started to 
develop a systemic view on human behavior and life in general.  What all the authors 
mentioned above had in common was a shift away from understanding intra-personal 
dynamics to changing the interactional patterns between people. Criticism leveled against 
these authors accused them of a fascination with technique and formulas while their 
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insistence on describing individuals only in terms of systems were seen as insensitive 
towards the inner world of the patient’s feelings (Joubert, 1987). 
 
As one of the recent proponents of the emerging systemic approaches to psychotherapy 
during my Masters studies, Bradford Keeney’s (1983) postulation of an eco-systemic 
epistemology encapsulated much of my then held beliefs about life and human behavior. 
Keeney (1983) defines ‘epistemology’ as the science that reflects on the rules that regulate 
cognition. It attempts to specify how organisms know, think and decide. Epistemology 
refers also to both how we know, think and decide as well as what we know, think and 
decide. The systemic foundation of his theory stemmed from Cybernetic Systems Theory 
from which he concluded that living systems self-regulate their behavior through primarily 
negative feedback. At the same time, he argues for an eco-systemic view on human 
systems, implying that health in a system will be represented by a vital balance of diverse 
forms of experience and behavior. This position implies that a healthy, integrated 
individual will not necessarily be free of (pathological) symptoms, because health and 
pathology represents two parts of a cybernetic complementarity. Rather, Keeney challenges 
therapists to look for patterns and sequences of interaction between members of a system as 
a search for the aesthetics of the system rather than the pathology of the system.  
 
The converging theories presented by these authors in combination with the day-to-day 
application opportunities via the Masters program convinced me of the power of this ‘… 
new epistemology … [opening] … new horizons, both theoretical and practical’ (Palazzoli 
et al, 1978: 8). (Admittedly, my Masters studies veered away from classical psycho-
analysis, because the ‘new epistemology’ clearly favored the view that symptoms are 
communicative acts within specific social/inter-relational settings that should be the focus 
of therapeutic interventions, rather than the more traditional intra-personal view.) 
Personally, I considered the acknowledgement of the impact of the social context on 
‘psychiatric disorders’ as particularly valid and useful. Once I started to look at the social 
context and circular causalities at play in patient behavior, the patterns and their (aesthetic) 
functions within the broader ‘system’ became blatantly obvious. Also, the novel 
approaches to change advocated by these authors (illogical, paradoxical, 
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uncommonsensical and unexpected) complimented my instinctive distrust in the rational 
approaches to behavioral change. These new approaches introduced opportunities for 
sudden shifts in behavioral patterns, often without the need for psychiatric medication. 
Today, I consider the shift in approach towards change in human behavior that these 
theorists brought about as extremely important in moving the philosophical debate in 
psychology along from rational, linear modernism to more of a socially constructed post-
modernistic view. Also, the possibility of novelty arising unexpectedly and without the 
expectation of a pre-meditated outcome became an acceptable approach to think about 
change, reflecting notions of current theories on complexity and emergence. Stacey (2003) 
criticizes all forms of systems thinking as requiring a constant re-drawing of the system’s 
boundary by something presumably outside the system. According to Stacey (2003) this 
tactic leaves system practitioners with no other causal explanation than a mystical one.. In 
my practice I rarely experienced this constraint to be an inhibiting factor, primarily because 
the extent of boundary re-drawing rarely extended to the level of mysticism. Also, I never, 
despite my break with formal religion, excluded a mystical, spiritual component from my 
view on causality. Accordingly, I firmly believed in the idea of the enfolded purposes of 
individuals and systems. So, Stacey’s abrupt conclusion that ‘Of course, an appeal to the 
mystical is not an explanation’ (Stacey, 2003, p.169) would have come as quite a surprise 
to me. I consider the mystical a relevant experiential realm with significant qualitative 
effects on my own well-being. 
 
So, while on the one hand I was busy probing and shaping my own understanding of 
human and social dynamics within a systemic, causally interconnected frame of reference, I 
was also starting to engage my friends and family on the implications and insights provided 
by this view of life. 
 
I remember the frustration of, on the one hand, beginning to see fresh and novel causal 
connections between the way people behaved and their immediate environmental or 
relational contexts, but somehow, on the other hand, being unable to clearly and 
convincingly articulate those insights to often skeptical audiences. Nowhere was this truer 
than during my internship year, completed at a psychiatric hospital. My sensitivities to 
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circular causality brought me and my fellow students in constant conflict with the 
hospital’s psychiatrists, who struggled to get to grips with our garbled attempts at showing 
how the psychiatric system might be partially responsible for patients’ relapses or the 
perseverance of symptoms. 
 
Dealing with the psychiatric ‘system’ became a real challenge. One incident in particular 
stands out as representing this personal challenge. I was assigned to a ward with male 
patients that presented with both acute as well as chronic psychiatric conditions. Amongst 
the heavily drugged patients, I happened to be drawn to a man diagnosed as schizophrenic. 
He presented specifically with endless versions of incoherent ‘word salad’, i.e. whilst 
appearing (through body posture and eye contact) to be genuinely intent on relating with 
you, his conversations were utter nonsense; a stringing together of reams and reams of 
unrelated words and concepts. Sitting next to him one day, I patiently waited out one of his 
bombardments. Then, as he paused for a breath, I let loose with my own version of similar 
gibberish that lasted the best part of five minutes – an approach deployed by Milton 
Erikson years before in a similar situation. The patient looked at me, first with complete 
disbelief, and then a smile started to appear. He reached out and shook my hand. Almost 
immediately the incoherence made way for much more constructive interaction. We were 
able to slowly build on this over the next few weeks and started to deal appropriately with 
what turned out to be very adverse personal conditions. I reflected the break-through and 
subsequent progress fully in the therapy journal as well as at the ward meetings held on a 
regular basis. I arrived one morning at the ward only to see, much to my surprise, this 
patient being shipped off to a long term hospital usually reserved for patients with really 
poor prognoses. The psychiatrist of the ward had, unilaterally, decided that, due to the 
diagnosis of schizophrenia and despite the progress made, the patient would be better off in 
a facility with no capacity for individual care. Despite my objections, the psychiatrist 
persisted with her decision and I watched helplessly while the patient got ferried off in an 
ambulance. 
 
I often reflect back on this incident as representing a recurring theme in my life, namely 
situations where I do not agree with events yet choose not to engage powerful people on 
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those differences. I often feel unable to materially affect the situation. In the incident with 
the psychiatrist mentioned above, I felt that I would have to change the whole psychiatric 
‘system’ and also did not trust myself to argue my case constructively with the psychiatrist 
involved. There seem to be two interdependent issues at play here – one, the despondency I 
feel when I bump up against ‘the system’ and two, my uncertainty to deal with situations 
involving potential conflict. 
APPLYING A DIFFERENT VIEW 
Early during my Masters program, I’d made up my mind that I would rather apply the 
clinical perspectives on human behavior and non-linear causality within the corporate 
sector than in a psychotherapeutic setting. My first job was with a bank where my most 
rewarding years were spent in the Organizational Development department. Two episodes 
that I regard as formative in terms of my current thinking are worth mentioning. 
A Development Initiative  
During the early nineties, I was instrumental in conceptualizing a development program 
that aimed to expose and prepare young, promising individuals for some of the demands of 
a ‘new economy’. The program focused on exploring how participants viewed the world 
while also increasing their interpersonal awareness. It alternated between specific inputs 
from an array of experts (including historians, physicists, ecologists, paleontologists, 
traditional African healers and difficult-to-categorize adventurers) and open-ended, 
facilitated, sense making sessions. While leading and facilitating the program, I 
experienced a strong shaping of my own emerging view on how things seem to work. 
Based on the work of authors such as Margaret Wheatley (1994), Jay A. Conger (1994), 
Arie De Geus (1997) and Robert W. Terry (1993), we gradually started to position a 
systemic view of the world as a preferred meta-theory to be socialized with the program’s 
participants. Consequently, participants were exposed to a series of work sessions aimed at 
taking a systems thinking view on an array of typical organizational challenges (e.g. 
problem solving, strategizing, organizational design and planning). The program is still 
running and is proving to be very popular. Through my involvement with the program, I 
seemed to have developed two vantage points on organizational change. 
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Firstly, I became committed to embed a systemic approach to organizational issues 
amongst leaders in the company. This resolve was strengthened by my observations that 
leaders appear to take extremely linear, simplistic views on complex issues and enforcing 
premature answers. From my perspective, more benefit could be gained from thorough, 
collective inquiries towards the nature of the problem or opportunity. I was intrigued by the 
apparent inherent truths that pervaded the writings of systems writers such as Russell 
Ackoff (1994) and Peter Senge (1995). Particularly, Ackoff’s arguments against a linear, 
mechanistic or even organismic view of corporate life substantiated my perception of the 
flaws in the mechanistic way we were thinking about organizations. His application of 
social systems theory in his conceptualization of a democratic corporate (1994), provided 
me with the conceptual proof of the increased adaptability and sustainability of 
organizations adhering to social systemic principles. Also I strongly ascribed to a 
humanistic view of people and therefore felt comforted by the humanistic imperatives put 
forward by these authors. I barely entertained the thought that a social systemic view may 
be only one view of organizational life and was quite appalled when people questioned the 
validity and viability of this view. My exposure to the systems thinking work sessions also 
provided me with practical, graphic frameworks to explore circular causalities in 
organizational dilemmas – a capability that I applied with great enthusiasm. 
 
Reflecting on those days now, I view my early adoption of theories and positions as 
uncritical and superficial. However, with virtually no critical challenges coming from 
management, I was free to apply whatever notions sounded fairly convincing and right. So, 
in the spirit of the Systems Thinking hype that was beginning to span the globe, as well as 
the constructive discussions we could facilitate in applying systemic frameworks, I viewed 
our efforts as admirable and beyond reproach. Still, even then, I was becoming aware of an 
ongoing but unexpressed disappointment with the level of abstraction that usually flowed 
from these systemic enquiries. It frustrated me that the many pragmatic breakthroughs that 
emerged during these discussions, soon got lost in the abstract and aggregated nature of the 
conclusions. For example, the generic conclusions emanating from a work session usually 
failed to reflect the specific and valuable ideas forwarded by individuals during the session. 
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Then, I looked on those frustrations as indicative of my own immaturity in applying the 
systemic concepts and frameworks, rather than looking for flaws in the philosophy itself. 
 
Secondly, I was developing a strong view on the importance of meaningful conversations 
in organizations (if organizations were to evolve to increased levels of sustainability), 
conducted by participants with a growing sense of self awareness. Underpinning the notion 
of meaningful conversations was an array of theoretical influences. Amongst these the 
work of Margaret Wheatley (1994), Herman B. Maynard and Susan E. Mehrtens (1993) 
and Arie de Geus (1997) provided me with key concepts that informed my practice. From 
Wheatley (1994), I adopted three principles pivotal to the prospering of self organizing 
teams, namely the importance of a clear sense of identity and purpose, requisite diverse 
relationships and the free-flow of information. De Geus (1997), reflecting on his 
observations of organizations, abstracted four factors that to him define a company as a 
living system. These factors are, firstly, a company’s ability to learn and adapt within the 
context of a changing environment; secondly, a company’s ability to build a cohesive 
community and identity or persona; thirdly, a company’s awareness of ecology – i.e. its 
ability to build constructive relationships within and outside itself – and lastly, a company’s 
ability to govern its own growth and evolution effectively through conservative approaches 
in both the application of financial resources as well as the distribution of power. In the 
detailed exploration of these factors, De Geus highlights the importance of continuing 
conversations as a central means to achieve sustainability whilst working towards these 
four goals. Also, in Maynard and Mehrtens’ (1993) exploration of a Fourth Wave of 
organizations, further credence was lend to the notion of highly participative, consensus 
seeking and purposeful organizations. These organizations will be led by individuals with a 
heightened sense of self and environmental awareness as well as the courage to ‘… 
recognize the fundamental dishonesty that pervades our lives and businesses …’ (Maynard 
& Mehrtens, 1993, p.161).  
 
To me, a significant indication of the level of self awareness amongst people was the extent 
to which they were committed to live purposeful lives. My own affinity towards the idea of 
individuals living purposeful lives can probably be traced back to my personal convictions 
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around spirituality. At the time, an array of literature emerged around the topic of 
spirituality in the workplace (e.g.  Bolman and Deal, 1995; Conger, et al, 1994). This 
strengthened my belief in the importance of congruence between what the organization and 
what the individual considered to be meaningful and significant. I pursued this ideal – to 
bring about personal and organizational congruence – with great conviction; developing a 
series of exploratory journeys with my colleagues that aimed at focusing individuals on 
their own sense of destiny and self discovery.  
 
Through this work, I became intrigued by how consistently individuals seem to only reflect 
their own struggles and issues or latest discoveries and opinions in conversations that 
require ‘generic truths’. I saw these patterns as proof of individuals consistently working 
towards an often undefined personal and life-long task. As I started to listen to executives 
engaging in discussions in a wide range of contexts, these patterns seemed to grow more 
and more obvious. Subtly or blatantly, we seem to have difficulty moving beyond our own 
world. Regardless of our efforts to veil this subjectivity with all sorts of rational arguments, 
our own agendas sit mockingly exposed for all who care to look. For me, this observation 
remains largely valid although my understanding of the origin of this phenomenon may be 
shifting. Where I used to attribute the origin of personal agendas to a deeper quest for 
meaning and purpose, I am now exploring the ever-emergent social context as the primary, 
non-deterministic source of recurring patterns.  
Bob Terry 
I met Dr. Robert W. Terry during the course of 1996. As a leadership theorist, lecturer and 
opponent to racism, the theme of authenticity, ‘… to be true to ourselves and be true to the 
world …’ (Terry, 1993, p.189), pervaded Terry’s work. His questions to me were often 
disturbing, revealing inconsistencies in me that I consciously or unconsciously refused to 
see. Most tellingly, his probing questions around issues of race exposed some of my 
unconscious assumptions around racial relations in South Africa.  
 
He made his primary theoretical contribution in his book, Authentic Leadership (Terry, 
1993), in which he poses a framework intended to expand leadership’s ability to frame 
issues correctly, that is answer the question: What is really going on? His framework, 
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referred to as ‘The Human Action Wheel of Leadership’ (Terry, 1993, p. 82), is a 
deceptively simple configuration of six categories of human action (Meaning; Mission; 
Power; Structure; Resource and Existence) and the implied relationships among them. The 
simplicity of the model belies the philosophical depth behind them, although it does 
assume a certain deterministic causality and sequence in the way people act and react in 
organizations. Still, by utilizing the framework as a base for inquiry, people are forced to 
step past the formal arguments for action and probe the less obvious and more awkward 
issues usually driving organizational decisions. 
 
Terry introduced me to the Myers-Briggs Type Indicator (MBTI) as a useful tool to apply 
in situations where a greater sense of self awareness amongst team members was indicated. 
Whilst my clinical training made me shy away from such a static categorization of people, I 
found the Jungian perspectives on psychological types, as adapted by the mother and 
daughter team of Katherine Briggs and Isabel Briggs-Myers, disarmingly accurate 
(Pearman & Albritton, 1997). I used to position the respective types as some sort of 
psychological DNA, which would explain how people present from an early age with 
specific preferences that hardly seem to shift throughout their lives. This understanding 
also contributed to my view of individuals sticking to some form of life-long script, closely 
associated with an evolving sense of personal purpose or contribution. In my own practice, 
I found the MBTI useful to allow people to attain comfort around some of their own 
perceived ‘pitfalls’. The benevolent way in which Jung framed and normalized socially 
unpopular preferences (e.g. introversion as reflective, procrastination as open-minded and 
exploratory) stood in stark contrast with the way these trends are usually problematized. In 
my experience people perceive the MBTI usually as quite benevolent and an easy, risk-free 
way of engaging colleagues or partners on individual preferences and idiosyncrasies.  
 
Now however, the MBTI leaves me with an unresolved dilemma, in that the underpinning 
theory suggests a deterministic view on human behavior with the individual paramount. In 
other words, if these are your preferences then you will in all probability, over time, 
regardless of changing contexts, consistently behave within the broad parameters of your 
preference type. My own experience seems to re-affirm this idea that people do present 
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with certain innate consistencies. Before the start of the Doctorate in Management 
program, I resolved this dilemma by viewing both the consistencies in people as well as 
their evolving, changing nature as, paradoxically, co-existing at the same time. Now this 
position seems to constrain the possibility for new and novel behavior, allowing people 
only to act within certain parameters, or put another way, unfold what is already enfolded. 
So, in a round-about way, the MBTI hints at the fundamental question of novelty in an 
often so familiar and repetitive universe. 
 
My days in the organizational development department of my company were rich and 
formative. My experiences left me with very strong convictions about organizations and 
people. I chose to embed those convictions, not because of the theoretical rigor 
underpinning those convictions, but often because, intuitively, the concepts appeared 
exactly right for the challenge at hand. The theoretical contributions that I was exposed to 
during those years, reinforced the systemic world view that took shape during my Masters 
studies. My exposure to Soft Systems methodology and its associated diagrammatic 
approach in depicting dynamic systems, made my commitment to a systemic view of the 
world explicit and categorical. I viewed the importance of socially constructed 
organizational positions (e.g. strategies, roles, business plans, etc.) as paramount and 
doubted the sustainability of positions developed in isolation by leaders or experts. In my 
view, individuals with a heightened sense of self awareness as well as sufficient awareness 
of circular causalities were key to viable organizational practices. It was at those issues that 
I was aiming my efforts as I approached the next junction in my career. 
STRATEGY – AT THE HEART OF THE BEAST 
In time, our organizational development department became more involved in extensive 
strategic work with teams of executives. During 1999, a small number of us were appointed 
to a newly formed unit tasked to facilitate strategic discourse in the company. So, after 
more than 10 years as a psychologist (a professional identity that I consciously held on to), 
I found myself, incredulously, responsible for business strategies. Up to this point in my 
life I never considered myself a business person. In spite of those personal anxieties, 
working with strategy sounded pretty challenging and important, so I rationalized the move 
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to strategy as a way to more fully understand the patterns of interaction within and amongst 
corporate organizations. 
Finding frameworks worth talking about 
On establishing the new department, my colleagues and I had a number of things in 
common. We shared a history of approximately six years during which the nature of our 
organizational development work created a strong emotional and intellectual bond amongst 
ourselves. We were also all registered psychologists with a limited grasp of business issues 
– concepts like market share, profitability and value propositions were not only foreign to 
us, but sounded suspiciously as if people using them were only skirting the real issues. In 
our minds, those ‘real’ issues were related to the way people think through business matters 
and also how they relate to both their own intra-personal as well as inter-personal issues. 
Finally, we also shared a strong preference to enquire into those issues through systemic 
methodologies and frameworks. The decision makers of our company were expecting us to 
collate various expert vantage points (like market and competitor intelligence, economic 
indicators, financial performance trends, etc) into consistent and coherent strategic 
positions for the respective business units. 
 
To get to those positions, we searched strategic theory for frameworks that would engage 
experienced executives in constructive discussions on businesses issues. Two frameworks 
in particular resonated with our systemic preferences: 
 
A. J. Slywotzky and D.J. Morrison (1998) presented a popular framework of sequentially 
and logically connected questions leading to the formulation of an enterprise’s ‘business 
design’ (Slywotzky et al, 1998: 289). The authors argue strongly for businesses to adopt a 
customer centric/profitability driven approach. This shift was exactly what our Executive 
Committee required and so we developed a two day process based largely on ‘the 
Slywotzky-framework’. The sequence of questioning culminated in an understanding of the 
enterprise’s profit model; how the business intends to exert strategic control over its profit 
streams and finally, articulating the key processes that its strategic business design depends 
on. We utilized the framework as not only a way of determining specific positions, but also 
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as the source for the more general, abstracted positions like the Purpose, Vision and 
Mission statements.  
 
As a way of moving from a general understanding of the unit’s competitive position to a 
more operative planning mode, we adopted the Balanced Scorecard (BSC), developed and 
described by Robert Kaplan and David Norton (1996). What particularly intrigued me 
about this approach was the way in which the four measurement perspectives of the BSC 
(namely the Financial, Customer, Internal Process and Learning and Growth Perspectives) 
combined to capture a simple, yet elegant virtuous cycle or engine of growth applicable to 
all organizations. By exploring the causalities between those business priorities on one 
piece of paper, a significant number of managers professed to, for the first time, appreciate 
the now obvious importance of both lead (like people, technology and process) as well as 
lag (like financial results) factors. We were off to a good start in the world of business 
strategy, contributing to my conviction that a solid process, based on thought provoking 
questions, is as important as the numbers, ratios and technical know-how of business 
executives. 
 
When we started, strategy creation was a once-a-year work session of two to three days, 
attended by the executive teams of the various units. Our approach during the sessions was 
highly interactive, yet quite structured. Small groups would engage around specific parts of 
the framework under discussion to then report back to the bigger group. In time, more 
perspectives and frameworks were added until a comprehensive storyboard emerged as the 
official way teams in our company will engage to arrive at a comprehensive strategic 
position. Today, this process incorporates extensive environmental, market, competitor and 
internal performance considerations. We now prefer to engage the respective units on a 
more continuous basis, focusing on specific competitive challenges, of which the 
conclusions may ultimately find their way into the unit’s strategic architecture.  
Reflecting on strategy 
In this way, a dramatic shift in career saw me dabbling with strategy over the past five 
years. Suddenly, my icons shifted from Wheatley (1994), Bolman and Deal (1995) and 
Maynard and Mehrtens (1993) to Slywotzky (1998), Hamel (2000), Porter (1985, 1996) 
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and Collins (2001). By and large, I held their theories in high regard except for a number of 
niggling concerns: 
 
Hamel’s (2000) anarchic hype around innovation sounded close to desperate. I attended 
one of his conferences on innovation in 2000 during which the conference goers could 
interact via a live video feed with a woman who was transforming a benchmark company – 
Enron. Thankfully, she was not responsible for the subsequent demise of that mighty 
corporate, but the incident left me wondering about the validity of the ‘high level’ 
conclusions we draw on companies when the destructive activities of pivotal players can so 
easily destroy that type of monolith. 
 
To me (admittedly with my own conflict and competitive issues) Porter seems to be 
obsessed with the notion of competition. I was all along hoping to hear him, especially 
given his reputation as ‘… the world’s single most important strategist today …’ (Sub-title 
on cover of Porter seminar held in Johannesburg, South Africa in 2000) acknowledges in 
some way the ‘limits to competition’ as so provocatively argued in the book by the same 
name by The Group of Lisbon (1994). In this study, the authors convincingly analyzed the 
consequences of unbridled competition and concluded that, in the context of a complex 
world, the conquering logic of competition will eventually fail as a means to govern the 
planet. 
 
Collins (2001) engaged in a prolific piece of research in an attempt to uncover the magic 
ingredients that make good companies great. Starting out from an initial sample of 1,435 
companies, Collins and his research team eventually ended up with a final group of only 
eleven companies that qualified as ‘great’ based on his stringent list of selection criteria. 
The eleven companies are truly remarkable, having been in existence for at least 25 years 
before making a transition into an industry beating performance streak that would be 
sustained for at least 15 years (Collins, 2001). My concern is that those companies are 
exceptional, they are not the norm. Collins then aggregate the reasons for their successes to 
six factors (Level 5 leadership, first picking the team and then the goal, confronting the 
brutal facts, determining your ‘hedgehog’ concept – a form of competitive sweet spot – a 
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culture of discipline and technological accelerators) and then propose those as a recipe for 
success. To me, it sounds suspiciously simplistic. 
 
Apart from these misgivings, I nevertheless joined in and fueled the debate amongst 
executives on innovation, competitiveness and the sustainability of business performance. I 
experienced an intuitive comfort in those debates; the territory and underlying assumptions 
felt aligned with my key systemic departure points, cultivated since my Masters studies. 
The dissonance was much more subtle and only became pronounced when I started to 
reflect back on the strategic positions and plans of three to four years ago. I tried to 
reconcile those with what actually transpired and also how the latter came about. Despite 
extensive and highly democratic debates on long term strategies and immediate projects to 
progress towards that desired state, things seldom worked out as planned. The multitude of 
projects executives insisted on having, rarely got implemented; scorecards, balanced or 
predictably skewed towards financials, did not shape people’s behavior as anticipated; day-
to-day crises led to executive decisions that often left the strategic aspirations of the 
business compromised and finally, the obvious, rational thing to do, got delayed, side-
tracked or ignored because of political considerations. 
 
All in all, business strategy started to look decidedly messy. Still, I also had to 
acknowledge the progress made, albeit often difficult to pinpoint. Certainly, our business 
performance kept on improving year-on-year. But the important sense of progress seemed 
to me to be more related to the quality of conversations that started to take place; the often 
slow but important resolution of political stalemates; the gradual agreement amongst 
powerful figures on a new approach to the market. I started to feel myself at a lost as to 
what was really going on. Was the official objective of a discussion actually what we were 
aiming for or was the important achievement much more subtle and part of a process with 
no apparent beginning or end? Were the bulky plans and budgets the critical, time bound 
directives they were made out to be or rather all part of an ongoing, complex discourse on 
where we are, where we are attempting to move and what we deem to be important on our 
way there?  
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 Then I joined the Hertfordshire University’s Doctorate in Management program. In what 
was for me an often painful experience, I read on as Stacey (2003) started to rip holes in the 
sanctified space of my systemic view of the world. Right then, I felt gloriously confused, 
but almost manically alert to seeing the world of business anew; stripped of useless 
constructs like ‘long-term’ and ‘high level’ that mostly obscured the significance of small, 
local actions. Soon, I was pushing for a reconsideration of what we considered to be the 
strategic realm of Head Office while coming to better understand the long term significance 
of local activities. I also, albeit clumsily, started to implore colleagues to embrace a more 
comprehensive spectrum of human behavior rather than a simplistic, rational view. 
CONCLUSION 
As I reflected on the theoretical influences that contributed to what I believe and how I 
approach my work, I was also beginning to notice a shift in how I perceived events in my 
organization. As I am writing this now, I am almost painfully aware of the immense 
number of local interactions happening on a daily basis between our staff members and 
clients. With this awareness I am also beginning to understand how impossible, perhaps 
even ludicrous, our Head Office attempts are to exert much influence on how those local 
interactions will emerge. 
 
I mentioned the reservations I now have with the work of authors like Porter (1985, 1996), 
Hamel (2000) and Collins (2001). On reflection, it is the conscious or unconscious audacity 
of those authors to imply that leaders can change how thousands of people behave by 
merely issuing a strategy that I am finding hard to believe. And yet, those were the very 
assumptions that underpinned my practice for the past five years. Having read Stacey’s 
(2003) criticism of systemically inspired approaches to strategy, I still often find his 
arguments harsh and overly pedantic. I will then, during the course of the next Project, 
focus on both Stacey’s critique of those approaches to strategy as well as my own doubts 
and suspicions as a way to accentuate and challenge the shift I am experiencing. 
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PROJECT 2: A CRITICAL REFLECTION ON THE 
ASSUMPTIONS OF STRATEGIC CHOICE THEORY 
 
INTRODUCTION 
My practice is closely linked to the notion of business strategy, having worked for the past 
five years in the strategy department of a financial services company. During those years, my 
understanding of what strategy means and why people do it has changed and appears to keep 
on changing as new vantage points become evident through different events in my life. Most 
notably, first, my exposure to and application of systemic approaches as reflected on in 
Project 1, second, the new perspectives offered by the Doctorate in Management program on 
complex responsive processes of relating and the implications of this perspective on the 
appropriateness of systemic approaches to strategy and third, a sudden introduction of an 
analysis-heavy approach in my department, all contributed to the ongoing evolution of my 
approach to strategy.  
The Research Question 
Starting off on Project 2, I was aware of an intensifying inner debate I was having around 
strategy as a social process. During the past five years I have adopted many of the strategic 
constructs conveyed by leading thinkers in the fields of Strategic Choice theory (e.g. Porter, 
1985, 1996; Johnson and Scholes, 2002; Kaplan and Norton, 1996 and Prahalad and Hamel, 
1990, 1994) as well as Learning Organization theory (e.g. Senge, 1990; Van der Heijden, 
1996 and De Geus, 1997). Often the constructs forwarded by these authors reflect the 
physical or biological heritage of their respective assumptions, e.g. strategic architecture, 
value chains, resources, scorecards, systems, stocks, flows, leverage, re-engineering, 
companies as living organisms, the brains of the organization and so on. (Admittedly, the 
advocates of Learning Organization theory have taken significant strides in viewing 
organizations as social systems (De Geus, 1997; Senge, 1990)). Further analysis, as that done 
by Stacey (2003), reveals still more orthodoxies underpinning these theories, e.g. consistent 
ways of viewing interaction, human beings, methodology and how the respective theories 
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deal with paradox. In applying constructs forwarded by these theorists in my own practice I 
have become puzzled with how unrelated the carefully crafted strategies and plans appeared 
when compared with what people actually did subsequent to formulating those strategies and 
plans. Certainly, if everyone agreed to the carefully analyzed positions as the best possible 
ways to approach business, their actions should then be shaped by those agreements? Then 
why were people not adhering to the logic and discipline of the strategies and plans? 
Something was not adding up. 
 
Through my exposure to the work of Elias (1970, [1939] 2000), Stacey (2000, 2001, 2003, 
2005), Griffin (2000, 2002, 2005) and Shaw (2000, 2002), I have started to speculate about 
the value of viewing the process of strategy as a social process, occurring between people in 
the course of ordinary conversations. Such an enquiry would stand in sharp contrast to the 
more rational, sequential and aggregated descriptions of strategic activity typical of the more 
traditional approaches to strategy. Still, the influence of Strategic Choice theory is obvious in 
my current practice. I was therefore intrigued by Stacey’s (2003) comment that ‘[Strategic 
Choice] theory provides a partial and limited explanation of how organizational life unfolds.’ 
(Stacey, 2003: 81). I had to explore my ‘intuitive’ resonance with this statement against the 
day-to-day realities of my actual practice. Thus, in this project, I aim to engage with the 
question: 
? In what way does Strategic Choice theory not explain the unfolding of organizational life 
sufficiently?  
Stated differently: 
? How do actions, that people will consider to be strategic in nature, arise in social 
processes rather than through the overly macro constructs and rational analyses forwarded 
by Strategic Choice theorists? 
 
In approaching this question my intention is to relate a strategic episode from my recent 
experience at work. My focus in relating this episode will not be on sanitized systemic 
constructs that usually get communicated to staff and the public, e.g. the strategic rationale 
for the change, the defined vision of the desired end-state and the sequential milestones and 
deliverables of the action plan. My focus will rather be on my own recollection of the formal 
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and informal discussions that happened between people as well as my own inner, subjective 
conversations that accompanied my participation and evolving intent during the process. In 
reflecting on this event I will consider how this strategic event is explained by the 
perspectives provided by Strategic Choice theory. (Due to practical constraints, I will limit 
the scope of this inquiry to Strategic Choice theory). I will also engage with perspectives 
provided by the advocates of Complex Responsive Processes of Relating to come to terms 
with the research question.  
 
In order to engage sensibly with the narrative through these theoretical perspectives I will 
first attempt to briefly summarize, in an uncritical fashion, the different approaches to 
strategy as presented by a number of the key proponents of the Strategic Choice and 
Complex Responsive Processes of Relating schools of thought. 
Strategic Choice Theory 
Introduction 
For the Strategic Choice theorist, strategy is all about the choices ‘a company’ makes to 
achieve a superior differentiated position in its market/s of choice relative to that of its 
competitors. According to two key advocates of Strategic Choice theory, Johnson and 
Scholes (2002), strategic choices are made with a corporate, a business or a directional issue 
at stake. Corporate strategy will deal with choices raised by the question: How do corporate 
‘parents’ manage the value created by the respective business units? Business strategy is 
aimed at making decisions around how a specific business unit competes successfully in the 
market while creating shareholder value. Finally, directional strategy concerns itself with the 
internal developments as well as possible opportunities through alliances or acquisitions that 
need to be considered. To test the viability of the decision, factors such as suitability (does 
the option address the circumstances in which the organization operates?), acceptability 
(what is the expected performance outcomes?) and feasibility (could the strategy be made to 
work in practice?) need to be considered. 
 
In the following paragraphs, I will focus on the work of respectively Michael E. Porter (1985, 
1996), regarded by many as one of the most influential authors in this tradition, and C.K. 
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Prahalad and Gary Hamel (1990, 1994), two voices who gained prominence in the 1990’s 
with their contrarian views on some of the initial premises forwarded by Porter.  
Porter 
As one of the foremost authorities in the field of strategy, Porter (1985) links the strategies of 
firms inextricably to competition. To him, ‘Competition determines the appropriateness of a 
firm’s activities …’ (Porter, 1985: 1). Thus, strategy is a response to competitive forces in the 
firm’s industry of choice. 
 
Competitive strategy is the search for a favorable competitive position in an industry, 
the fundamental arena in which competition occurs. 
Porter, 1985: 1. 
Thus, the entire book reflects a recurring assessment of the competitive value of the strategic 
choices companies need to consider. To assist in this understanding in a systematic way, Porter 
introduces the notion of a ‘value chain’: 
 
[A basic tool that] disaggregates a firm into its strategically relevant activities in order 
to understand the behavior of costs and the existing and potential sources of 
differentiation. A firm gains competitive advantage by performing these strategically 
important activities more cheaply or better than its competitors. 
Porter, 1985: 33. 
 
Porter then applies the value chain in this way to consider the competitive options companies 
have with regards cost advantage, differentiation from competitors as well as technology. He 
devotes a substantial part of this work to consider the segmentation of an industry as a basis 
for competitive strategy before exploring the pro’s and con’s of, as well as counter measures 
to, a ‘substitution’ strategy. In the light of the emerging importance of synergies across 
different business units at the time, he next describes the concept of ‘horizontal strategy’ as a 
way to think about and deal with the obstacles to cross business unit collaboration. He 
concludes this book with a section on defensive and offensive competitive strategy. 
Prahalad and Hamel 
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Ten years later, Prahalad and Hamel (1994) start off by acknowledging their indebtedness to 
Porter as they explore strategy as ‘competition for the future’ (Prahalad et al, 1994: xiii). 
Simultaneously, they pay tribute to the work of Henry Mintzberg (1994) in his recognition of 
strategy as ‘always evolutionary and often unpredictable.’ (ibid: xiii). Curiously, they do not 
pursue the notion of unpredictability again as they steadily start to build a realist argument 
for the construction of the future. For them, in this race ‘to get to the future first’ (ibid: 23) 
the required view of strategy is a view that one, attempts to understand the nature of the 
competitive challenge and how it has changed; two, finds the future through learning and 
forgetting, foresight and positioning and comprehensive strategic architecture; three, 
mobilizes the company for the future by providing stretch goals that challenges employees 
while accumulating and leveraging resources; four, gets the company to the future first by 
shaping the future structure of industry, lead the race for core competence leadership, 
compete as a coalition and not as a single entity and finally, maximize the rate of new market 
learning while minimizing the time to global preemption. 
 
To become industry leaders, companies must reinvent their industries through, amongst 
others, thinking differently about competitiveness, strategy and organizations. They continue 
to argue that, instead of focusing on what it is that makes one company more profitable than 
the next (e.g. their competitive advantage and position – the key components of Porter’s 
definition) it is now becoming more important to focus on the ‘why’ some companies are 
more adept at transforming industry structures to their advantage. To uncover this hidden 
cause the authors suggest that previous attempts to understand competitiveness (presumably 
also by Porter) has been too narrow in terms of the time frame considered (three to four years 
instead of ten, fifteen or even twenty years), the unit of analysis employed (competing 
products or service offerings instead of competing firms, top management teams and even 
coalitions of firms) and the competitive arena encompassed (competition for foresight, 
building competencies and shaping industry evolution all happening ‘outside’ traditional 
markets). Finally, the authors uncover the hidden cause of competitiveness as a company’s 
‘genetic code’ (ibid: 279), i.e. how managers of a company ‘… are genetically encoded to 
think …’ (ibid: 280) and suggest a guide to ‘… “gene replacement therapy” for senior 
managers.’ (ibid: 280). This would entail ‘… making industry and company conventions 
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explicit, understanding how those conventions could imperil the firm’s success in the future, 
delving deeply into industry continuities, establishing a process for extending industry 
foresight and working collectively to craft strategic architecture …’ (ibid: 280). 
 
In taking up this position, Prahalad and Hamel introduce an important deviation from the 
Porter position. They contest the primary issue behind competitiveness as not finding a 
unique position in response to the industry, but rather transforming the industry to capitalize 
on the company’s strategic core competencies. They also suggest that Porter’s view of 
industry as the fundamental arena for competition is too narrow. Whilst conceding to the 
Mintzberg position (1994) of the evolving and unpredictable nature of strategy, they are 
however extremely optimistic about companies’ abilities to create selected competencies 
over time periods of ten years and longer. They do not engage with the apparent 
contradiction of unpredictability and emergence on the one hand and on the other hand, being 
quite deterministic about planning what capabilities will be required ten years into the future. 
Their ‘guide to gene replacement therapy’ reflects the influence of Learning Organization 
theorists by alluding to (toxic) mental models. 
Porter’s Response 
Porter subsequently reiterated his initial position. In an article published in 1996, he insists 
that ‘Competitive strategy … means deliberately choosing a different set of activities to 
deliver a unique mix of value.’ (Porter, 1996: 64). He adds that ‘… the essence of strategy … 
is choosing to perform activities differently or to perform different activities than rivals.’ 
(ibid). For Porter, there are essentially three strategic choices companies can make to find a 
unique strategic position; first, choices related to variety-based positioning in which 
companies opt for product or service varieties rather than customer segments (an example 
will be the first incorporation of a digital camera functionality into a cellular phone – 
problem is that competitors usually manage to replicate such a feature rather quickly); 
second, choices related to needs-based positioning  in which companies choose to serve the 
needs of a particular group of customers (the very exclusive services offered to wealthy 
customers through the private banking offerings of banks will be an example) and third, 
access-based positioning in which companies opt for specific configuration of delivery 
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activities in order to grant customers with special access requirements, access to their 
products or services (Banks have introduced novel ways of giving customers living in remote 
areas access to banking facilities, e.g. a ‘portable’ branch that can be erected in a matter of 
days without the usual infrastructural requirements of electricity and water – all these come 
‘built-in’.) By sticking to these three differentiating factors, Porter (1996) challenges 
Prahalad’s and Hamel’s (1994) suggestion that the scope of enquiry into differentiation 
should be broadened beyond mere products, services, customer segments and access issues to 
incorporate capabilities like competing executive teams and coalitions as well as different 
competitive arenas like competition for foresight. Porter (1994) seems to suggest that authors 
should stick to the (his) basics. He continues his argument by claiming that unique and 
sustainable competitive positions arise not from a single choice or activity (which can easily 
be understood by terms such as ‘core competencies’) but rather from the ‘... strategic fit …’ 
(ibid: 73) between various interconnected systems of activity. It would be virtually 
impossible for competitors to replicate the activity systems of companies with strong fit 
among their activities. Apart from the difficulty to copy not only the activities but also the 
unique interconnections between activities, competitors may also be forced into too many 
trade-offs in terms of their own current activities to successfully follow companies with 
strong fit. Still, these systems of activity stem from your primary strategic choices. This then 
seems to be Porter’s counter-proposal as the root cause for competitiveness. He does, 
however mention, that these type of strategic positions ‘… should have a horizon of a decade 
or more …’ (ibid: 74) because continuity ‘… fosters improvements in individual activities 
and the fit across activities, …’ (ibid:74). 
Complex Responsive Processes of Relating 
Transformational Teleology as Foundation 
Stacey, Griffin and Shaw (2000) relate their own growing disillusionment over time with the 
application of systems thinking and cognitivist psychology to explain organizational life 
while also finding analogical resonance with complexity theory. In moving to think about 
organizing (as opposed to an organization as a system) as ‘highly complex ongoing 
processes of people relating to each other’ (Stacey, et al 2000:188), they seek to understand 
organizing or human action from within the causal framework of Transformative Teleology. 
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Stacey (2001) describes ‘teleology’ as ‘concerned with why a particular phenomenon 
becomes what it becomes …the kind of movement into the future that is being assumed … 
the reason for the movement into the future.’ (Stacey, 2001: 162). With ‘Transformative 
Teleology’ Stacey then implies that  
 
[The] movement of human action is toward an unknown future, that is, a future which 
is under perpetual reconstruction by the movement of human action itself. The reason 
for the movement of human action is to express continuity and transformation of 
individual and collective identity and difference at the same time. 
Stacey, 2001: 162 – 163; italics added. 
With this position as foundation, the Complex Responsive Processes theorists make a 
significant shift away from the Strategic Choice position which advocates the future as 
knowable through analysis and foresight. 
The Future Constructed through Ordinary Human Interaction 
Following on from this teleological foundation, Stacey (2001) continues: 
 
[The] process of perpetual construction is one of communicative interaction, in the 
living present, between human bodies and the context they find themselves in. In 
other words, the cause of the movement toward a know-unknown future is the 
detailed, self-organizing process of human interaction as it forms and is formed by 
itself at the same time. 
Ibid: 163; italics added. 
 
Another important difference between Strategic Choice and Complex Responsive Processes 
becomes evident through this statement, namely that of the radical social view of 
organizational life proposed by the latter group. Like other social phenomena, organizational 
life and the future arise through human interaction in a self-organizing and perpetual, 
paradoxical way, where interaction between people patterns the themes that will give shape 
to the future and is shaped at the same time by the very patterns it (the interaction) is 
forming. 
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 If people were to make sense of organizational life from this perspective, they need to: 
 
… [attend] to the ordinary, everyday communicative interacting between people at 
their own local level of interaction in the living present. This is because it is in this 
process that the future is being perpetually constructed as identity and difference. 
Ibid: 163. 
 
In acknowledging the everyday conversational life in organizations as ‘where’ or ’when’ the 
future is being perpetually constructed, the authors (Stacey, Griffin and Shaw, 2000) find the 
complexity sciences useful sources of analogies for human action. It is in the ongoing 
conversations between people that themes arise while at the same time ‘continuously 
reproducing and potentially transforming themselves in the process of bodily interaction 
itself’ (Griffin, 2002: 169). When small fluctuations, often introduced through diverse 
interactions between diverse people, are amplified, novel, discontinuous change emerges as 
new themes patterning the interactions between people. (Stacey, 2001). Implied in focusing 
the attention on the everyday conversational life in organizations, these authors also 
acknowledge the importance of the present as ‘when’ the future is perpetually being 
constructed.  
 
The present is described as living, which means that instead of just being a point that 
separates the past from the future, the present has the temporal structure of 
communicative interaction … Focusing attention in this way on the living present 
places the constructive role of ordinary, everyday communicative interaction between 
people at the center of one’s understanding of how organizations evolve. 
Stacey, 2001: 173; italics added. 
 
This position stands in stark contrast to the negligible way in which the present is being dealt 
with in Strategic Choice literature, compared to those authors’ acute interest in the future. 
The Implications of Understanding Organizations as Complex Responsive Processes of 
Relating 
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Stacey (2003) points to four important implications if organizations are viewed as complex 
responsive processes of relating. One, he suggests a move from thinking about organizations 
in terms of a spatial metaphor (a system with boundaries) to thinking about organizing as a 
temporal process where people are, in their ordinary daily interactions with each other, 
producing further interactions. This shift raises the importance of everyday conversations 
between people as the essential process through which the future is continually constructed. 
Two, the approach requires a radical shift from viewing people as autonomous individuals to 
the fundamental proposition that ‘individuals and groups form and are formed by each other 
simultaneously … there can [then] be no human individual outside of relationship.’ (ibid: 
411). Three, from a methodological perspective, it is impossible for people, like managers, to 
stand outside a process and ‘control them, direct them or even perturb them in an intentional 
direction. All such intentions are gestures made to others in an organization and what 
happens unfolds from the ongoing responses.’ (ibid: 413). Managers, like any other, are 
active (albeit influential) players in a temporal process that holds the potential for continuity 
and spontaneous transformation. Four, the theory emphasizes the importance and 
pervasiveness of paradox as intrinsic to organizational life ‘in that the individual and the 
group are paradoxically formed by and forming each other at the same time.’ (ibid: 413). 
Unlike systems thinking that attempts to dissolve paradox, this theory acknowledges that 
paradox cannot be resolved, but ‘only endlessly transformed.’ (ibid: 414). 
Implications for Thinking about Strategy 
Stacey (2003) concludes that, instead of providing strategy practitioners with a new 
methodology and specific prescriptions, the theory of complex responsive processes of 
relating ‘invites recognition of the uniqueness and non-repeatability of experience’ (ibid: 
415). Thus, it attempts to focus attention differently. He highlights focusing attention on the 
quality of participation, the quality of conversational life, the quality of anxiety, the quality 
of diversity and finally, focusing attention on unpredictability and paradox. Stacey 
concludes: 
 
Strategies emerge, intentions emerge, in the ongoing conversational life of an 
organization and in the ongoing conversations between people in different 
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organizations. Strategic management is the process of actively participating in the 
conversations around important emerging issues. Strategic direction is not set in 
advance but understood in hindsight as it is emerging or after it has emerged. This is 
because small changes can escalate to have enormous consequences, then the 
distinction between what is strategic and what is, say, tactical becomes very 
problematic. The distinction can only be identified after the event. Complex 
responsive processes theory therefore leads to a different conceptualization of 
strategy and strategic management. 
ibid: 423. 
Conclusion 
From these abbreviated perspectives on strategy from respectively Strategic Choice theorists 
and the proponents of Complex Responsive Processes, the contrasting differences in 
approach should be quite clear. The Strategic Choice theorists subscribe fully to being able to 
not only predict the future, but also shape and create ‘systems’, organizations and even 
industries in line with those predictions. In contrast, the Complex Responsive theorists are 
adamant that the future is unpredictable yet at the same time recognizable. They hold that this 
acknowledgement should not prevent anyone from acting with conviction, because acting on 
the ‘basis of one’s own local understanding’ (Stacey, 2003: 421) is sufficient. It is from those 
local interactions that global patterns will emerge. 
 
Next, I will attempt to track my and other role-players’ local interactions as we engaged in 
what I considered an ‘important emerging issue.’ I would hope to, through the narrative, 
return to my earlier question (In what way does Strategic Choice theory not explain the 
unfolding of organizational life sufficiently?) and explore to what extent the two approaches 
explain, challenge or refute what the narrative recounted. 
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THE NARRATIVE: ‘INTEGRATING SALES AND SERVICE’ 
Entering 
I arrived late for a meeting convened at short notice. Beforehand, I was told that the meeting 
will have a bearing on anticipated changes to our Sales and Service environment. I was 
expecting my own role in what was to follow to become clearer during the meeting, as is 
often the case. Based on past experiences, I anticipated that the other members of the meeting 
would have slightly varying expectations from me, some to assist in ‘driving’ the 
implementation of whatever was envisaged, others to assist in still shaping the anticipated 
changes. 
 
At the table, A2 and B were already in deep conversation with their mutual immediate boss, 
C. I have been working closely with A for four years as the strategy consultant assigned to 
his former business unit. We have build up a close relationship even though we tend to differ 
regularly on issues relating to business. My perception of A is that he tends to move first and 
then attempts to deal with the consequences of his actions. On a number of occasions this 
approach has worked well for him – amongst his superiors and colleagues he is considered to 
be a person who gets things done. His close involvement with all parts of his business makes 
him a demanding boss to work for. His subordinates often complain about the ever-growing 
list of problems A would insist requires immediate fixing. This demanding approach and 
constant shifting of focus, whether or not his intention, imbue A’s environment with an 
unremitting sense of pressure. 
 
As a seasoned financial broker with years of sales experience, B has come into his own since 
being asked to head up a new combined unit encompassing all sales personnel. Despite a 
complex set of dependencies with other executives, B has managed to bring sales people 
from various disparate areas together in a highly focused and motivated team that was busy 
delivering on the ambitious sales targets set to them. 
 
                                                 
2 Within a narrative, the same alphabetical letters will designate the same players. However, with each new 
project, letters will be assigned anew to players in order of ‘appearance’. 
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The last member at the table, C, has recently been appointed to our Group Executive 
Committee as both A’s and B’s superior. She worked previously in another division within 
the company, so information about her is still sketchy and anecdotal.  
Background 
The discussion centered on bringing together the two structures currently managed 
respectively by A and B. A’s area of responsibility encompasses all branches, call centers, 
our internet services as well as Automated Teller Machines (ATM’s). Apart from the actual 
technology and infrastructure, this business unit also accounts for approximately 7000 
people, the majority of which are working in the branches in a customer service capacity, e.g. 
teller and enquiry services. B’s area of accountability is for all sales activity in the business. 
The number of people in his business unit amounts to approximately 3000, mostly working 
in either branches or call centers. In the majority of banks today, these two functional areas 
will work together and will also report to the same executive. The anomaly in our operations 
came about in 2001 when a decision by the executives at the time, ruled to ‘split’ the sales 
from the service function in the branch structures. In time, the decision proved to be a costly 
and ineffective one as people working together in branches began to adopt often conflicting 
ways of dealing with customers. In the case of management structures, the ‘split’ left the 
company with duplicated positions in each of the geographical regions.  
 
But now the game has changed. In 2004, the plans around a majority share buy-out in our 
company by a big international company became known. From the outset, delegates from the 
acquiring company made it clear that the sales and service anomaly cannot continue if we 
were to implement the global philosophy of the acquirer. It was clear that this meeting was 
intended to pre-empt the inevitable – integrating the Sales and Service structures before 
being told to do so by a foreign executive. 
The Proposal and my Countering Logic 
As I sat down, A briefly told me what had already been agreed between himself and B. In 
essence, A will take charge of all sales people in addition to his current team. B will establish 
a small, specialist team aimed at enabling the performance of the sales people through sales 
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process enhancements, incentive programs and technological enablers. B appeared, 
uncharacteristically, quite detached and pensive. The agreed approach would see him passing 
accountability for 3000 sales people to A. Over the past year he has proved to be 
exceptionally effective in engaging with these sales people. This new proposal will see him 
lose touch with them and narrow his responsibilities down to a primarily office bound 
position.  
 
Although still unclear about exactly what it was they wanted from me, the account given to 
me by A of their proposal triggered an immediate reaction in me. My first reaction was that 
the proposal is short-sighted and typical of the ‘back-of-a-cigarette-box’ proposals I associate 
with A. If we were now presented with a strategic opportunity to rethink how we will be 
organizing our activity in our delivery operations, I would prefer to also consider the 
strategic opportunities from a technological and structural point of view. Our position of 
market leadership in our delivery operations (e.g. a market leading internet banking offering 
as well as the bank with traditionally the most extensive branch network coverage) was now 
increasingly being challenged by competitors through innovative alternative offerings as well 
as a much more rapid approach to the deployment of branch facilities in remote and 
previously neglected localities. Also, the competitive challenge extends to the technological 
platforms that should support and integrate all the front-end solutions. Those developments 
would require hundred-million dollar investment decisions. Finally, banks were starting to 
enter into various alliances with other players to deliver some of those solutions through 
partnering deals. At the time, those decisions were forwarded in a fragmented way and 
lacked a comprehensive yet clearly articulated and shared intent and rationale. Certainly, by 
spending time understanding the extent of the work required better, we should be able to 
make better use of not only B’s, but also, A’s vast capabilities and experience. Looking at C, 
I surmised that she was still too new in the position to grasp the implications of the suggested 
change. She was not going to question the discretion of the two experienced colleagues. I felt 
I could not let the suggested proposal pass by unchallenged.  
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My Response and A’s Retort 
Consequently, I reacted by saying that the proposal did not sound sustainable for two 
reasons: Firstly, the number of people reporting into A will leave him with little time to think 
about the highly complex infrastructural and technological developments required in modern 
day delivery of banking services. Secondly, given B’s seniority and capabilities, the proposed 
specialist sales enablement function looked like a hastily created fall-back position that will 
soon prove to be very short term focused. I proposed that we should consider the full 
spectrum of delivery challenges that face us, as touched on above. In considering those and 
other factors, I was of the opinion that we would find a more appropriate way of organizing 
the long, medium and short term tasks associated with our delivery operations amongst both 
A and B. 
 
While I was talking, A’s bodily response made it clear that he was losing interest. As soon as 
I stopped talking he commented that it was not the time to try and implement a ten year view 
– we needed to move quickly and so ensure that we do not lose the current sales momentum 
achieved through B’s efforts. I responded that none of what I talked about was due to happen 
in ten years from now – all the mentioned facets of delivery were happening as we spoke 
albeit in a haphazard and disjointed way. A responded with an abrupt remark that what I was 
suggesting was in any case of no concern, because no one was listening to what I have to say 
anyway.  The remark left me stunned. I immediately sat back, feeling insulted and snubbed. 
My interpretation of A’s comment was that he was determined to move quickly on the 
obvious thing – merging structures and moving people around. His remark was clearly aimed 
at stopping any drawn out deliberations on an issue that to him was already settled. As I sat 
back I tried to understand how the idea came about. 
 
By the looks of it, B was feeling quite ambivalent about the proposal – I could sense his 
uncertainty in the way he was still testing other alternatives. Often in similar circumstances, 
A would have taken his cue from D, C’s superior. My relationship with D is open and frank 
even though we do not talk more than two or three times a month. If A was acting on D’s 
instructions, it would be harder to introduce a different proposal at this stage. B tried to 
pursue the argument I fielded, but shortly thereafter sat back and kept quiet. At this point, C 
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joined the debate, backing A’s proposal and effectively bringing an end to the discussion. 
She requested a speedy, one page proposal on the integration effort and adjourned the 
meeting. 
My Internal Conversations after the Meeting 
The initial meeting in C’s office lingered on in my own internal conversations. I was 
intrigued by the origin of A’s proposal – it seemed to have emerged out of nowhere. This was 
often a tell-tale sign of involvement by D. In principle, I have no objection to powerful 
people introducing specific intentions into business; my reaction to the suggestion of an 
intervention by D was therefore interesting. I felt myself reacting against the exclusive nature 
of the proposal – one or possibly two people were included and a host of others (including 
myself) excluded from arguing the appropriateness of the idea. But then, how does intention 
take shape and grow to a commonly shared attitude? Is inclusivity not a pre-requisite? As a 
Strategy Consultant supposedly informed of all strategic movements, I certainly used to think 
so. Thus, I was constantly exasperated by the relentless emergence of new intentions. If, 
however, strategic intentions emerge in the ordinary conversations amongst people and not 
only, if ever, in the carefully orchestrated but often lifeless strategy workshops, then those 
intentions will be shaped and formed (at least initially) behind closed doors, in casual and 
formal conversations, even in an individual’s private reflections on a difficult issue and/or 
through the heavy-handed tactics of powerful people. 
 
Also, the political nature of the proposal was quite obvious. Already, a project had been 
constituted by people working on the proposed buy-out to explore the possible integration of 
our Sales and Service environment. I was appointed to head up the work-stream responsible 
for the ‘Organizational Design and Human Resources.’ During the initial discussion of the 
proposal, A suggested that we keep this piece of work outside the collaboration with the 
acquisition team, clearly a political move to maintain power over the 10 000 people working 
in the Sales and Service divisions. By involving me in the proposal, I was now presented 
with the precarious task of keeping the inseparable separate. The work originating from the 
acquisition deal presented us with a clear strategic reason for the Sales and Service 
integration – the acquiring company adopted a very specific approach to their operations 
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aimed at value creation. Business was driven from a clear intent to optimize long term 
economic profit rather than merely driving huge volumes of sales, regardless of the 
contribution to profitability. To do this effectively, the people in branches and call centers 
have to be managed from an integrated intent, represented by a branch or call center 
scorecard. In this dispensation, a split between the Sales and Service organizations simply 
would not make sense. Thus, initiating the Sales and Service integration from within the 
acquisition project provided us with a compelling rationale for change. Trying to keep it 
separate, not only introduced more political complexity, but also left the work dangling in an 
intention-poor vacuum.  
The Follow-Up Meeting 
C’s request prompted A, B and me to convene an urgent follow-up meeting to discuss what 
was to happen next. At this meeting, we were joined by the general managers reporting to A 
and B respectively – if the integration was going to happen, they would be the first to be 
affected. Also invited were the Human Resource (HR) Managers of the two areas. B and his 
HR Manager came prepared with a document listing the potential responsibilities of the 
proposed new Sales Enablement Unit. The list spanned five pages of activities, all somehow 
related to the support and enablement of our staff’s sales activities. I concluded from the 
document that B had resigned himself to the proposed change and was beginning to create 
some sense of what his future position might hold.  
 
Whilst discussing the document, B’s General Manager mentioned in passing that the staff in 
the branch network had got wind of the proposed change – rumors and speculation were 
beginning to emerge everywhere and he was getting calls from across the country from 
people trying to glean what was going to happen. I was quite shocked to hear this. From past 
experience I knew how quickly rumors of this nature and the resulting uncertainty could 
negatively impact on the ability of people to keep on focusing on their work. Already reports 
in the media were planting the seeds of doubt about our ability to sustain our business 
performance amidst all the anticipated changes. With the high expectations created around 
the deal (reflected in a soaring share price), we were committed to consistently exceed 
market expectations over the following months. With people in the regions already talking 
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about the changes, we were left with little choice but to tackle the situation head-on and in 
record time. The meeting resulted in a number of principle decisions on the nature of the 
changes envisaged as well as possible approaches to bring those changes about. I was tasked 
(together with the two HR Managers) to formulate a more detailed document addressing the 
rationale for the change, principles to adhere to during the change as well as the proposed 
changes themselves. 
Broadening the Conversation 
Shortly after the meeting and the first draft of our document, I was approached by E, a new 
colleague who was leading the acquisition project. E became aware of our initiative and was 
trying to ascertain from me whether the work could be approached from within the broader 
acquisition project. He assured me that he had discussions with A, B and C and that they 
were all comfortable with such an approach. Although this came as a surprise to me, I was 
relieved by this development. It would immediately involve more participants and at the 
same time, create the opportunity to link the sales and service integration work with the 
management approach favored by the acquiring company. A work session was scheduled 
where a comprehensive approach to the Project would be determined. During the work 
session, the full scope of the Project became clearer. A complete new approach to optimizing 
the value of business would accompany the Sales and Service integration. Accordingly, 
work-streams responsible for the application of management techniques like product 
weightings based on value contribution, branch scorecards and a revised target setting 
approach were also established. Then an interesting development became apparent. E was in 
the process of arranging a visit abroad for people to see the intended way of work at the 
acquiring company’s offices first hand. Not only was A invited, but the delegation would 
also include the two general managers reporting to A and B respectively. The two managers 
were, after A and B, the most influential in the two areas of Sales and Service. Consequently 
their commitment to the proposed changes was seen as critical. With the intended trip, E was 
securing his own power base relative to that of A and B as he was now being seen as the 
person holding the key to the ‘new way’ of doing business. A trip abroad also holds a certain 
allure amongst our people and was sure to sway the sentiments of the two managers, 
regardless of the insights the visits to the international locations might bring. Our intentions 
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around sales and service were evolving rapidly through conversations, moves and counter-
moves. 
The Announcement 
The Sales and Service Integration effort was constituted as a formal XXX3 Integration 
project, shortly after the return of the international delegation, subjecting it to external 
auditing scrutiny. As a formal XXX Integration project, several principles and practices 
utilised in the XXX international operations were now also formally included in the local 
project. Specifically, a value based business philosophy and a number of associated practices 
were seen as an integral part of the new designs of the integrated sales and service workforce. 
Concurrent with this initiative, E also suggested an intensive focus on sales production over 
the last quarter of the financial year, aimed at providing immediate proof of the financial 
viability of the deal. To bring about this focus, E proposed a Sales Campaign through which 
our Sales and Service people would share in a lucrative incentive scheme if they were to 
achieve significantly stretched targets. The internal launch of this campaign was planned to 
happen within a month of the initial proposal being made and was to take place at a big 
meeting of regional sales people. 
 
I received a call from one of our general managers shortly after the sales campaign was 
announced to test my views on whether we should not, simultaneously with the launch of the 
campaign, also announce our plans with the integration of Sales and Service. According to 
him, queries amongst staff were escalating daily. I knew that, with rumors and speculations 
on the increase, the campaign event would be overshadowed by those conjectures if we did 
not address the issue in some way. Although this would mean making the announcement 
significantly earlier than we initially planned the risk of delaying it was now beginning to 
overshadow the risk associated with a rushed and therefore possibly incomplete 
announcement. As a result, my project team, responsible for the Human Resource and 
Organizational Design, accelerated our work on role descriptions, geographical 
demarcations, the role and functions of B’s new specialist unit, implications for other 
departments and many more.  
                                                 
3 A pseudonym for the acquiring company 
 66 
 Concurrent with all of this happening, I started to compile a PowerPoint presentation that 
would serve as the anchor communiqué during the event. Starting of with a brief history on 
our current Sales and Service configuration, I then dealt briefly with the rationale for the 
change, crafted a vision of an ideal end-state before pausing to reflect on the XXX concept of 
Value Management. Next, I highlighted the proposed changes as they would manifest in 
geographical demarcations, organizational structures and inter-departmental dependencies. I 
concluded with an abbreviated timeline, specifying what was supposed to happen by when. 
With input from the rest of the Event Design Team, the presentation made its way through 
five iterations. In the end, the presentation reflected a coherent logic, tying together even the 
company’s new vision as well as our aspirations with the proposed changes. The XXX 
approach to Value Management was now positioned as a core principle in the rationale for 
change. Of course, none of the initial conversations and motives was reflected in the official 
communiqué, strengthening the belief that strategic change is an organizational process 
driven by logic and the foresight of executives. 
A CRITIQUE ON STRATEGIC CHOICE THEORY  
Introduction 
In approaching the following critique on Strategic Choice theory, my arguments will be 
strongly shaped by my understanding of a radically social approach to strategy, relying 
heavily on the work of Elias ([1939] 2000), Griffin (2002), Shaw (2002), Dalal (2002) and 
Stacey (2003) in particular. However, as will soon be evident, my critique also exposes first, 
how I continue to adhere to the rational and formative assumptions so evident in Strategic 
Choice theory and second, my associated inability to engage people in such a way that will 
focus our attention differently in our ordinary conversations. 
The Realist Position of Strategic Choice Theorists  
Perhaps the most immediately evident and pervasive characteristic of the deliberations of the 
Strategic Choice theorists is the realist position that they assume. By adopting a realist 
position on business phenomena such as competitive advantage, core competences, the 
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competitive arena and systems of activity, Strategic Choice advocates treat these factors as 
realities that actually exist and not as social constructions by people participating in the day-
to-day activities of organizational life (Stacey, 2003). 
 
When Porter (1996) refers to ‘systems of activities’ or Prahalad and Hamel (1994) to 
‘resource leveraging’ (Prahalad et al, 1994: 157) we must assume that what they refer to will 
in most cases eventually come down to the actions of people. Elias (1970) remarked of these 
‘de-humanizing concepts’ (ibid: 64) that: ‘After all, industrialization ultimately means 
nothing more than that more and more people came to be occupied as entrepreneurs, 
employees and workers’ (Elias, 1970: 64; italics added). Similarly, when Porter (1996), in 
describing the Southwest case study, refers to a component in that ‘system of activity’ as 
‘Lean, highly productive ground crew’ (Porter, 1996: 73) it simply means that a limited 
number of people show up on a daily basis and maintain a high level of productivity, day in 
and day out without fail. The abstract phrase ‘High aircraft utilization’ (Porter, 1996: 73) 
somehow fails to convey the fact that it is the people working on those aircraft (flight 
schedulers, maintenance engineers, pilots, flight crew and others) that should be doing their 
work in such a way that collectively they can keep the aircraft flying more regularly than 
other competing airlines. In a similar vein, Prahalad and Hamel (1994) suggest five 
fundamental ways in which companies can achieve ‘resource leverage’. (ibid: 160). Those 
are, one, concentrating resources on key strategic goals; two, efficiently accumulating 
resources; three, complementing resources of one type with those of another; four, 
conserving resources and five, rapidly recovering resources. Again, not only will each of the 
five ways have to be done by people, but the reference to ‘resources’ often imply ‘human 
resources’ or people. Thus, in this ‘leveraging of resources’, people need to get other people 
to concentrate on strategic goals; stay and not leave in order to accumulate; complement 
other people’s activities and so on. If one treats these component descriptions as realities 
(e.g. systems, resources, activities) that actually exist and not as social constructions by 
people participating in the day-to-day activities of organizational life (Stacey, 2003) one is 
left with the expectation that this ‘variable’ occurs in a consistent (regardless of how people 
show up for the task), stable (as if the described state has been achieved with no continuing 
evolution happening) and therefore predictable way. 
 68 
 The sales and service experience leads me to believe differently. On a personal level, A and 
C might have considered that they were ‘concentrating resources on key strategic goals’ by 
enrolling my own and other people’s services in the Sales and Service effort. What this 
meant for me personally was that I had to now juggle another task in conjunction with three 
other major projects while appearing to be ‘concentrated.’ At the same time, I was 
desperately trying to convince people working with me on the project that they need to scale 
down on their current commitments – a requirement that nobody could fulfill. As a 
‘resource’ that should work in a consistent, stable and predictable way, I had real problems 
‘concentrating.’ 
 
In our initial designs for the project we also assumed a uniformity of responses across 
different components. For example, we envisaged highly collaborative teamwork between 
sales and service in the branches; that this would lead to the generation of more sales leads 
that can then be converted to more sales. As we introduced those designs to the people 
whose, by implication, jobs we were trying to design, we were struck by how particular the 
responses of people to the conceptual design were. It appeared that ‘collaborative teamwork’ 
implied specific shifts in existing power relations that people reacted strongly against. On a 
very practical level, the ‘collaborative teamwork’ would be facilitated by morning team talks 
between the respective sales and service people. But who was going to convene and lead 
those discussions and by implication take up the formal leadership role between respectively 
the current sales and service leaders? This specific dilemma led to continued changes to how 
we were thinking about, amongst others, performance measurements and team 
configurations. By insisting on designing abstract solutions to social situations, we assumed a 
consistent and stable response from approximately one thousand people. Ultimately, the 
‘final design’ was never completed, because the future was going to be perpetually 
constructed through the communicative interaction of people that were, amongst others, 
scattered around the country in hundreds of branches. 
 
The componentized way in which we have become used to describe complex social 
processes like the sales and service organization consistently leads us to assume a 
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homogenous, uniform and predictable response from people which simply never 
materializes.  
A Cognitivist View on People 
Stacey (2003) reflects on what he refers to as a ‘cognitivist’ view of human beings, a view 
held implicitly by Strategic Choice theorists: 
 
It is assumed [by the theories of Strategic Choice] that individuals are essentially 
cybernetic entities. They make representations of a pre-given reality taking the form 
of regularities built up from previous experience and mentally stored in the form of 
sets of rules, or schemas, cognitive maps or mental models. Through experience they 
make more and more accurate representations, more and more reliable cognitive 
maps. This process is essentially one of negative feedback in which discrepancies 
between the cognitive map and external reality are fed back into the map to change it, 
closing the gap between it and reality.  
Stacey, 2003: 77. 
 
In his earlier work, Porter (1985) describes the impediments and their sources that may 
hamper cross business unit ‘interrelationships’, the term he presumably developed in his 
subsequent work as ‘strategic fit’ (Porter, 1996). Amongst these sources of impediments he 
cites ‘managers’ resistance to a perceived or actual loss of autonomy’, ‘incentive systems 
encouraging the formation of outside coalitions’ and ‘problems of communication causing 
business units to perceive sister units as “other companies”’. In doing this, he alludes to the 
political nature of organizational life even if he attributes this phenomenon still to reified 
notions such as ‘business’ and ‘sister’ units. His cognitivist stance on people is reflected in 
his description of those behaviors in terms such as ‘resistance’ and ‘problems’, implying that 
reacting in this way is wrong and must be dealt with by management. He then continues by 
suggesting various ways to facilitate those interrelationships or ‘horizontal organization’ in 
an effort to ‘[strike] a balance … between the vertical and horizontal elements in a 
diversified firm if the potential of interrelationships is to be unleashed’ (Porter, 1985: 394). 
Specifically, he suggests four ways in which to approach ‘horizontal organization’ namely 
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structural organizational devices (e.g. ‘grouping of business units, interdivisional task 
forces), management systems (e.g. planning, control and incentives with a cross unit 
dimension), human resource practices (such as cross-business unit job rotation) and conflict 
resolution processes that cut across business unit lines. In doing this, he assumes the 
cyberneticist position of the manager intervening from outside the system to, through 
negative feedback, create a more stable, consistent and harmonious state. 
 
The interesting correlation between Porter’s account of ‘interrelationships’ and my own 
experience during the Sales and Service episode is how we tolerated the protracted 
negotiation of the shifts in power relations between specifically A and B. However, in our 
design of the new integrated sales and service organization in branches, we assumed similar 
cognitivist and interventionist views by minimizing in our own minds the discomfort and 
anxiety our proposed changes would have on the affected people. In anticipating those 
reactions, we designed a ‘People Change Enablement’ plan through which we hoped to ‘take 
care’ of any ‘resistance to change’. We were then quite taken aback by one or two 
particularly sharp retorts from participants at the announcement event.  
 
In exploring his notion of ‘systems of activities’ and ‘strategic fit’ (Porter, 1996), Porter 
states: ‘[Strategic] Fit locks out imitators by creating a chain that is as strong as its strongest 
link’ (1996:70). In reflecting on the importance of ‘strategic fit’ he seems to base the notion 
of ‘fit’ on a complementarity that is arrived at by rational means. He does allude to 
difficulties that may be experienced ‘… because it requires the integration of decisions and 
actions across many independent subunits’ (ibid: 74).  
 
What my experience points to is that the ‘fit’ we strived towards during the Sales and Service 
integration effort was as much a political as a rational endeavor. Even though there was 
ample rational proof of the potential value that could be gained by integrating the two 
functions we consistently delayed the intervention due to political constraints. B and A’s 
predecessors were at pains to demonstrate how closely they were working together, but no 
one attempted to approach full scale integration. With the XXX deal, the power balances 
suddenly shifted. Highly influential XXX representatives made it clear that a ‘split’ between 
 71 
Sales and Service is ineffective and inefficient. The relative political discomfort of one or 
two senior officials (like B and A) was now less of a deterrent to change than the consequent 
annoyance of the new majority shareholder. 
 
Again, as in the case of the ‘realist’ assumption dealt with above, viewing people and 
‘organizations’ as essentially rational, provides me with only ‘a partial and limited 
explanation of how organizational life unfolds.’ (Stacey, 2003: 81). 
A Humanistic View on People 
Stacey (2003) observes that, when Strategic Choice theorists do acknowledge human 
reactions and influences, they do so from alternatively a cognitivist and/or humanistic point 
of view. When the theory focuses on control, a cognitivist view is preferred while the 
humanistic view is dominant in issues related to leadership, motivation and culture. Prahalad 
and Hamel’s position on strategic intent (as cited below) seems to bear Stacey out on this 
observation. 
 
In tackling the challenge of ‘mobilizing companies for the future’ Prahalad and Hamel 
(1994) concludes that it is often not a company’s access to resources that indicate future 
success, but rather their resourcefulness. This attribute stems from ‘… a deeply felt sense of 
purpose, a broadly shared dream, a truly seductive view of tomorrow’s opportunity’ 
(Prahalad et al, 1994: 128). They continue: 
 
[It is] an ambitious and compelling strategic intent that provides the emotional and 
intellectual energy for the journey. Strategic architecture is the brain; strategic intent 
is the heart. 
Prahalad et al, 1994: 129, italics added. 
 
To get people to do something with commitment and passion, the authors believe the true 
elixir is a strategic intent that conveys a sense of direction, discovery and destiny. They then 
quote examples of strategic statements of intent that seemingly conveyed those messages to 
employees: Boeing’s dream of super-jumbo aircraft, Time Warner’s dream of interactive 
 72 
home entertainment systems, Komatsu’s dream of encircling American-based Caterpillar to 
be the dominant global challenger in earth-moving equipment. 
 
During the Sales and Service initiative, members frequently blamed our temporary faltering 
in progress on the lack of a coherent vision or end-state. This despite the existence of a 
document that contained all the traditional statements – vision, rationale for change, expected 
outcomes, a graphic depiction of the end-state and so on. This apparent gap did however not 
deter people from working diligently and with great passion towards what we at that moment 
came to understand as the most meaningful way to proceed.  
 
Prahalad and Hamel (1994) seem to subscribe to the humanistic view that people ‘… can be 
motivated by providing experiences in which they can experience more of their true selves.’  
(Stacey, 2003: 78). Thus, ‘… strategic intent is as much about the creation of meaning for 
employees as it is about the establishment of direction’ (Prahalad et al, 1994: 134). A 
compelling strategic intent or vision therefore coincides with, emerges from or in some other 
way evokes the personal visions of autonomous individuals on their journey to self-
actualization. This teleological explanation of human action, where the latter can best be 
understood as ‘the pursuit of preconceived goals’ (Joas, 1996: 156) is starkly contrasted by 
Stacey’s (2003) assertion that ‘Intention emerges in self-organizing processes of conversation 
while [paradoxically] at the same time organizing that conversation.’ (ibid: 421). He bases 
this assertion on the fundamental proposition of complex responsive processes theory that 
individuals and groups form and are formed by each other simultaneously in the act of 
conversational relating. 
 
This view provides me with a different perspective on why people seemed committed and 
passionate about the work during the Sales and Service integration initiative in spite of the 
apparent lack of a compelling strategic intent. The conversations between people involved in 
the initiative reflected the anxiety, diversity, unpredictability and thematic quality reflected 
on by Stacey (2003) as he describes the implications of understanding organizations as 
complex responsive processes. People like A, B and the general managers were, while 
shaping the new identities of the new units also busy shaping their own identities. The 
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involvement of influential XXX representatives introduced an often tangible quality of 
diverse subversion and deviance as our employees resisted yet investigated the newly 
introduced ideologies at the same time. The pure scope of impact on so many employees left 
all participants with a sense of personal responsibility that created as much energy as anxiety. 
 
In my view, it was this quality of the conversations emerging from those and other factors 
that kept people engaged and committed amidst ridiculous schedules and crowded agendas. 
The quality of the conversations often approached what Shaw (2002) describes as analogous 
with the phenomenon perceived by scientists exploring the behavior of computer simulated 
complex networks of digital symbols and termed by Langton ‘at the edge of chaos’ (quoted 
in Shaw, 2002: 67).  The term represents the moments during the simulations when ‘the 
patterns produced were neither random nor repetitive, but seemed to combine both 
characteristics simultaneously’. (ibid: 67). Shaw expands on the metaphorical application of 
this term to the process of people interacting: 
 
As a metaphor we can imagine that in free-flowing communicative action, we co-
create qualities of responsiveness between us whereby we experience meaning on the 
move, neither completely frozen into repetitive patterns nor fragmenting and 
dissolving into meaninglessness. … The significance of the past may be recast, a new 
sense of where to go from here materializes, there may be a shift in people’s sense of 
self and in their relations to others, … The patterning of our social identities shifts 
spontaneously. 
Shaw, 2002: 68. 
 
It is in reflecting now on the quality of those interactions during the period – from the 
meeting in C’s office to the arrangements around the announcement event – that I find 
myself concurring with Stacey (2003): ‘The fundamental motivator of human behavior is the 
urge to relate.’ (ibid: 411). It was not a compelling vision but  rather the sense of ‘liveliness, 
fluidity and energy [and] a feeling of grasping at meaning and coherence’ (Stacey, 2001: 
181) that kept people engaged. 
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The Company as a Cybernetic System 
From the narrative it is clear how we all mostly viewed the task at hand as the integration of 
two organizations as systems, basing our decisions on macro interpretations of those 
organizations. Based on those interpretations our plans emphasized how we and others would 
intervene from outside onto observable ‘wholes’, e.g. integrating ‘Sales’ and ‘Service’, 
stripping out the ‘sales force’, putting ‘it’ with A, zipping the ‘branch network’ to area level 
and measuring ‘branches’ on a full balanced scorecard. These assumptions reflect the 
pervasive influence of Strategic Choice theory - by applying this way of thinking to the task 
at hand we considered those de-humanized wholes as the primary units of analysis, often 
reifying those to actual things (Stacey, 2003). 
 
Team members would regularly request a clear picture of the end-state, following which it 
will be easy to then determine the steps to ‘close the gap.’ In arguing this way, they appeared 
to subscribe to the notion of companies as goal-driven, self-regulating systems. Such an 
approach led us to ignore ‘… the richness of human relationships …’ (Stacey, 2003: 77) 
prevalent in the different units and branches. We anticipated people to move to stability, 
consistency and harmony and when this did not happen, blame was apportioned to the 
‘culprits with their own agendas.’ 
What is the Role and Nature of Competition in Strategy? 
As quoted above, Porter (1996) is explicit about competition as the basis of strategy. 
Prahalad and Hamel (1994) also refer to strategy in similar competitive terms, e.g. 
‘competing for the future’ and ‘getting to the future first’. It struck me as peculiar therefore 
when, reflecting on the Sales and Service episode, I realized how seldom we referred to what 
our ‘competition’ was doing or how this effort would enhance or detract from our own 
competitiveness. If strategy is fundamentally about being different from competitors or 
getting to the future first; why were these concerns so absent from our deliberations? This 
then raises the question for me of whether the notion of competition in Strategic Choice 
theory is not over-emphasized while not enough recognition is given to the role played by the 
day-to-day ‘thematic patterning’ of organizational participants in interaction with each other. 
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While, during the Sales and Service intervention, our efforts were then not seen (at least not 
primarily) as a response to the actions of competitors; the realization that ‘it had to be done’ 
seemed to emanate from people’s understanding of the limitations, frustrations and possible 
opportunities within our own operations as they started to engage with each other. While 
participants in the episode might at different times and in different ways have reflected on 
competitor approaches to sales and service, their intentions on what had to be done were 
formed more by the emerging themes arising from their day-to-day interaction with each 
other than with some remote competitor. And even in instances where the actions of other 
players were discussed, the intent was often to emulate what other entities (like XXX) were 
perceived to be doing rather than creating differentiated positions. What was more evident 
then during the episode was what Stacey (2003) refers to when he comments: 
 
Attention is then focused on the thematic patterning of interaction, such as the pattern 
of power relations, the patterns of inclusion and exclusion, the ideological themes 
sustaining them and the feelings of anxiety and shame aroused by shifts in patterns of 
identity. 
Stacey, 2003: 417. 
 
It was in the patterning of power relations, of individual’s responses to perceptions of 
inclusion and exclusion, of new ideological themes emerging between participants like A, B, 
C, the XXX representatives, myself and others that our understanding of what needed to 
happen next, emerged and evolved. 
 
What these observations point towards is that the Strategic Choice interpretation of 
competition as primarily a motivator for companies to seek to differentiate themselves from 
other players in an industry might be too narrow. If we expand our understanding of 
competition to also allow for it to mean a pervasive social phenomenon that manifest in all 
power relations (e.g. in those relations of organizational agents such as A, B, C, D and E) the 
notion of competition becomes more useful. In doing this, the work of sociologist Norbert 
Elias (1970, [1939] 2000) becomes significant as a source of insights into the strategies of 
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organizations as societies (Stacey, 2003). I will refer to two specific instances in which his 
findings contribute to explain my experience during the Sales and Service episode.  
 
In the first instance, my attention is focused on the competition amongst our own agents as 
they compete for control of resources. In this regard, Elias ([1939] 2000) reflects on the role 
and evolution of free competition in the following paragraph: 
 
[Free competition] is a struggle among many for resources not yet monopolized by 
any individual or small group. Each social monopoly is preceded by this kind of free 
elimination contest; each such contest tends towards monopoly. 
As against this phase of free competition, monopoly formation means on one hand the 
closure of direct access to certain resources for increasing numbers of people, and on 
the other a progressive centralization of the control of these resources. 
Elias, [1939] 2000: 274. 
 
The narrated episode can now be understood in competitive terms as, amongst others, the 
struggle between A and B for the monopolized control of a key resource in the company – 
the ten thousand people who interact with our customers as well as those people who work in 
supporting roles to make those customer interactions possible. The stakes were certainly 
high. My suggestion during the initial meeting to re-consider the configuration of C’s 
complete portfolio, introduced a real threat to A’s move – he was going to have none of that, 
hence his sharp retort that left me snubbed and silenced. 
 
In the second instance and also referring to the work of Elias ([1939] 2000), I would like to 
explore the meaning of the term differentiation in the context of its social function. In his 
exploration of the long-term transformations of social structures, Elias ([1939] 2000) 
describes the tendencies towards either increased or decreased differentiation and integration 
as two of the main directions observable in those long-term processes. Specifically, he refers 
to the manner in which the upper, more powerful classes or aristocracy continued to 
introduce increasingly sophisticated behaviors/manners to differentiate themselves from the 
commoners. In response, the commoners kept on emulating those behaviors which in turn 
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drove the aristocrats to further embellishments of their behavior. The interesting notion 
commented on here by Dalal (2002), is that, despite bloody competition amongst the 
aristocracy over territory, the ‘lines of differentiation between people were more “horizontal” 
than “vertical.”’ (Dalal: 2002: 123). In other words, a feeling of likeness would be more 
evident amongst the upper strata of different courts than what would exist vertically within 
one court. He elaborates: 
 
The reason for this level of identification between the courts was the logic of power. 
… Despite the enmity between the courts as they engaged in bloody conflicts over 
territories, they nevertheless saw each other as the same type of person.’  
Dalal, 2002: 123. 
 
In their narrow depiction of ‘competition’, Strategic Choice theorists focus attention on the 
‘bloody conflicts over territories’ whilst neglecting to recognise the mutual 
acknowledgement of similarity that exists amongst peers. By implication, the continuing 
attempts by the major banks to differentiate themselves from each other are in all probability 
exceeded by their respective attempts to remain the same. Simultaneously, new entrants (like, 
second and third tier banks, intermediaries and others) who might be viewing the profitable 
territories reigned by those players with envious eyes, must be kept at bay by continually 
introducing costly, progressive refinements to raise the threshold of inclusion. In this way, 
the ‘court society’ remains intact. 
 
By suggesting a notion of conforming strategies (as opposed to ‘differentiating strategies’) I 
want to uphold the implications of complex responsive processes of relating for strategy as 
proposed by Stacey (2003). In other words, I would still see those strategies emerging in the 
conversations between people. I refer again to Stacey’s (2003) comments quoted above: 
 
Strategies emerge, intentions emerge, in the ongoing conversational life of an 
organization and in the ongoing conversations between people in different 
organizations. Strategic management is the process of actively participating in the 
conversations around important emerging issues. 
Stacey, 2003: 423. 
 78 
 In conclusion, whilst not negating the very real competitive struggles for market ‘territory’ 
between companies, I am suggesting that, from a social perspective, competition, as an 
important emerging issue, is not limited to this arena only. Competition needs to be 
acknowledged as ubiquitous amongst people inside and between different companies.  
Finally, Would Strategic Choice Theorists Consider the Sales and 
Service Episode ‘Strategic’? 
Within the Johnson and Scholes (2002) framework of strategic choices referred to above, 
the Sales and Service Integration initiative would be considered a strategic choice 
concerned with the direction or method to be pursued with an internal development. Porter 
may refer to the episode as creating a specific ‘activity’ or even a ‘system of activity’ which 
should fit strategically with other activities or systems to create a differentiated competitive 
position for the organization. Hamel and Prahalad may consider the sales and service effort 
as a choice around a core competency. So, making radical changes to the way we sell to 
and serve our customers would be considered strategically significant by Strategic Choice 
proponents. 
 
At the same time though, they may argue that we failed to turn this episode into a definitive 
strategic moment, (i.e. an instance where we significantly enhanced our competitive 
position relative to our competitors) because of the way we went about the effort. For 
example, Porter’s criticism may well be that we seemed to be more led by conforming to 
the sales and service activities of other players like XXX than trying to build our own 
unique and differentiated position. Arriving at a unique and differentiated position would 
have been more likely if we systematically considered some or all of the following 
questions: How could we best configure the different components of our sales and service 
value chain within the context of market segments, industry developments and/or 
geographical factors? How were we to gain cost advantage over competitors by 
deliberately controlling cost drivers within the sales and service value chain? Could we 
attain valuable differentiation by leveraging factors such as scale, timing, technological 
advances and/or branch and ATM locations? None of those factors seemed to have been 
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considered, thus making our effort little more than an incremental attempt at optimizing 
two sub-optimal functions (Porter, 1985).  
 
Similarly, Prahalad and Hamel (1994) would comment on first, the absence of a clear 
understanding of the competitive challenges we were trying to address; second, the lack of 
analytical foresight and a derived strategic architecture and third, clearly linked, stretch 
goals that will challenge and compel employees to get to the future first. They would 
conclude that our effort was constrained by being too inward looking, short-term focused 
and too personality driven to transform not only our company but industry itself. Was this 
then a strategic significant episode? Yes. Did we approach it in a strategic way? No. 
 
What is of interest to me here is that this line of arguing closely reflects my own initial 
engagement with A, B and C. Then, I insisted on a more ‘considered approach’ that would 
take the ‘technological advances’ and other competitive opportunities we might capitalize 
on into account. So, I intuitively engaged in that politically loaded conversation from a 
Strategic Choice perspective. The apparent validity of such a stance provided me in my 
own mind with the moral high ground in my struggle against A’s more pragmatic approach 
– an approach that I labeled ‘back-of-a-cigarette-box’ while writing the narrative. Why did 
I think that way; why is it that the rational approach reflected in long term visions and 
logically constructed abstract positions holds such instinctive appeal, making more 
concrete and pragmatic approaches sound obtuse and simple-minded? Even now, as I 
reflect on what I related in the preceding paragraphs as Porter, Prahalad and Hamel’s likely 
critique on our approach, I am aware of feelings of shame – what would strategy experts 
think of us, of me, should they read this account? Surely as a strategy practitioner I should 
have known better and advised or influenced my superiors differently. Or maybe this 
account will expose how backward we are in our company; is it possible that we are the 
exception and that most other companies go about their strategic challenges in a systematic, 
methodical way? Then again, a comprehensive document does exist, crafted in 2003, which 
reflects a comprehensive logic including a full value chain reconfiguration and analysis. 
Still, not once in our conversations did anyone make mention of this positioning paper. So 
even if we engage with the frameworks favored by Strategic Choice theorists, the resultant 
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positions and choices either take two years to germinate and prompt us into acting or they 
do not play a role at all when we do act. 
 
The inner conflict I am experiencing between my own instinctive affinity for the arguments 
posed by Strategic Choice theorists and my own understanding of what actually happened 
during the sales and service episode can be understood in the growing difficulty I have to 
subscribe to the teleological assumptions held by Strategic Choice theorists, highlighted by 
Stacey, Griffin and Shaw (2000) in the following paragraph: 
 
[Mainstream social sciences] regard systems of human action in the same way that 
natural scientists regard systems in nature and apply Formative Teleology to those 
human systems. Like nature, human systems are assumed to change in ways that 
unfold or reveal what is already there, and their futures are therefore knowable. 
However it is also assumed that, like nature, these human systems can be operated 
upon by humans standing outside them and choosing, in accordance with 
Rationalist Teleology, what future they should unfold. By this move, both 
Formative and Rationalist Teleology are applied to human action in a way that 
splits the chooser, governed by Rationalist Teleology, from the chosen, governed by 
Formative Teleology. 
Stacey, Griffin & Shaw, 2000: 184. 
 
My ‘instinctive affinity’ for Strategic Choice theory could then at least be partially explained 
by the sense of control this theory exudes by promising to not only know the future, but also 
persuade others to act in accordance with that knowledge of the future, causing them to 
‘create the future’ in accordance with my/our plans. In understanding organizational life in 
this way, it then makes sense to ‘outthink’ competitors, create futures in which organizations 
and industries get transformed, proactively design and shape value chains and performance 
manage people against stretch goals linked to these plans.  
 
In my exposure to the work of authors like Stacey, Griffin and Shaw (2000), I am beginning 
to understand organizational life differently. As an example, I now find it difficult to not 
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notice the Formative and Rationalist teleological positions evident in the writing of Strategic 
Choice theorists. (Admittedly, this was not as evident to me when I engaged A, B and C in 
that particular discussion.) In adhering to Formative and Rationalist Teleology it is possible 
for authors such as Porter, Prahalad and Hamel to assign ‘ownership’ of significant 
organizational and even industry changes to specific entities and their strategies. For 
example, Porter (1996) comments on Southwest Airlines Company, offering ‘short-haul, 
low-cost, point-to-point service between midsize cities and secondary airports in large cities’ 
(Porter, 1996: 64); Bic Corporation, selling ‘a narrow line of standard, low-priced pens to 
virtually all major customer markets’(ibid: 71) and The Vanguard Group, aligning ‘all 
activity with its low-cost strategy (ibid: 71). Similarly, Prahalad and Hamel (1994) cite the 
accomplishments of Charles Schwab, changing the brokerage and mutual fund industry; 
Apple, creating an entire new industry in personal computers and NEC, exploiting the 
convergence of the computer and communication industries.  
 
In Strategic Choice theory, these references (often elaborated on in lengthy business cases) 
are quite common place and often serve to demonstrate how smart strategies, rationally 
designed and deftly implemented led to dramatic successes in the world of business. What 
these authors fail to acknowledge is that their account of those ‘good strategies’ (Porter, 
1996: 70) are always written in hindsight. This vantage point allows them to assume and then 
embroider on how a (rationally inspired) predetermined, deliberate strategy and plan were 
(formatively inspired) imposed on ‘an organization’ that dutifully executed that plan. Thus: 
 
Early in the 1970’s, NEC articulated a strategic intent to exploit the convergence of 
computing and communications, what it called “C&C.’ … Management adopted an 
appropriate “strategic architecture” summarized by C&C, and then communicated 
its intent to the whole organization and the outside world during the mid-1970’s. 
NEC constituted a “C&C Committee” of top managers to oversee the development of 
core products and core competencies. NEC put in place coordination groups and 
committees that cut across the interests of individual businesses. Consistent with its 
architecture, NEC shifted enormous resources to strengthen its position in 
components and central processors. 
 82 
Prahalad & Hamel, 1990: 80; italics added. 
 
These accounts seldom reflect the emergent quality of how those patterns arose through ‘the 
detailed, self-organizing process of human interaction’ (Stacey, 2001: 163). On the contrary, 
it is difficult to ascertain from Porter’s work that there are any people involved in 
organizations at all – e.g. ‘Such plans are likely to have overlooked the fundamental purpose 
of competitive strategy …’ (Porter, 1985: 25; italics added), ‘The decision by a firm to 
discard …’ (ibid: 180; italics added), ‘A business unit can potentially share any value activity 
with another business unit in the firm, …’ (ibid: 326; italics added).  
 
Subtle clues in these authors’ work do hint that everything is not as rational, easy and simple 
as it might appear. 
 
? Taking into account that Porter (1985) seldom admits to the presence of people in 
organizations, he still devotes a full 100 pages to what he terms ‘horizontal strategy.’ 
Through this concept, he alludes to the difficulty ‘corporate management’ might have in 
‘resolving disputes’ (ibid: 394) amongst business units in a company. He proposes a number 
of mechanisms to deal with those ‘impediments’ to ‘achieve interrelationships,’ another 
rational intervention aimed at shaping the organization in line with the desired executive 
intent. 
 
? Prahalad and Hamel (1994) observe four years after their initial citing of NEC’s “C&C” 
strategy that ‘the idea of exploiting the convergence between the two industries wove 
together the thoughts of many minds in NEC’ (ibid: 77). Exactly what this ‘weaving together’ 
implies and how it came about is not attended to by the authors. My personal experience 
points to this type of weaving to be often inordinately difficult, especially if ‘the idea’ 
implies huge risks, the shifting of ‘enormous resources’ and other political challenges. 
 
? Little wonder then, that the rather condensed account of NEC’s strategic sojourn with its 
apparent clear, sequential logic, covered a period from ‘Early in the 1970’s’ (ibid: 80) to 
1988 – a period of almost twenty years.  
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 This made me wonder about the nature and extent of the concealed ‘detailed, self-organizing 
process of human interaction’ that took place over lengthy periods implied in the respective 
business cases. Certainly, the convergence of computing and communications in NEC’s 
strategy, the amazing and continuing success of the Bic low-cost pen and the ingenious trade-
offs, associated risks and sensitive dependencies that underpins Southwest’s low-cost 
strategy did not simply appear in someone’s mind one day, was articulated and then 
communicated to everyone in the organization who then happily proceeded to implement it. 
Rather, those themes probably emerged over time, patterning the interaction between people 
in various localities inside and outside the respective organizations, whilst being shaped at 
the same time. 
 
The issue that I am pointing to is that Strategic Choice theorists attend to themes that 
emerged over substantial periods of times as if those themes were known and decided on as 
deliberate strategies in the minds of rational people, standing ‘outside’ an organization, 
imposing those known and deliberate strategies on the people of that organization, who then 
dutifully adhered to and executed the plan. Strategic Choice theorists accomplish this by, in 
hindsight, proposing a highly condensed, rational, aggregated, de-humanized (Elias, 1970) 
narrative with simplistic causal explanations of how one thing led to another thing. (The 
PowerPoint presentation I crafted is a case in point.)These versions of what happened 
provide everyone with a clear sense of the value of rational strategies and how to go about 
doing the same thing in other organizations. In doing this, Strategic Choice theorists distract 
attention from the importance of often protracted, often irrational, context specific, utterly 
human, iterative patterns of interaction through which, over time, potentially transforming, 
potentially continuous themes emerge. 
 
To be able to depict rational, formative approaches to organizational change as plausible and 
valid, Strategic Choice theorists make a subtle, but in my view flawed shift from drawing 
aggregated, rational conclusions in hindsight to suggesting that aggregated, rational concepts 
based on foresight are key to the formative unfolding of the future. In doing this, they show a 
disregard for the complex social processes through which people in organizations engage 
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with important emerging issues, some of which may in time ‘give rise to changes and 
patterns that no individual person has planned or created’ (Elias, [1939] 2000: 366). In 
thinking about strategy in this way, strategy practitioners confuse the informative but limited 
value of analytical forecasts (e.g. expected market growth, anticipated financial growth 
requirements, etc.) with the complex social choices people in companies should make around 
what to do next in order to sustain that company’s survival over time. 
CONCLUSION 
In this project I have attempted to reflect critically on how the assumptions underpinning 
Strategic Choice theory, specifically the Rationalist and Formative teleological assumptions 
evident in this theory, lead to insufficient explanations of what is really happening when 
people engage in activities of strategic importance. I pointed to how my experience during a 
particular episode seemed to corroborate much of the criticism leveled at Strategic Choice 
theory by Stacey (2003). In this regard, the realist positions, the cognitivist and humanistic 
views on people as well as the view of companies as cybernetic systems were not only 
evident in my own and other colleagues’ approach to the specific episode, but also led us 
consistently to unexpected results. 
 
I then focused on one of the cornerstones of Strategic Choice theory, namely competition. In 
engaging with the notion I concluded that, because of their fixation on competitors and the 
need to be different and/or to win, Strategic Choice theorists deal too narrowly with the 
notion of competition. By reflecting on the work of Elias (1970; [1939] 2000), Dalal (2002) 
and Stacey (2003) interesting and rich perspectives on the pervasiveness of competition open 
up that lead to more appropriate ways to understand and engage with other potentially 
competing, potentially colluding organizational participants during episodes of significant 
change. 
 
Finally, I attempted to demonstrate how Strategic Choice theorists simply attend to the 
aggregated, rational explanations of a company’s story over time, by implication concealing 
the complex processes of human communicative interaction that gave rise to any 
recognizable themes. Simultaneously, Strategic Choice theorists create the illusion that, by 
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thinking rationally and in aggregated terms about the future, the future can also be 
formatively unfolded. 
 
Stacey (2003) concludes that Strategic Choice theory ‘provides powerful explanations of and 
prescriptions for, the predictable, repetitive aspects of organizational life over short time 
frames into the future.’ (Stacey, 2003: 81). My work on the project has, to my mind, 
sufficiently demonstrated the shortcomings of Strategic Choice theory during an episode with 
high interpersonal volatility. 
 
However, I am also left with a sense of incompleteness, as if more needs to be said. Stacey’s 
(2003) arguments against the rational and formative assumptions of Strategic Choice 
theorists also triggered in me reactions of difference. In the next project I aim to critically 
reflect on some of the key dissonances with Stacey’s arguments that I am beginning to 
register.
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PROJECT 3: WHAT STRATEGISTS SEEM TO DO 
 
INTRODUCTION 
In Project 2, my critique of Strategic Choice theory was not only a way for me to articulate 
what I believe the practice of strategy is not, but also a difficult personal exploration of 
why people find conversations about strategy useful at all.  
 
Through the project, I attempted to metabolize the thinking of Strategic Choice theorists in 
order to make how I am thinking differently, more pronounced. I ended up with a number 
of observations; three of which I felt were of specific importance to me: 
 
The first of these was the conclusion that the ‘Strategic Choice interpretation of 
competition as primarily a motivator for companies to seek to differentiate themselves from 
other players in an industry might be too narrow.’ Rather, competition, as a factor that 
shapes which options people in companies exercise, should be recognized as ‘a pervasive 
social phenomenon that manifest in all power relations’ specifically those amongst 
colleagues working in the same organization.  
 
The second observation was that, instead of ‘companies differentiating themselves from 
other companies’, what people consistently try to do is to emulate what they think people in 
other companies are doing. ‘By implication, the continuing attempts by [competing 
companies] to differentiate themselves from each other are in all probability exceeded by 
their respective attempts to remain the same.’  
 
The third observation was that ‘Strategic Choice theorists make a subtle, but in my view 
flawed shift from drawing aggregated, rational conclusions in hindsight to suggesting that 
aggregated, rational projections based on those retrospective conclusions should be 
understood as foresight. This perspective is then assumed as not only sufficient but also as 
key to formatively unfold the future in a predictable way.’  
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What I am pointing to through these observations is not only the limiting and often flawed 
assumptions of Strategic Choice theorists, but also the need to enhance and deepen the 
articulation of the view of strategizing as an emergent social conversation amongst people 
in organizations.  
THE RESEARCH QUESTION 
In my own organization, the supremacy of Strategic Choice theoretical assumptions is 
currently reinforced by the introduction of various practices by influential people. This is 
not a conscious ‘tactic’ on their part – the principles of Strategic Choice theory are largely 
uncritically assumed as how the world of business works. Thus, conversations that I am 
involved in on a day to day basis are conducted from these assumptions and any 
introduction of concepts that allow for more than the rational and formative are treated with 
relative skepticism. 
 
One implication of this factor is that I have difficulty assimilating the vantage points 
presented by the complex responsive processes of relating theorists; my participation in the 
dominant Strategic Choice discourse at work often leaves me highly frustrated and anxious 
for not being able to meaningfully introduce a different way of talking about what we are 
doing. It follows then that, in my own practice, I am still finding it extremely difficult to 
avoid the very pitfalls I described in Project 2. I am constantly involved in discussions 
about what we should be doing next and/or what we ought to be doing in order to be better 
at what we do. It is when I engage in those discussions that I find the allure of a perceived 
end-state and the means-end arguments we use to then plan our actions to ‘close the gap’, 
particularly persuasive in the way we talk about our work. 
 
In Project 2 I reflected on Stacey’s (2001) countering argument to this rational, formative 
ideology:  
[The] movement of human action is toward an unknown future, that is, a future 
which is under perpetual reconstruction by the movement of human action itself 
Stacey, 2001: 162 – 163; italics added. 
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Also: 
Strategic direction is not set in advance but understood in hindsight as it is 
emerging or after it has emerged. This is because small changes can escalate to have 
enormous consequences, … 
Stacey, 2003: 423. 
 
And finally: 
Why do people prepare long-term forecasts if it is impossible to make useful long-
term forecasts? Why do they adopt investment-appraisal methods that require 
detailed quantitative forecasts over long time periods? Complexity theory suggests 
that it is impossible to make such forecasts so why do people carry on doing it? 
Stacey, 2003: 421. 
 
Right now statements like these stir up a multitude of questions within me. I am struggling 
to reconcile them with my day-to-day experience with colleagues as we think and act 
around issues affecting what we think should happen next. It is specifically Stacey’s 
statement ‘Strategic direction is not set in advance but understood in hindsight …’ (Stacey, 
2003: 423) that I would like to take up in more detail. What is implied by ‘strategic 
direction’? What does ‘not set in advance’ mean? Can ‘direction’ ever be ‘understood in 
hindsight’? Would it be acceptable for Stacey to express our ‘intention’ in advance? How 
would that be different from ‘[setting] direction’? Does Stacey take issue with attempts to 
predict the ‘unknown’ future or does his discomfort lie with the reified connotations arising 
around words like ‘direction’ and ‘setting’. From his immediate explanation (‘… because 
small changes can escalate to have enormous consequences’) it would appear to be the 
former. In other words, engaging in attempts at foresight has limited value. Still, as humans 
we have difficulty not thinking about what we fear or would like to happen as a way of 
directing our present actions. Mead (1934) is of the opinion that it is this characteristic, 
namely ‘the control of present behavior in terms of its future consequences, or in terms of 
future behavior; …’ (ibid: 118) that differentiates human from non-human intelligence. 
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When … we speak of reflective conduct we very definitely refer to the presence of 
the future in terms of ideas. The intelligent man as distinguished from the intelligent 
animal presents to himself what is going to happen. 
Mead, 1934: 119. 
 
Based then on these apparent conflicting positions I would form the initial assumption that 
how we think and talk about the future (whether in our own silent, inner conversations or 
when we engage with colleagues around important emerging issues at work) should be 
further explored specifically within the context of our understanding of strategy as an 
emergent, social process. 
 
Therefore, in this project I aim to turn my attention to the theory of complex responsive 
processes of relating and consider critically some of the principles espoused by Stacey 
(2003) on strategy. My research question therefore is:  
? In which ways do we sensibly and/or not so sensibly bring the future into play when we 
are busy strategizing? 
 
THE CONTEXTUAL SETTING 
During 2005, XXX purchased a majority share in the company that I am working for. The 
finalization of the deal and the initial integration priorities to demonstrate the viability of 
the transaction occupied substantial numbers of people for the best part of the year. A part 
of the initial activities involved the re-shuffling of our Group Executive Committee to 
accommodate the agreed quota of XXX Executives. This move brought about a significant 
movement of executives between portfolios, not only in the Executive Committee but also 
amongst executives reporting to them. It was only towards the end of 2005 that most of the 
organizational shuffling had been formalized and people seemed to start to settle down into 
what for many were new positions, roles and responsibilities. 
 
I work in a division referred to as the retail operations. In this part of the business we aim 
to serve the financial needs of a wide spectrum of individual customers – from the very 
poor to the average salary earner to the extremely rich – through as wide a range of 
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products and services. Our approximately seven million customers are served through 
comprehensive branch, internet, telephone and Automatic Teller Machine networks. As a 
way of understanding how best to organize the activities of the retail operations’ 
approximately 13000 staff members, we have developed a set of principles, relative roles 
and responsibilities through which we hope to see people act in ways that will support our 
broad strategic intent. We have come to refer to this set of principles, roles and 
responsibilities as our Operating Model and Governance Principles. 
 
In recent years, the financial services sector has become a highly contested market, not 
only amongst the few big, local players, but increasingly by smaller, niche players as well 
as retail companies, offering their customers the convenience of drawing or saving money 
while buying their groceries. Simultaneously, governmental interventions to make banking 
accessible to people that were traditionally excluded from receiving banking services, have 
increased significantly, imposing new rules with very real investment and pricing 
consequences on the banks. The country’s economy has also benefited from the positive 
trading conditions over the past five years and businesses in the retail sector in particular 
are experiencing positive growth. Therefore, there are specific expectations on the people 
heading up our retail operations to ensure the company benefits as much as possible from 
the current economic conditions. 
 
Accordingly people working in the retail operations are occupying themselves on a day-to-
day basis with a wide variety of tasks as they feverishly attempt to live up to these 
expectations. Some of these tasks relate to what have become the fashionable topics in the 
industry; some are inspired by the XXX deal while still other tasks relate to the formalizing 
of recent role changes amongst various role players and their units within the business. 
Many people with varied histories and organizational standings engage each other daily 
around those and other tasks, interests, hope and fears.  
 
This is the organizational context in which I work. It is then also within this context that I 
am considering the apparent conflicting positions by Stacey (the impossibility of useful 
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forecasts) and Mead (the intelligent man presenting to himself what is going to happen) and 
what that would imply for the way in which I engage others around strategy. 
KEY THEORETICAL CONSTRUCTS 
In engaging with this project I will assume that I have sufficiently demonstrated in Project 
2 that I do not consciously subscribe to the notion of foresight as applied by strategic 
choice theorists. Specifically, my observation that these theorists ‘make a subtle, but in my 
view flawed shift from drawing aggregated, rational conclusions in hindsight to suggesting 
that aggregated, rational projections of those retrospective conclusions should be 
understood as foresight’ should indicate that the debate I am entering into is not about 
critiquing the inappropriateness of linear attempts at predictive foresight. What I am 
attempting to understand is how and why people call on their sensing of the future in their 
attempts to grapple with what to do next and engaging others and themselves in reflexive 
conversations around strategy or in the words of Stacey (2003), important emerging issues. 
The Time Structure of the Living Present 
By implication, I will attend to the notion of the future from ‘the time structure of a living 
present’ (Shaw, 2002) as expressed by Hegel, taken up by, amongst others, Mead (1934) 
and Shotter (1994) and expanded upon by Stacey, Griffin and Shaw (2000), Stacey (2001) 
and Griffin (2002). 
 
Stacey et al (2000) reflected on the paradoxical nature of the time structure of action where: 
… the future is changing the past just as the past is changing the future. In terms of 
meaning the future changes the past and the past changes the future and meaning 
lies not at a single point in the present but in the circular process of the present in 
which there is the potential for transformation as well as repetition. 
Stacey, et al, 2000: 35. 
 
To come to grips with the circular, paradoxical nature of this time structure, one might 
think of a micro-temporal structure of the present (as opposed to a macro-temporal 
structure flowing linearly from past to present to future) where this present has, almost 
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fractal like, a micro-past, a micro-present and a micro-future. This micro-temporal structure 
is the gesture and the response the gesture calls forth, taken together. 
 
The here-and-now, then, has a circular temporal structure because the gesture takes 
its meaning from the response (micro-future) which only has meaning in relation to 
the gesture (the micro-past), and the response in turn acts back to potentially change 
the gesture (micro-past). The experience of meaning is occurring in a micro-present 
and it accounts for the fact that we can experience presentness. 
Stacey, et al, 2000: 35.  
Put differently: 
We find ourselves recognizing the meaning of what we are saying as we speak into 
the response of others and, as we do this, the meaning of what we are saying may 
well be transforming. 
Stacey et al, 2000: 33. 
 
Stacey et al (2000) argued that it is in this micro temporal structure of the present that the 
circular back-and-forth gesturing-responding can be truly transforming or simply repeat 
what has always happened. So even though we, during those micro moments of gesture-
response, cannot know what will happen, the exchange is also instantly recognizable. It is 
then through this emerging process that identity is potentially confirmed and potentially 
transformed, both at the same time.  
 
An important implication of this temporal structure of the living present is that, due to its 
interactive communicative nature taking the form of gesture-response between living 
bodies, this inter-action is of a local nature. In other words, whatever themes should emerge 
from the turn-taking/turn-making, gesture-response between people in the living present, 
those themes have reality only to those who are interacting (Stacey, 2001). ‘Themes do not 
exist outside of bodily interaction and bodily interaction has to be local.’ (Stacey, 2001: 
174). Stacey (2001) acknowledges the impact of technological communicative tools that 
may take the form of global systems. 
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Griffin (2002) positions the notion of the living present as very different from temporal 
perspectives by which people tend to view the past, present and future as separable, often in 
an attempt to utilize our memory of the past in attempts to take control of the future. In 
doing this, we have to view time as linearly moving from, what then becomes a fixed, state-
like past to an unfolding, controllable future, without acknowledging that we are 
continuously constructing both future and past in the present. Mead’s notion of the 
‘specious present’ is derived from his understanding of the development of mind: 
… because humans have a unique capacity to call forth in themselves the attitudes 
of the other they can know what they are doing. Knowing what one is doing 
immediately incorporates anticipation and expectation into the action of the present 
and it also immediately incorporates reconstructions of actions past, or memory, all 
as the basis of acting in the present. 
Griffin, 2002: 184; italics added. 
The significance of this particular perspective on the structure of time becomes even more 
apparent when considering the following reflection of Griffin (2002) in which he contrasts 
the dominant temporal approach amongst modern day managers with the implications of 
the micro-temporal, circular structure of the ‘living present’: 
The future is much spoken of in the present, but only in terms of themes of control 
and intentional change. For this to be achieved the future must be reduced to simple 
aspects that can be manipulated to determine the present. This is very different to 
the notion of the living present in which the future, as expectation and anticipation, 
is in the detail of actual interactions taking place now, as is the past as 
reconstructions in this process of memory. 
Griffin, 2002: 185. 
 
It is in attempting to articulate the strange and elusive nature of this awareness that Shotter 
(1994) refers to the knowledge arising in this recursive micro-structure of relating as 
‘knowing-from-within’ or ‘more properly … embodied knowledge.’ (Shotter, 1994: 2). 
Unlike the theoretical or technical knowledge people may ‘have’, this type of knowing only 
appears within the act of relating; ‘in the process of our talk.’ (ibid: 2). This ‘embodied 
knowledge’ is evident in the preciseness of our gestures (even if and especially when 
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unconscious) towards each other in the way we intonate, pace, pitch and pause our 
interactions toward each other as accurate reflections of the ongoing construction of those 
relationships (Shotter, 1994). It is literally in these ongoing exchanges that Shotter (1994) 
observes life forms taking shape and being allowed or disallowed to continue. Shotter then 
concurs with Bernstein when the latter reflects on this knowledge as ‘knowledge not 
detached from our being but determinative of what we are’ (Bernstein, 1992: 25 in Shotter, 
1994: 2). 
 
Following Griffin’s (2002) argument about the emergence of ethics in the every-day 
conversations amongst people, it follows that this micro-temporal structure is the context in 
which the ethical evolution of organizations happens: 
The process is one in which people negotiate and account for their immediate 
actions to each other in ordinary conversation … This is simultaneously a process 
of sustaining and shifting ordinary, everyday power relations and judgments on 
good conduct. 
Griffin, 2002: 169,170. 
 
Understanding what Stacey, Griffin and Shaw meant when they posited the notion of the 
living present appears to be key in any discussion around how we bring the future into our 
conversations. Their mentioning, almost in passing, of a ‘macro-temporal structure from 
past to present to future’ (Stacey et al, 2000: 35) leaves me unclear about how this notion is 
to be understood relative to the notion of the micro-temporal structure of the living present. 
Did they intend such a perspective to be taken as arising thematically through the micro-
temporal experiences of the living present? Or are they implying that our lived experience 
can be reflected on from two vantage points – one micro and one macro? In describing the 
macro-temporal structure as (apparently) moving linearly ‘from past to present to future’, 
the paradoxical quality of Hegel’s understanding of time certainly appears to be somewhat 
obscured. If we attempt to, at anytime, think about the macro-temporal structure as ‘longer’ 
(or what would macro imply differently?) than the fractal like momentary movements 
implied in the micro view, the present tends to become increasingly compressed by a 
seemingly expanding past and future, leaving ‘it’ with little or no time structure to reflect 
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on meaningfully. In such a macro state of consideration, the allure of both the formative 
and rationalist positions, where meaning is located in either the past or the future, becomes 
increasingly appealing.  
Intention and Intentionality 
Of similar importance to understanding my intention with my research question is stating 
my position with regards the notions of choice, intention and emergence. Again, I do not 
consciously subscribe to the sweeping aspirations of strategic choice or other systemic 
practitioners who believe that leaders can choose markets and then deliberately bring about 
large scale changes across organizations that eventually will result in their successful 
participation in those markets. Within Strategic Choice theory, the concept ‘intent’ and 
‘intention’ is seldom reflected on but regularly used in a reified combination with the word 
‘strategic’, i.e. ‘strategic intent.’ With this expression Strategic Choice theorists usually 
imply the formally stated and presumed collective strategic aspiration of ‘organizations’ 
often expressed in the form of the official ‘Vision’ and/or ‘Mission’ statements. Stacey 
(2003) concludes that the formation of intention is simply assumed by Strategic Choice 
theorists and not treated as problematic at all. If we subscribe to the notion of a living 
present, we cannot deal with any attempt at foresight with such a simplistic, predictive 
expectation. How are we then to engage sensibly with the future while participating 
responsibly in the circular process of the living present? 
 
During the course of my writing of Project 2, I have become increasingly intrigued by the 
notion of ‘intention’. At first glance, the term suggested to me a pointing towards, what I 
presumed to be, the future. Also, the term would allow for a socially rich interpretation of 
strategic activity rather than the socially depleted character of terms such as ‘forecast’, 
‘end-state’ and so on. I have subsequently started to pay closer attention to references in the 
literature by authors to ‘intention’ in an attempt to move my own thinking about and 
utilization of the word to a more considered level.  
 
Early in those explorations, my attention was drawn to the difference between the notions 
of ‘intention’ and ‘intentionality.’ Griffin, Shaw and Stacey (1999) draw on the work of 
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Brentano (1874) and Polanyi and Prosch (1975) to accentuate the specific application of the 
term ‘intentionality’.  
The very nature of consciousness is that it is intentional, that is directed towards an 
inner object. It attends from an historically and ethically rooted present context to 
goals that are spontaneously arising as the basis of next actions, which are also 
reflexively constituting the historical/ethical context from which consciousness is 
attending. Intentionality is a process of from-to and simultaneously to-from … This 
is a conscious act, which means for Brentano and Polanyi that ‘all knowing is 
action’. 
Griffin, et al, 1999: 3. 
 
Implied then in the notion of intentionality is a broader understanding of the movement 
towards than my initial idea of movement towards the future. Of particular importance is 
also the idea that the process of intentionality implies movement from, namely the 
historical and ethical context from which people are attending towards. This movement is 
however, recursive/circular/reflexive in that consciousness is also, at the same time, 
attending and changing the historical and ethical context from which it attended. Already 
then, the term ‘intentionality’ forcefully introduces the micro-temporal structure of the 
living present into the debate. 
 
For Mead (1934), in an essay in which he built on an ethical theory on social principles, 
intention was as central to the notion of moral action than the position taken by Griffin et al 
(1999): 
You do have to bring the end into your intention, into your attitude. You can, at every 
stage of the act, be acting with reference to the end: and you can embody the end in 
the steps that you are immediately taking. That is the difference between meaning 
well and having the right intention. … A person who is taking all the steps to bring 
about a result sees the result in the steps. It is that which makes one moral or 
immoral, and distinguishes between a man who really means to do what he says he is 
going to do, and one who merely ‘means well’. 
Mead, 1934: 383. 
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 In this passage, Mead suggested that an envisaged picture of the end moves reflexively 
with the intentions emerging between people. As they continue to act with reference to that 
intended, albeit evolving end, a sense of moral coherence develops as what each person is 
seen to be doing, coincides with and affirms what he/she said he/she was intending to do. 
 
By acknowledging these arguments, I aimed to position the term ‘intention’ within a 
broader frame of reference, pointed to by Searle (1983) when he draws an explicit 
distinction between ‘intention’ and intentionality’: 
… intending to do something is just one form of Intentionality along with belief, 
hope, fear, desire, and lots of others; 
Searle, 1983: 3. 
 
This context will remain important and appropriate as I now start to attend more 
specifically to the ‘intending to do something’ meaning of the term, intention. More to the 
point, in my own practice I am concerned with what is going on when people ‘intend to do 
something strategically important.’ 
 
Stacey (2003) refers to ‘intention’ regularly as he reflects on strategy from a complex 
responsive processes of relating perspective. Turning to intention specifically, he argues as 
follows: 
The question arises as to where intention comes from? Intentions emerge in 
relationship just as any other organizing theme does. Intention … emerges in the 
conversational life of a group of people. A single individual does not simply ‘have’ 
an intention. Rather, the intention an individual expresses has emerged in the 
conversational interaction with others. Intention and choice are not lonely acts but 
themes organized by and organizing relationships at the same time. 
Stacey, 2003: 352; italics added. 
 
In viewing intentions as organizing themes emerging in conversational interaction between 
people, Stacey expands the application of intention as an organizing factor beyond the 
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static version employed by strategic choice theorists. Importantly though, linked 
recursively to the notion of intentions, as with other propositional themes such as desires 
and aspirations, is the notion of ideology. Stacey (2005) concurs with Dalal (1998) in 
concluding that it is based on their ideological convictions that people form desires and 
intentions and exercise choices to act in certain ways. In this context, Dalal (1998) defines 
ideology as: 
[the] means of preserving the current social order by making it seems natural, 
unquestionable, by convincing all the participants that it is so. 
Dalal, 1998: 116. 
 
Stacey (2005) holds that: 
Together the voluntary compulsion of values and the obligatory restriction of norms 
constitute ideology. 
Stacey, 2005:9. 
 
If ideology is constituted by values and norms, then I need to reflect on Mead’s (1923) 
notions of cult and functionalized values as taken up by Griffin (2002). The process by 
which members of a society would constitute a cult is one of ‘individualizing a collective 
and treating it “as if” it had overriding motives or values. … The members of such a cult 
found their behavior driven by the cult’s values.’ (Griffin, 2002: 115). While initially (in an 
attempt to come to grips with the atrocities of the First World War) linking the notion of 
‘cult values’ to negative ideals only, Mead subsequently recognized that the notion also 
related to positive ideals, thereby generalizing the influence of cult values in the 
understanding of social interaction. (Griffin, 2002). The relevance of cult values to my own 
inquiry becomes obvious when, in following Griffin, we consider how Mead related the 
functionalization of cult values to the temporal structure of the present. Mead argued as 
follows: 
The cult value of the institution is legitimate only when the social order for which it 
stands is hopelessly ideal.… There are no absolute values. There are only values 
which, on account of incomplete social organization, we cannot as yet estimate … 
Mead: 1923: 238. 
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 Based on this assertion it then follows that the cult value remains incomplete and is only 
continually functionalized in ordinary everyday interaction between people in ways we 
‘cannot as yet [or perhaps ever] estimate.’ Griffin concludes: 
This is how people are continuously constructing the future. But this does not in any 
way suggest that they are not acting with intention. Just as they are being formed by 
the structures, they are also forming intentions on the basis of the cult values they 
have from their past, ‘the most precious part of social heritage’, in order to shape 
social action, that is, the constructing of the future in the movement of the present. 
Griffin, 2002: 189. 
 
Considering ideology as a basis for the emergence of intentions between people seems then 
inescapable. It would however be prudent to warn against a simplistic assumed causality of 
an idealized ideological position, causing people to behave in a certain way. Rather, it is in 
the repeated instances of people functionalizing those idealized positions through the 
‘conflictual conversation of gestures and responses as the living present’ (Griffin, 2002: 
190) that ‘[they] are continuously constructing the future.’ (ibid: 189). Similarly, Stacey 
points to ‘… ideology as a mutually constructed conversation that is continually repeated, 
not a “thing” that is shared or stored.’ (Stacey, 2003: 325). 
 
Turning to Joas (1996), the value of conversations about emerging intentions becomes even 
more explicit as he points to the temporal ‘locality’ of aspirations and goals. 
 
The conception of goals as anticipated future states does not describe adequately 
their role in the present action precisely because, as anticipations, they belong to the 
present. 
Joas, 1996: 154, reflecting on Dewey. 
 
Intentions emerge in conversational interaction between people, in the micro-temporal 
structure of the living present, where those intentions and associated choices shape the 
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activity people engage in as they attempt to bring further particularization to their evolving 
intentions.  
 
In the fifth edition of his book, Strategic Management and Organizational Dynamics 
(2007), Stacey reflects on the implications of Elias’ thinking around the non-polarization of 
emergence and intention and how these two factors are at play rather than being opposed 
by or subordinated to the other. He then concludes that: 
 
…organizational strategies emerge unpredictably in the interplay of many different 
intentions and, as such, emergence is not a matter of chance. 
Stacey, 2007: 250; italics added. 
 
This leads me to a final comment on the nature of intentions as it affects the rest of this 
inquiry. To the point that ‘the interplay of intentions’ contribute to the unpredictable 
emergence of organizational strategies, I would argue that that is so also because of the 
thematic nature of intentions, leaving ‘them’ always in a state of relative generalization in 
need of particularization (Stacey, 2005) when the next conversational opportunity arises 
between people. Those subsequent conversational opportunities in which further 
particularization could occur could therefore see the intentions continue along logically 
consistent lines or be transformed in completely unpredictable ways due to the 
recognizable but unpredictable spontaneity of people interacting in the living present. 
 
So, in moving forward with the inquiry, I would want to guard against the reification in my 
own mind of concepts such as ‘the interplay of many different intentions’. I seemed to have 
found immediate resonance with this phrase and therefore run the risk of becoming 
enthralled with the phrase instead of with the meaning of the phrase. This still refers to the 
messy everyday exchanges between people in both the legitimate and shadow themes 
organizing relationships in companies. To avoid the risk of merely subscribing to 
abstracted notions such as ‘the interplay of many intentions’ I would like to narrate 
episodes from my daily work life in an attempt to increase my understanding of what 
actually happens and what that might mean. What does ‘the interplay of many different 
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intentions’ look like and how do organizational strategies emerge during such interplay? Is 
it at all possible to narrate the experience of these processes of spontaneous self-
organization? And would such a reflection lead to anything useful or will it be seen as 
common-sensical? 
FORESIGHT, THE LIVING PRESENT AND THE INTERPLAY 
OF INTENTIONS  
 ‘Pre’-Amble to the Narratives – Written Post and During the Fact 
In the following paragraphs I am attempting to relate a number of episodes spanning a 
number of years that in some or other way portray the evolution of intentions between 
people as they engage each other around important emerging issues. Through these 
episodes, I am attempting to firstly, remember the intentions and choices that emerged in 
the interaction of large numbers of people in my company as we tried to assume an 
organizational pattern (referred to as the Operating Model) aimed at transforming our 
company into a ‘customer centric’ organization. My reason for selecting an episode that 
emerged over an extended period is to reflect on the official intentions expressed at the 
outset and then sustained during the ‘implementation phase’ of the process. I am then, on 
reflection, trying to understand what actually happened by applying the lenses of the living 
present and the interplay of intentions as discussed above. In the second episode, I am 
reflecting on the continuing interplay of intentions as we seem to be still engaged in the 
process of particularizing our generalized ideal of a customer centric organization. In this 
episode I am attempting to pay closer attention to my own experience in the movement of 
the living present. 
 
Also, in reflecting on these episodes with my supervisor and learning set members, I was 
alerted to the temporal structure of this project – how I am constantly oscillating across the 
apparent linear structure of the project’s introduction/front, middle and conclusion/end; 
constantly tweaking and adding to the theoretical departure points as apparent gaps open up 
in the narrating of the episodes; constantly adding to and rewriting the narratives as 
perspectives emerge that cast my memories and expectations along different lines. In all of 
 102 
this I am constantly attempting to keep ‘things’ orderly and sequential when actually, 
nothing seems to follow that flow. So, in the writing of this project, I am experiencing the 
very interplay of intentions in the fleeting, moving experiences that is the living present – 
my and other’s emerging and evolving expectations, the constant returning to/reconfiguring 
of the past/the written and always the thinking/writing/thinking construction of the future. 
Episode 1: Operating Model and Governance Principles 
The context 
As stated above, one of my key responsibilities is to continually monitor the effectiveness 
and propose changes to what has become known as our operating model and governance 
principles. With these terms we refer to the way we arrange our business in specific 
business and supporting or specialist units as well as the principles underpinning the 
relative interdependencies amongst these units. Our operating model became topical during 
the last years of the nineties and culminated in a major revision of the operating model 
during 2000 and 2001. Four other colleagues and I were then only recently appointed as the 
new strategists of the organization. As reflected on in Project 1, our theoretical assumptions 
in developing the various frameworks and models were steeped in strategic choice theory. 
 
When initially conceptualized during 2000/2001, our intention, or generalized ideal with 
the operating model was to adopt a customer centric position in the way we organize our 
internal processes and activities. This intention emerged during an episode of intense 
deliberations between our executive team, a consulting team from the United States, our 
own team as well as other members of specialist units (e.g. project managers, marketers, 
etc). According to the initially agreed upon concept, our picture of a preferred future state 
of our retail operations would comprise the following: 
• four market/segment business units, 
• three product business units, 
• an integrated delivery business unit;  
• an array of specialist functions supporting the respective business units in the areas 
of human resources, finance, marketing information technology and so on. 
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 Our intention with this specific design stemmed from where we concluded the future of 
banking was moving. According to the consulting team, success would follow those 
organizations who managed to match the rise of consumerism with an uncanny 
responsiveness to customer needs. The latter would be achieved through the advances in 
customer information management technology and an organizational design that enables 
the manufacturing and delivery of products and services to those customers. By 
establishing segment business units we were hoping to create a high awareness within our 
operations and a corresponding responsiveness in our processes to where customer 
preferences were shifting. Also, this way of organizing would move our aspirations from a 
high volume, product punting approach with little regard for customer retention and 
expansion to a bigger emphasis on the sustained profitability of our retail customer base 
through the pursuit of, amongst other focuses, cross-selling and non-interest income. The 
four segment business units would target different identified markets segments. Our 
product business units would have a very specific product bias; thus we established a 
business unit focused on mortgages, one focused on the (credit) card market and one 
focused on the financing of vehicles and other movable assets. Finally, the people 
working for the delivery business unit were responsible for the efficient delivery of all the 
products and services to all customers through our extensive branch, telephone, internet 
and ATM networks. This way of organizing presented us with a high degree of complex 
integration issues, requiring executives to balance their own business unit aspirations with 
advances from other business unit heads on the same customer sets and often while 
dependent on the same specialist or delivery resources. With each business unit 
accountable for its own performance on specific product sets, the level of internal 
competition soon proved to be a constant challenge, resulting in lower than expected cross-
sell ratios and other envisaged synergies. 
 
In bringing about segment business units, we introduced a new set of roles to our social and 
political landscape. While the product and delivery unit members could still recognize their 
businesses and accountabilities from the previous configuration, the segment players were 
expected to bring a new approach to our business to bear, namely that of custodian to the 
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different customer sets. Those units were responsible to determine the primary offerings in 
respect of products, services and distribution for each of their respective markets. In 
determining the actual offering to their specific market, the segment business units had the 
official mandate to exercise choices that can materially affect the business opportunities of 
other business units, i.e. the so-called Product business units as well as the Delivery 
business units. In assuming that role, they, more than the other units, came to represent our 
generalized ideal with the operating model, namely creating sustainable value through the 
pursuit of customer centricity. 
 
As Stacey (2005) commented however, the particularization of the generalized 
idealizations we create inevitably involves conflict. At the time, as we were busy 
constructing the conceptual design of the operating model in 2000, I remember often 
feeling overwhelmed by the sheer magnitude of what we were trying to describe. Also, I 
then only recently started to engage with the ‘business issues’ as opposed to the so-called 
‘soft issues’ of team building and leadership development that occupied me in my previous 
role. Therefore, I had difficulty understanding the relevance of the hotly debated ‘business’ 
issues between people vying for the leadership positions in the newly established units. 
Particularly two questions led to numerous debates that somehow never reached any 
satisfactory conclusions, namely:  
1. Who owns the customer? 
2. Who owns the balance sheet? 
What made it difficult for me to understand the relevance of the question on customer 
ownership was that everyone seemed to be in agreement that in a customer centric 
organization, ‘nobody owns the customer; rather, the customer chooses.’ Also, in a 
customer centric organization, the balance sheet should reflect the growth achieved in the 
targeted markets – thus the balance sheet should reflect the business performance of the 
respective segment units. However, due to the difficulties expected to reflect business 
performance across various products (as would have to be the case if the performance 
across a customer segment was to be measured) our financial systems were only being 
marginally adapted and thus continue to reflect product performance rather than the 
performance of specific customer markets. Now, in retrospect, I will suggest that those two 
 105 
questions represented the battle for dominance and control of resources between the 
various leaders or as Elias ([1939] 2000) reflected:  
‘[the] struggle among many for resources not yet monopolized by any individual or 
small group. Each social monopoly is preceded by this kind of free elimination 
contest; each such contest tends towards monopoly.’ 
Elias, [1939] 2000: 274. 
 
What transpired was that the official ‘ownership of customers’ came to mean relatively 
little at the time. As expected, customers could not be owned. Consequently, despite the 
segment unit leaders claiming ownership and by implication regulation of access to 
customer information, as it turned out, members of various business units were accessing 
customer information and ultimately the customers, at will. By doing that, business unit 
executives and employees were doing whatever was required to achieve their product sales 
targets through promotional campaigns even if it meant that the same customers were 
contacted repeatedly by people representing different parts of our organization. In effect 
then, despite the widely talked about intention of establishing a customer centric 
organization, we were still selling as many products as we possibly could, regardless of the 
value those activities might hold for either the customers or the organization. 
 
The ownership of consequence proved to be the ownership of the balance sheet – by 
assuming balance sheet responsibility for specific revenue streams (the latter could only be 
derived from products or services and not from claiming ownership of the customer base), 
access to money and resources became easier. This twist resulted in the segment unit 
executives desperately clinging on to whatever products were not already assigned to the 
product business units, e.g. savings products, loan products and transactional products. 
 
So after four years, we were left with essentially six product business units:  three officially 
and three – the different segment business units – un-officially. Again, our much talked 
about customer centric strategic intention, supposed to be facilitated through the operating 
model and governance principle has manifested in a way markedly different than what we 
initially expected. Of particular importance in bringing about the manifested pattern were 
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the less official but highly emotive conversations about ownership of the balance sheet. 
The resolution that would see us leave balance sheet ownership assigned to product owners 
certainly did not flow rationally from the conceptual intention of the operating model but 
was somehow never challenged.  
 
How, within the constraints of this inquiry, am I then to understand our apparent failure to 
bring about our formally expressed intention of customer centricity? One way of 
interpreting what happened would be to understand the events as they happened as the 
particularization of a generalized ideal (Stacey, 2005). Officially, the generalized ideal 
could be seen as the intention to put the customer first and then reap the benefits of 
valuable, profitable relationships with our customers. According to Stacey (2005), in 
particularizing this generalized ideal of a customer centric organization, people would then 
engage, simultaneously in ‘processes of communicative interaction, power relating and 
ideological evaluation in which individual selves/identities and the global patterns of the 
social emerge at the same time.’ (Stacey, 2005: 10). Reflecting back on my own experience 
at the time, I am left with a sense of being caught looking at the wrong stuff: 
Conversational Interaction 
As a member of the team that worked closely with the subject matter experts flown in from 
the USA, I was privy to ongoing conversations around ‘best practices from around the 
world’. Those conversations convinced me of the long term necessity of implementing the 
idealized operating model, as narrated by those experts. Based on the emergent meaning we 
were developing in our understanding of the ideal, we (as the strategy team) engaged 
players across the organization in small and large meetings. During those meetings, the 
nature of the design as well as the implications on work processes and responsibilities were 
debated. From the agreements reached during those discussions, our team continued to add 
to and adapt two primary documents – one depicting the operating model and the other, the 
governance principles. Those documents became the focus of our attention – as the 
documents started to assume the status of sanctioned representations of what we were 
hoping to achieve, we started to grow impatient with conversations that challenged that 
ideal. Too soon perhaps, we brought the particularization opportunities to be had through 
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conversation to a close by moving to get executive sign-off on those documents as 
officially representing the desired ‘end-state.’ The formal acceptance of those two 
documents as representing the ideal were not a distinct event – it happened over time and 
as one of many efforts happening simultaneously. But as the acceptance of those depictions 
amongst the powerful leaders grew, certain members expressing opposing views became 
subdued and their points of view increasingly entered the realm of gossip and shadow 
themes from where they continued to influence the emerging patterns. The official 
particularization of certain intentions became increasingly constrained while those 
intentions reflected in the officially approved documents became the focus of the formal 
particularizing conversations. In attempting then to understand what actually happened I 
am concluding that, at least in part, we seemed to have moved too early past the conflictual 
particularization of specific themes. By not pursuing the veiled and obscured issues (e.g. 
the implications of customer and balance sheet ownership) in the conversational reality of 
the living present, we were left with significant diverging interpretations of what the 
official intention might imply for people’s own continuing realities.  
The Shifting of the Balance of Power 
At the same time, as the new operating model assignment was our first in our new role as 
strategists, our team was desperate to make a success of this effort. Our appointment to the 
role of strategists was contested politically by a number of other specialists, specifically the 
individuals formerly responsible for the strategy function who were now expected to work 
with us in a complimentary role. Our sudden access to the American experts and all the top 
ranking officials of the organization at a daily rate were disrupting the established balance 
of power between us and those specialists. As the significant impact of the effort became 
clear, the power relations between us and the company’s executives also started to tilt. Due 
to our highly reciprocally supportive relationship with the then Chief Executive Officer, we 
remained quite ignorant of the animosity with which a number of executives viewed our 
ability to influence proceedings. On a number of occasions, those feelings were expressed, 
but mostly our relational proximity to the CEO kept our opponents’ resistance to the realm 
of shadow themes. In all of those relational tensions, the idealized model became one of 
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our primary power differentials – we knew how this was supposed to work and were in a 
position to evaluate the ‘other’ on their ability to show similar understanding. 
 
Personally, my own visibility during the process was high and I featured regularly in 
presenting specific positions or facilitating and coordinating discussions and work sessions. 
Inevitably, my own aspirations, ideals and ultimately identity became largely intertwined 
with the intention of making the proposed changes to the operating model happen. Looking 
back, that phase was a significant period in re-defining my identity and role in the 
company. After the operating model work, I would be firmly established as one of the 
people responsible for the development of strategies for specific business units. Also, my 
responsibilities would invariably include the ongoing verification of the suitability of the 
operating model. 
 
Similarly, the relative power relations between many other people were shifting. The 
approval of the proposed changes to the operating model in October 2000 meant that at 
least seven new Managing Executives had to be appointed. Those appointments came from 
the ranks of a younger generation than the bulk of the incumbent executives at the time. 
Suddenly, the balance of power was swinging dramatically to the young executives, each 
desperate to lay claim to as many resources as possible. Two incidents in particular will 
corroborate this hypothesis: 
? A was intimately involved in the conceptualization of the business case aimed at 
proving the viability of an affluent market segment business unit. A marketer by 
profession, A exuded high levels of authority, energy and an uncompromising approach 
to getting things done his way. On presenting a highly lucrative case for the 
establishment of such a business unit, he proved to be the best suited to head up the 
new business. He accepted ‘reluctantly’, but on a number of conditions that challenged 
the agreed upon governance principles. In essence, A argued, the customers in this 
market deserved such specialized and personalized service that he would have to have 
direct control of all his required resources – own customer facing staff, dedicated 
marketing and credit staff, separate suites to meet and deal with customers, and so on 
and so on. This directly contravened the principle of sharing those generic services, a 
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strategy aimed at containing costs. All those conditions were accepted. Gossip and 
passage talk soon started that typified that business unit as ‘wasting money’, ‘more talk 
than action’, ‘all show and little performance’ etc. In functionalizing the generalized 
ideal of a business unit for the affluent market, A and his team appeared to be spending 
an enormous effort in differentiating themselves from the rest of the retail staff. In 
contrast, their ability to fulfill their official strategic intentions of differentiating the 
company’s offering to the affluent customer segment remained clouded in controversy. 
Their apparent lack of performance was usually defended with technical arguments like 
the movements of customers in and out of ‘their customer base’ or the intangible value 
they created by retaining valuable customers. Their inability to deliver the promised 
personalized service to their customers also became another shadow theme that started 
to haunt the respective segment business units as time past. 
? As the newly appointed managing executive of the segment business unit responsible 
for our middle market growth, B was left with primarily the responsibility of crafting 
interesting strategies for the middle market customers and, as mentioned above, balance 
sheet accountability for the savings, loan and transactional products. For an experienced 
banker like B, the challenge probably appeared rather insignificant. Also, B had to rely 
on the sales and service delivery of the centralized delivery business unit, selling and 
servicing on behalf of most of the respective business units – both product and segment. 
This design aimed to bring efficiencies to one of the most costly aspects of our business 
– that of people. So instead of every business unit providing for their own sales and 
service staff, the delivery business unit was supposed to do that on behalf of all the 
other units. Within five months of implementation B managed to persuade the Group 
Executive responsible for retail operations that it would be in everybody’s best interest 
to have the sales people ‘stripped out’ of the delivery business unit and moved into his 
own structure, thus laying claim to an additional three thousand people. According to 
B, it was impossible for an executive to take accountability for certain sales targets if 
the people selling were not reporting to that executive. B was quick to assure everyone 
that, when reporting to him, he will somehow see to the sales people doing justice to 
everyone else’s targets – a feat not possible according to B in the dispensation he was 
challenging. In bringing this change about, B immediately expanded his influence on 
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what got sold. It did not take long for rumors to emerge that the sales people first 
attended to selling the products in B’s portfolio before attending to any other products 
with any sense of urgency.  
 
Through the complex emergence of new forms of power relating between people, our 
attempts at particularizing the generalized ideal started to manifest in unexpected ways, 
almost right from the start. As much as we were cloaking our own intentions in the 
ideological higher ground of the generalized ideal (obtained first hand from the US 
experts), other protagonists were as adept to tilt the ratios of power in their favor through 
seemingly small deviations from that ideal. On reflection, I recall the sense of quiet, 
resigned collusion amongst all in observing the slow but steady erosion of the principles 
underpinning the initial ideal. On his final departure back to America, one of the 
consultants pulled me aside and almost pleaded with me: ‘Tinus,’ he said, ‘don’t let them 
dilute the design.’ Right now, I have no idea how anyone could stop that from happening. 
Ideology … Adapted 
Finally, let me consider the working of ideology in the particularization of our customer 
centric intention. If we assume ideology to be the means through which the current social 
order is made to seem natural (Dalal, 1998) and if ideology is constituted by values and 
norms (Stacey, 2005) and if we are continuously, through ordinary interaction, constructing 
the future by functionalizing the hopeless ideal represented in our cult value/s in the 
movement of the living present (Griffin, 2002) then we can relate the intention of customer 
centricity to the introduction of a new (cult) value constituting a shift in the dominant 
ideology amongst the people of my company 
 
Certainly, the functionalization of the cult value of customer centricity manifested in very 
different interpretations: some people viewed customer centricity as a means to make more 
money from customers; other interpreted this as complying with every customer demand, 
regardless of how valuable that customer was for the bank; still other viewed customer 
centricity as a movement away from a commodity and volume driven approach to relating 
in more personal and intimate ways with each customer. As a new-comer to the business, C 
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was appointed to head up a segment business unit with close to three million customers. In 
establishing himself as the new leader, he embarked on a country-wide ‘road-show’ 
announcing his aspiration to turn the business into a truly customer-centric operation. To 
achieve this, he proposed that our sales people should begin to spend much more time with 
each customer, offer them coffee, find out their needs and so on and so on. Almost 
immediately, sales volumes tumbled – it took a two month long concerted effort by senior 
management to re-interpret what he said to mean a balanced approach between selling and 
caring for the customers. This type of episode reflected the conflict that arises inevitably in 
the process of functionalizing the cult value (Stacey, 2003).  
 
More interesting though is the conflict that arose between different ideological positions, 
namely between the newly introduced value of customer centricity and the accepted norm 
or obligatory restriction (Stacey, 2005) of business volume. The notion of customer 
centricity posed a serious challenge to the well-established norm that retail banking is all 
about sales volumes. According to the new customer centric ideology huge business 
volumes can still be dead and lifeless; a successful enterprise should be obsessed with 
valuable, profitable business volumes. Thus, the best way to derive monetary value in a 
volume business is to take a keen interest in what customers viewed as valuable and would 
be willing to pay a premium for to have or experience. 
 
As the newly appointed strategy team, the argument for customer centricity presented by 
the US experts and authors like Slywotzky and Morrison (2001) was clear and compelling; 
thus we had little appreciation for the ideological struggle that was about to ensue. What 
we had little appreciation for was the ruling idea (unquestioned and deemed as completely 
natural) that business success was directly related to pure business volumes. This ideology 
was reflected in how executives accounted for performance, how they marketed, how they 
sold, how they rewarded and how they shamed and ridiculed. Apart from not being able to 
gauge business value or profitability at the time, the accrual of business value at the 
potential cost of business volumes was simply too risky and anxiety producing for the 
respective executives. No matter how appropriate a value driven tactic or strategy might 
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have appeared, the moment business volumes started to decline, panic ensued and leaders 
reverted to the tried and tested, indiscriminate, volume generating business practices. 
 
My hypothesis is that in time, the normative, obligatory requirements of the customer 
centric ideology was never accepted but increasingly interpreted as (the exemplary value) 
to be ‘good’ to our customers. At the same time, business volume remained the norm thus 
resulting in an adapted but not transformed ideology.  
Episode 2: Taking up the Role 
Since the initial implementation of the operating model recounted above, many changes 
have come about – people moved between positions and out of the organization at an 
alarming rate, leaving the new incumbents and their teams to continue the particularization 
process in often very different ways. Throughout, the role and survival of the segment 
business units remained contentious. Ironically, these units were the ones that I associated 
most with representing our ideological shift, yet their members continued to struggle for 
recognition. Towards the beginning of 2005, three managing executives were promoted to 
the Group Executive Committee. D was appointed to head up all delivery capabilities; C 
was appointed as head of our wealth and affluent businesses and E was to lead the 
remaining three segment business units – mass, middle and small business markets. Amidst 
the turmoil of the XXX deal, we initiated another review of the operating model. As the 
second exercise of its kind since the inception of the model in 2000, we were aiming to 
strengthen some of the original principles and do away with a number of obvious over-
elaborations and duplications that have become apparent over the past two years. 
Specifically, the number of executive meetings and attendees were getting out of hand. 
 
I led an initial round of discussions to decide on the most likely list of activities that we 
should embark on. I documented my findings and submitted my proposals to the Executive 
Committee of the retail operations. In the document, I reiterated my position that we should 
think of our business as serving primarily four markets. I suggested that our financial 
reporting should be adapted to reflect our performance in those markets as the 
measurement of significance while the product houses as well as the delivery business unit 
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should take their cue in terms of new product and service developments from the segment 
units. In the proposal I suggested a set of reduced meetings with reduced membership 
between the various units to coordinate activities (e.g. new developments, marketing 
campaigns and sales priorities). Following intense deliberations, the proposal was accepted. 
 
Within weeks it became clear to me that E was focused on utilizing the renewed attention 
on the operating model and the implied significance of the segment units to improve his 
and his people’s relevance amongst their peers. During a period of approximately three 
months E and his immediate reports engaged each other in intense debates in an attempt to 
clarify and confirm their approach and role in business. 
 
At the end of those deliberations, E called for a meeting with their delivery counter parts to 
‘align our understanding of the roles of delivery and segment.’ He approached me to also 
attend and play a facilitating role during the session. I immediately accepted but suggested 
that we rather treat the session as a business meeting with him leading the session as he 
would any other meeting. He concurred. I was exited about the prospect of arguing the case 
of a segment led model with members of the delivery environment –in particular F, a XXX 
executive that was hugely critical of the segment component of the operating model. I 
resisted the facilitation request because I did not see the necessity for that and also felt that 
it may constrain my ability to freely express my point of view. Of particular interest here is 
the fact that E opted not to invite the respective product unit heads to the meeting. 
Although I suggested that he should invite them, he made a dismissive remark about the 
two people implied and kept to his decision. From this, a number of assumptions can be 
made with regards E’s objectives with the meeting: Firstly, he must have concluded that an 
early alliance with D’s delivery people is an important way to ensure the relevance of the 
segment people in the business. Admittedly, it is through the delivery people that all 
business with customers occurs, so if he could secure a productive working relationship 
with them, he would be able to influence a critical part of the business. Secondly, he was 
hoping to counter the mounting animosity by the product executives against him by means 
of the alliance with D and her people. 
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In opening the meeting E pointed to the combined financial target indicating that 
collectively, the represented businesses needed to more than double its current annual 
contribution over the next 5 years. E continued by highlighting the various challenges 
facing the respective business units: their respective growth targets; their collective revenue 
and balance sheet targets; regulatory challenges and so on. By doing this, E was 
demonstrating a familiarity with the challenges facing all business units that in all 
probability exceeded the more parochial views of most of the other participants around the 
table. Also, he was articulating his message clearly, demonstrating a degree of comfort 
which allowed him to accurately reflect the ongoing construction of the relations around 
the table with subtle shifts in the pace, pitch, pauses and intonation of his gesturing 
(Shotter, 2005). He then moved on to, in a more forceful and direct manner, spell out his 
expectations from ‘his’ people – those employees representing segment at Head Office and 
specifically in the provincial offices. No longer was he negotiating his own or his people’s 
roles with his delivery counterparts; he was directing his people to act in accordance with 
the intentions that emerged between him and his direct reports during three months of 
discussions. In following this line of argument, E was, in Mead’s (1934) words, ‘acting 
with reference to the end’ that would see him and his co-segment members, play a leading 
role in conversations about what we should be doing next. In doing that, E embodied this 
end in the ongoing shaping of his introductory comments. 
 
I felt my own disposition towards the meeting shift – from initially feeling uncertain and 
anxious because of the reluctance and resistance I was anticipating from the delivery 
participants, to where I was now experiencing a bodily ‘leaning into’ the conversation from 
myself as well as the majority of people around the table. As he reached the end of this 
initial gesture, I paused, anxiously trying to peer into that interactive space between 
speakers and listeners where politics is at its most intense, where respect and the 
continuation of forms of life are decided (Shotter, 1994). In their immediate utterances 
following that moment, the delivery participants, including D and the usually critical F, 
started to acknowledge a different and potentially richer ‘sense as to the possible nature of 
our future conduct – how we will relate what we do both to the others around us, and, to the 
rest of our circumstances’ (Shotter, 1994: 2) than what was previously the case. A 
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productive conversation followed, people argued and built on each others arguments, 
reached conclusions and decided to act in various ways. In reflecting on this incident now, I 
am struck by the significance of that introductory exchange and the forms of life (Shotter, 
1994) that subsequently emerged as the meeting progressed. How am I then to understand 
this specific instance as an ‘interplay of intentions’? 
 
It should be clear that the interplay of intentions during that meeting had a significant 
bearing on the emergence of the future identity of specifically the segment protagonists. To 
progress my arguments emanating from this narrative, I need to reflect briefly on Dalal’s 
(2002) interpretation of the work of Matte-Blanco. In paraphrasing Dalal’s conclusion on 
Matte-Blanco, I will summarize as follows: 
 
• The formation of identity is based on a process where, if you should test the internal 
structure of that identity, it will collapse into another. This is because at the center of 
each identity there resides a symmetrized space – a homogenized heterogeneity. 
• In other words, the illusion of similarity is based on the repression of difference while, 
at the same time, the illusion of difference is based on the repression of similarity. 
 
By implication, our attempts at the creation of a sustainable and recognized identity for the 
segment players relied largely on our success in assigning roles to the segment people that 
should appear to be significantly different from those of others. To be able to do this, we 
needed to suppress what is similar and accentuate what is different. In other words, we had 
to try to build a case for the uniquely valuable contribution that segment players would 
make. So, we could not allow acknowledging that a lot of what the segment incumbents 
were claiming to do was already done by others, e.g. the marketing function, the product 
players and even delivery. At the same time, people opposing the rise of the segment 
players to power, would claim in all probability that whatever the latter were attempting to 
do was already being done quite sufficiently by others, thus implying similarity.  
 
Following on from Elias and Scotson (1994) we can also assume that the universal 
workings of power figurations would apply to the dynamics observable between segment 
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players and the delivery and product players. In building on the argument pursued above 
where the delivery players were implying similarity, now, as the established, the latter 
would argue that not only were the tasks the segment agents intended to do already being 
done, but the segment players would be stigmatized as ‘incompetent’, ‘useless and 
redundant’, ‘overly elaborate’, etc. at performing those tasks. Comments like those had 
been the order of the day in selected circles. As an outspoken and visible proponent of the 
segment view, I was usually excluded from those gossip themes, but did partake in a 
number of conversations where delivery and product players admitted to their skepticism 
about the role of segment. The new XXX colleagues were much more forthcoming in their 
criticism of the proposed role of segment players, adding significant power to the 
charismatic cohesion amongst the skeptics.  
 
With this in mind, let me reflect again on the exchange recounted above: The exchange 
itself was an explicit demonstration by E of the ‘difference’ he, and by implication his 
people, could make. He raised issues, recognized by all as important (thus implying 
similarity), but seemingly the only one in a position to talk with authority and resolve about 
them (demonstrating difference and thus refuting the themes of stigma forwarded by other). 
That act was reminiscent of the voices of the outsiders, wanting to become part of the 
established. Or it might even have been a more radical assertion – the outsiders wanting to 
become the established; the must-not-haves challenging for the position of the haves. 
 
Following on from his initial utterances, and responding to the tone of do-ability exuded by 
E, a very different than expected, productive session followed, resulting in a number of 
very specific resolutions taken. 
 
That list of resolutions would be the formal record of what happened at the meeting. 
However, the movement of consequence was the shift in the patterning of the identities and 
power relations between the segment and the delivery players brought about in the micro-
temporal structure of the living present. In order to understand that shift and the potential 
different forms of relating which may emerge from that shift, we had to turn to not only 
that a discussion took place or what was being discussed, but also how the protagonist 
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constructed the future in the movement of the present. In subsequent discussions and events 
it became clear that the stigmatized image of the segment players was not miraculously 
transformed, but a different sense as to the possible nature of our future conduct did 
become plausible. The interplay of intentions and the emerging patterns flowing from that 
interplay can often be dramatically impacted by the pre-meditated choices exercised in 
crafting a statement of intent as well as the spontaneous twists and turns a person makes in 
delivering that statement. 
THE THOUGHTS I AM HAVING NOW 
In writing this project, I am drawn to think how the perspectives I explored would make me 
engage differently in my practice. How will I reflect on the notions of intentions and the 
living present while moving through my daily experience? 
Deferring Deferred Discussions 
Since embarking on the project, I have become acutely aware how I regularly used to, in an 
unconscious albeit bodily recognizable way, defer expectations about anything of 
significance emanating from discussions about ‘strategic’ issues to ‘another moment, soon 
to come, but not quite now.’ During discussions of that nature we, as participants, seem to 
silently agree that the significance of this conversation might be that it is simply setting up 
or paving the way for another/other discussion/s that will be the really important one/s. My 
involvement in discussions is now shifting to one where I intend to affirm the significance 
of each and every discussion as important ‘right here, right now.’ In this, I am influenced 
by the notion of intentions and goals belonging to the present as argued by Joas (1996). 
Consequently, ‘deferred’ discussions have become quite conspicuous to me, leaving me 
with a distinct sense of missed opportunity. In writing this, I acknowledge the generalized 
character of this aspiration, but am keen to see where my practice may lead in 
particularizing this ideal. 
At Play in the Interplay 
This observation also leads me to my second observation: I started this project off with the 
need to, in a particularized way, understand what Stacey means when he writes about ‘the 
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interplay of intentions.’ By reflecting on my own experience during the writing of the two 
narrative episodes, I recall times when I felt completely overwhelmed and anxious by the 
sheer multitude and fluidity of intentions at play between the various players. There was 
simply no way to capture everything that was going on! So then, would it be useful at all to 
merely reflect on one or two probable intentions of as few protagonists? My physical 
reaction to this realization pointed me to my own need to be able to say something useful to 
those reading and reflecting on this project – not only the faculty members of the university 
or a faceless external examiner, but perhaps more acutely, the executives of my company. 
To them, this project would be really useful if I could in some or other way point to a smart 
way to exert control, to enforce alignment amongst all those people with the shifting, 
evolving intentions. My next realization was that that expectation was first and foremost 
my own – all along I was still harboring the silent wish to bring people together, to find a 
way through which the holy grail of a ‘strategically aligned’ work force could be attained 
 
 If I had so much difficulty in trying to understand my own gestures-responses in the 
‘interplay of intentions’ I would have to give up on the ideal of meticulously describing and 
tracking the ever-shifting interplay of intentions between multiple players. This interplay 
cannot be conclusively described or depicted in any way. Rather, I had to come to 
understand the ‘interplay of intentions’ as an ongoing, infinte process of which I am merely 
and yet always an integral part, adding to the often bewildering, kaleidoscopic intentional 
stimuli. My own part in this process is not to attempt to think about and comment on the 
interplay of intentions, but rather to be part of the interplay, engaging others responsibly 
with my own emerging ideas and expectations. If I should in any way attempt to converge, 
condense and/or integrate those intentions, (as indeed other and I do attempt – and probably 
with good reason – from time to time), that intent to integrate and condense would but 
constitute simply another propositional theme for protagonists to respond to. So, as another 
way of approaching my work differently, I recognize my own participation in the interplay 
of intentions as never being the ‘final play’, but simply another gesture-response in the 
ongoing process of people strategizing. 
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Power and Ideology – Commenting On or Participating In? 
Next, my understanding now of the nature of intentions arising between people appears to 
be inextricably tied to the ideological and political interests of the respective players 
involved. Regardless of the episode, the ideological and political considerations of the 
respective players were critical in developing any understanding of what actually 
transpired. By implication then, when we evoke narratives of the future and the past during 
our conversations about strategy, we should recognize in those narratives the textured 
messages that hold out images of not only a commercial opportunity, but more deeply, 
images of an ideological and political order that could compel us to act in highly 
transformative ways. 
 
This is of course not a new perspective to be added to the broader strategic discourse – 
authors like Mintzberg (1994) and Pettigrew (1973) have long been arguing the power-
political characteristics of strategy-making while Dalal (1998) and Stacey (2003), drawing 
on Elias and Scotson (1994) took up the case for the understanding of people’s behavior in 
organizations as recursively linked to their (often subconscious) ideological themes. My 
challenge is how to make the notions of ideology and power discussable with and amongst 
leaders? In a radical picture of the future of strategy, I can imagine us spending as much 
time considering the ideological roots and power-political ramifications of an option as we 
would currently spend modeling the financial implications of that option. But my own 
recent and not so recent experience of introducing issues around power and ideology into 
conversations with company executives is that it seems to introduce an immediate different 
quality into the conversation. In reflecting on that movement in the quality of our 
conversations I recognize my noticing of that shift as knowledge-from-within (Shotter, 
1994); in other words, I know that is how we are. This how-we-are when being confronted 
with the notions of power or ideology, can be described as people glancing furtively (a 
mixture between stealth and caution) beyond the conversation, as if having been caught out 
and at the same time merely humoring me (the introducer). Also, the how-we-are means 
that I am probably as furtive (that is cautionary and stealthily) in my introduction of the 
notions as ‘they’ are in responding to it. 
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In referring to this pattern as how-we-are, I am reminded of Dalal’s (1998) reflection on 
ideology as making the current order seem natural and unquestionable – by implication 
then, skirting around the important emerging ideological and power issues is a 
manifestation of our current ideology. Talking openly about ideology and power in the 
context of strategy making would therefore be treated as unnatural and questionable, or in 
Elias and Scotson’s (1994) words, different and indicative of outsider status. ‘Insiders 
know that business is ultimately about the “hard” stuff; as insiders we do not make 
decisions around people, rather we do the rational thing, that which is right for the 
business. Talking about power, politics and ideology or deeply held beliefs are for the 
“shrinks”; we call on them from time to time but on issues of business, they are best left 
outside.’  What then to do? I suspect the answer is to be found in the same vicinity as my 
second observation above: Instead of aiming to introduce discussions about ideology and 
power from a processual vantage point, I am acknowledging my part in all of what is going 
on and aim to participate as a protagonist subject to the very effects of ideological themes 
and the shifting of power balances. 
CONCLUSIONS 
When I initially started on this project, I was intrigued by our innate need to call on our 
sensing of the future in our attempts to grapple with what to do next. This need seems to 
appear more and more useless as we come to understand socially constructed life as 
essentially emergent and unpredictable. I shifted my focus to understand that sensing of the 
future as social material people use to inspire human action in the movement of the present. 
I reflected on two episodes from my daily practice during which I attempted to describe the 
interplay of intentions as themes shaping the identities and activities of people. Through 
those reflections, I recognized the fluidity of intentions and how people’s engagement in 
the interplay of intentions usually reflects their ideologies and/or issues of power relating. 
 
I have come to understand foresight as an important source for people to speculate, 
fantasize and/or have premonitions about what might or should happen over time. People 
bring their evolving attempts at foresight (whether gained through analyis or their intuitive 
sensing of future possibilities) into conversations with other people. The necessity for those 
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conversations is borne from an ideological imperative, aimed at the preservation of the 
preferred order of the people having those conversations. Flowing from those conversations 
in a recursive and reflexive way, mostly in the micro-temporal structure of the living 
present, intentions form between people that may be expressed thematically as goals, plans 
or strategies. Viewed this way, the meticulously analyzed forecasts and strategies take on 
an important role as the formal expression of the intentions of the powerful. 
 
Together with other forms of intentionality, people do experience these goals and/or 
intentions in a bodily way, as inner objects that they aspire to or resist; primarily because of 
the historical and ethical contexts those goals do or do not represent in their lives. It is in 
the (often conflicting) conversational particularization of those intentions that people keep 
on acting from those intentions or propositional themes, and in doing so form 
organizational patterns of relating while at the same time having their own identities 
formed. 
Exploring the Move to Micro 
As a next focus of my enquiry I would like to engage with the work done by a number of 
researchers in which they attempt to ‘[call] for an emphasis on the detailed processes and 
practices which constitute the day-to-day activities of organizational life and which relate 
to strategic outcomes.’ (Johnson, Melin and Whittington, 2003: 3). By drawing attention to 
the micro-activities of organizational players, they commenced a movement away from the 
highly abstracted categories and lifeless concepts that so characterizes the work of macro-
strategy theorists. The movement in the debate around strategy from macro to micro is a 
constructive one that can be productively expanded on by also introducing the novel and 
radical vantage points offered by the complex responsive processes of relating perspective 
to this development. 
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PROJECT 4: THE MOVE TO MICRO-STRATEGIZING 
REVISITED 
 
INTRODUCTION 
The Experience of Movement in My Practice 
During the course of my writing of projects 2 and 3, the way I think about strategy changed 
significantly. I will describe the change as firstly, that I am becoming highly critical of 
rational, formative and humanistic assumptions underpinning the approach to strategy by 
mainstream theorists (Hamel, 2000; Kaplan and Norton, 1996; Porter, 1985 and 1996; 
Prahalad and Hamel, 1990 and 1994; Senge, 1990) and practitioners. Secondly that, by 
drawing on the work of authors like Elias ([1939] 2000), Dalal (1998 and 2002), Griffin 
(2000), Mead (1934), Shaw (2002), Stacey (2003) and Stacey, Griffin and Shaw (2000), I 
am coming to view strategy as an ongoing social exchange between people as they attempt 
to act intentionally from living moment to living moment. 
 
In critiquing my former role models during the writing of Project 2, I was of course 
challenging my own long held rationalist and humanistic beliefs and the formative 
causalities implied in de-humanized constructs such as markets, competences, competitive 
advantage and visionary leadership. Simultaneously I was exploring and assimilating new 
perspectives on the radically transformative and social nature of organizations and strategic 
change. In doing this I was beginning to experience how liberating and confirming the 
insights afforded by these perspectives were. Specifically, I pointed to how the fierce 
competition happening within organizations for scarce resources and political power is 
largely ignored in the works of the strategic choice theorists. As a counter to the blandness 
of some far-fetched ‘vision’ I concluded that a more compelling reason for people to keep 
on showing up for work was the joint perpetual constructing of an emergent sense of 
meaning and identity in the face of anxiety, conflict, diversity and unpredictability. And 
although we live in the hope of always being involved in engagements with that specific 
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quality, there is no recipe to replicate that sense of ‘meaning on the move’ (Shaw, 2002: 
68) at will.  
 
As important theoretical constructs during Project 3, I attended firstly to the notion of the 
future not from a linear perspective on time but from the circular, micro-temporal structure 
that is the living present (Stacey, Griffin & Shaw, 2000, drawing on Mead, 1934)). 
Secondly, drawing on the work of amongst others, Griffin, Shaw and Stacey (1999), Mead 
(1934), Dalal (1998), Searle (1983), Shotter (1994) and Joas (1996), I analyzed the notion 
of ‘intention’ as a useful construct to describe the inherently social activity of people 
continuously constructing the future from living moment to living moment (Griffin, 2002). 
In viewing intentions as organizing themes emerging in conversational interaction between 
people, Stacey (2003) expands the application of ‘intention’ as an organizing factor beyond 
the static version employed by strategic choice theorists. These explorations aroused in me 
an expectation that without an adaptive shift in our thinking towards the circular and micro-
temporal structure of time as well as accepting the inherently social and emergent nature of 
intention as arising amongst people (as opposed to within individuals), we are bound to 
engage naively and irresponsibly with the notion of strategy. In adopting this position I 
discarded the reference to a macro-temporal structure of the past, present and future as 
posited by Stacey, Griffin and Shaw (2000) as potentially obscuring the living present and 
redirecting attention to either the macro past or macro future with the associated allure of 
formative and rationalist expectations 
 
Through the inquiry, I came to understand people’s sensing of the future, not as an attempt 
to predict or control (even if that may be their conscious aspiration), but as important social 
material people converse around to evoke important themes between them. These socially 
constructed themes will then often inspire human action from living moment to living 
moment, thus giving rise to people perpetually constructing the future and ultimately their 
identities. Through those reflections, I came to recognize the fluidity of intentions amongst 
people. I also came to understand how their engagement in the interplay of intentions often 
stems from their ideological convictions and/or issues related to the relative balance of 
power between them. Consequently, I noted a shift in the way I approach my practice: from 
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thinking about my involvement as that of impartial observer to that of compromising 
participant, attempting to engage fully in the interplay of intentions with all its ideological 
and political nuances. This is however, easier said than done. 
 
Far from being only a pleasantly challenging experience, this process also brought about a 
significant degree of personal bewilderment and despondency in how I engaged on a day-
to-day basis with my practice. Not unlike the case in most organizations, the dominant 
discourse between people on strategy, planning and action in my own organization is 
driven from the rational, formative and humanistic assumptions I have come to question. 
The fact is, on a daily basis, those are the conversations happening – there is no escaping 
the constant deluge of rationalist and formative assumptions and conclusions being made 
by players. As a full time employee of the organization in an executive position I find the 
pervasiveness of that dominant ideology and my expected allegiance to it quite 
overwhelming. The nature of my day-to-day work rarely afforded me the opportunity to 
engage in protracted conversations with colleagues around ideological differences. In our 
everyday discussions, our ideological positions and differences manifested covertly during 
the course of ordinary exchanges around sales, sustaining business performance, the 
recruitment of talent, an approach to a major change initiative and so on. Over the course of 
twelve months I became increasingly uncertain about what I was to do in the daily 
interactions I had with colleagues: Should I constantly critique those assumptions and 
conclusions while insisting on a more social, emerging account of events? Should I attempt 
to alert people to the problematic philosophical implications of their departure points? 
Should I persist with the inner debates as I, in the moment, analyze and convert my 
transformative interpretations of the rational and formatively driven discussions with 
colleagues into something accessible and pragmatic? Or should I quietly submit to the 
approach agreed to by colleagues only to adopt an ‘I could have told you so’ attitude at the 
slightest signs of unforeseen hiccups as the process starts to unfold in unexpected ways?  
The Focus of Inquiry 
Working for a major financial services company, I was recently tasked by the group 
executive director heading up the retail operations, A, to lead a review of our operating 
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model. Amongst the people working in our organization, it has become customary to refer 
to the way we organized our respective business and support units (in how we approach 
different markets, how we account financially for performance, how and who we need to 
converse with about different issues) as the operating model and governance principles. I 
have been intimately involved in a number of operating model projects during the past 
seven years and now hold official accountability for this component of our business. I 
consider my involvement with the operating model and governance principles as very 
significant, because of two reasons: One, the operating model in my view reflects the 
official power differentials between the various business unit heads. Accordingly, debates 
and conclusions around the operating model usually depict the relative degrees of influence 
between the respective executives as well as their relative ability to access funds and other 
forms of resources. Two, the governance structures, i.e. forums and committees, formally 
represents the conversations required to make our business work optimally. Through the 
continuous shaping of the membership and agendas of those forums, we seem to be 
modeling broadly the type of conversations that should be happening formally and 
informally amongst different players.  
 
In taking up the task, I was acutely aware of the intensity of my own uncertainty expressed 
in the introductory paragraphs. Now I was facing a substantial project with far-reaching 
implications and high risks. I knew that I would have no choice but to engage with the task 
at hand as a way of particularizing the insights and aspirations I concluded Project 3 with. 
As much as those statements were the conclusions to a Project, I have also through them 
stated my emergent beliefs – I would not be able to revert uncritically to the traditional 
rational, formative and humanistic approaches our people have become used to. In many 
ways, the arguments I took up in my projects reflected the struggle I am experiencing in my 
practice: the un-reflexive application of rational, formative and humanistic principles by 
both colleagues and authors seems to cumulatively add to the illusion that those principles 
reflect organizational ‘realities’ not only adequately but absolutely. This approach opposes 
directly my emerging belief (admittedly steeped in constant reflection and often self-doubt) 
in the socially constructed, emerging and transformative nature of strategy and 
organizational change. But would my attempts to particularize those aspirations prove to be 
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significantly different from the approaches I have come to criticize? Would I introduce and 
engage in different processes and conversations or merely engage differently in the 
processes and conversations we have become familiar with? And would those prove to be 
enough of a variance from the traditional formative approach for people to acknowledge 
afterwards that the experience and results were different?  
 
As I engaged with the operating model project, I started to record my experience in 
narrative form. Progress on the project proved to be slow and arduous, but simultaneously 
packed with day-to-day experiences that left me spoilt for choice: subtle and blatant 
political moves from various protagonists (including myself); unexpected, random events 
that saw the process taking unexpected turns and always the slow, unrelenting emergence 
of thematic patterns that appeared and then seemed to vanish again. Through iterative 
discussions with my learning set, questions around the usefulness of the notion of micro-
strategizing as a bridging concept that I could use in explaining my emergent beliefs to my 
colleagues kept on turning up. This concept stemmed from a recent series of publications in 
which Johnson and his co-authors (2003) attempted to advance the notion of micro-
strategizing as a way of calling for ‘… an emphasis on the detailed processes and practices 
which constitute the day-to-day activities of organizational life and which relate to strategic 
outcomes’ (Johnson, Melin & Whittington, 2003: 3). In many daily instances, I could 
reflect on a specific event or sequence of events as indicative of people in the act of micro-
strategizing. Simultaneously, I could also sense unease with some of the explicit and 
implicit assumptions espoused by the authors. I propose then to reflect on my experience 
during the course of our review of the operating model by way of the following question: 
 
How useful is the notion of micro-strategizing in understanding and adequately explaining 
my experience during an important episode at work? 
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A NEW OPERATING MODEL? 
Events and Circumstances Leading Up to the Work 
Amongst the people working in my organization the notion of an operating model only 
became topical after a comprehensive reconfiguration of our organizing principles during 
1999 and 2000. Ever since then, the operating model has come to represent the political 
triumphs and challenges of our executives. Through the governing principles underpinning 
the operating model, executives were able to claim expanded accountabilities, forge new 
alliances and justify their inability to perform due to insurmountable complexities. The first 
big challenge to the initially agreed model came barely one year after our initial effort in 
2001 – an executive persuaded his colleagues that it would be in everyone’s best interest if 
he gained control over the sales force. Two years later in 2003, a close colleague led a 
comprehensive review of the operating model that concluded with radical suggestions on 
re-shaping the entire model. The implications of the suggestions on the relative balances of 
power were simply too profound and the proposal was rather dramatically discarded. Still, 
the proposal challenged some of the emerging frustrations people were having with the 
existing dispensation and therefore led to a series of ongoing tweaks and changes that are 
still continuing to this day. 
 
Increasingly though, these changes have become more and more challenging of the 
generally assumed set of governing principles. One of the ideological assumptions 
underpinning our current way of organizing was that anything other than a customer-
centric disposition is immoral. Despite the fact that most people probably had varying 
explanations of what customer-centricity actually meant and why it was deemed so non-
negotiable, any proponents of a more product-centric or branch-centric approach were 
summarily dismissed as running counter to our customer-centric ideology and therefore 
implicitly wrong. In time, this dominant ideology came to be represented more and more 
by specific parties, namely the people working in the business units loosely referred to as 
segment business units. As a result, more and more official power was granted to those 
segment players. This subtle shift in interpretation and meaning (namely that the segment 
business units represented customer-centricity) as well as the mentioned shift in the 
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balance of power contributed significantly to a growing resistance amongst people 
representing the product or branch environments to the segment business units. The 
resistance amongst the product and branch representatives was strengthened significantly 
with the arrival of representatives of the new majority share holder in our company, XXX. 
From the very initial meetings held with these new colleagues, their dislike and distrust in a 
‘segment-led’ approach were clearly expressed. (This disposition apparently stemmed from 
their failed attempt to approach business from a segmented point of view.) Colleagues who 
favored a more product-led approach immediately cottoned-on to this new and rather 
significant base of support. Some of the new XXX colleagues were quite up-front about 
their intentions to ‘close down segments within a year.’ Those types of statements 
obviously led to a flurry of activity – segment players trying to re-affirm their assumed 
supremacy; product biased players scurrying to gain more influence. 
 
In time, various projects were launched by proponents of the different view points, some of 
which were now openly aimed at ‘changing our approach to business from segment to 
product-led.’ Over time, as more of those seemingly disparate initiatives got underway, 
people were beginning to question the extent to which there still existed a set of operating 
principles to which people should adhere. People expressed the concern that those largely 
independent efforts posed a risk of people unknowingly introducing divergent and 
contradictory positions that may compromise our strategic options. From an operational 
point of view, we were also beginning to experience the drag caused by a low level of 
coherence as more and more effort was required to approach activities such as marketing, 
sales, fulfillment and financial reporting in a coordinated fashion. Also, our operations have 
become bogged down in endless rounds of coordination and consultative meetings as 
people continually attempted to readjust the precarious balances of power. In addition, 
influential people were at odds with each other around who was supposed to be doing what 
and why. Our ability to bring new products and/or services ‘to the market’ lagged our 
competitors by months. This seemed to be at least in some way the result of a fragmented 
and contested set of accountabilities where one group of people will direct another group 
on what product to develop only to be challenged by the latter about the suitability of the 
proposed product. 
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Taking Up the Task 
Amidst all of those tensions and conflicts, I was tasked by A to do a comprehensive review 
of our operating model. Exactly how the work on the operating model came about is hard 
to pinpoint. References to a review of the model were made at different points by different 
people. Specifically, it was one of an impressive list of tasks that emanated from an 
Executive Committee planning session; it also featured as a project in an early version of 
our medium term plan. Despite all these and other prompts, work on the operating model 
never got going. If someone could be held accountable to do something about those, it 
would have been me. Curiously, I opted not to, busying myself with other projects and 
tasks that, at the time, had to have a more urgent and appropriate ring to them. Then, one 
morning on my way into work, I received a telephone call from A, indicating his specific 
and urgent need to have the operating model reviewed. The call was void of any threats or 
promises, but must have conveyed to me an indication of resolve on A’s behalf that I had 
found lacking in previous references to the work required.  
 
In thinking about a formal response to his call, I was keen to do a comprehensive review of 
the way we were organized – from reconsidering and re-framing our ideological 
assumptions to a congruent reconfiguration of our businesses and supporting functions. 
(This bias was certainly influenced by the events and circumstances mentioned in the 
paragraphs above that, in my view, had contributed to a significant erosion of the efficiency 
and effectiveness of our organizing logic as well as the political resolve by leaders to abide 
by that diminishing logic.) If I were to succeed in positioning the task in this way, the scope 
and potential impact of the work would be huge. A comprehensive reconfiguration of our 
retail business could potentially see us closing down current and establishing new lines of 
business. This type of intervention is usually fraught with multiple risks – from people 
becoming increasingly uncertain resulting in productivity levels dropping to the disruption 
of intricate business processes. The importance of the sustained financial performance of 
the business was unquestioned – of the five business areas in our group the retail sector 
contributed more than 50% of the total profit. 
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In retrospect, my choice to escalate the profile and potential scope of the intervention was 
an interesting one. Such an approach would obviously intensify the risk I was taking – in 
the initial approach by A I certainly had the option to treat this as more of a gradual, 
evolutionary process. However, based on my experience over the past two and a half years, 
I viewed such a gradual approach as too risky an option. During that period A was 
attempting to bring about a significant shift in how we were suppose to think about our 
business by following a low involvement, low profiled approach. Frustrations ran high 
amongst executives – none seemed to be bound by any principled agreement; everyone was 
quick to blame everyone else and A was content to prolong those impasses by simply 
telling the feuding parties to solve their own problems. This time around, however, I was 
adamant that we should allow for the key protagonists to come to hard-fought ideological 
agreement as to what we would believe about the way we were suppose to do business. 
Exactly how I intended getting there was not clear at all; I simply undertook to start 
engaging people right away before the impact of the phone call had worn off. 
Engaging the Powerful 
One of my first responses to A was to send him an e-mail confirming our telephonic 
discussion. In the mail, I suggested a two phased approach: during the first phase we should 
continue and conclude the work underway in a number of business units. The second phase 
should see us engage with the issue at a deeper level that might point us to more 
fundamental changes as those being conducted in the respective businesses at the time. The 
motivation behind the e-mail was for me to get a sense of how comprehensive a review A 
had in mind. From the initial telephone conversation it was difficult to gauge – at times it 
sounded like a quick effort to optimize some of our current approaches while other 
comments made the task sounded much more radical. From A’s response to the e-mail it 
was clear that he required a more detailed description of what I intended to do. 
 
I therefore compiled a formal proposal on how to approach the task. In the document I 
detailed the rationale, the organizational context, what we would expect to address via the 
intervention, the approach to the task I was proposing, an estimation of the cost involved as 
well as the involvement in the project by different parties. I specifically introduced the idea 
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that I would, in addition to a small but influential internal team, also involve a major 
consulting house during the course of the project. Through the document I was hoping to 
move the conversation with A along to some form of agreement on specifically the scope 
of the suggested change. We subsequently convened a meeting during which A was 
supportive of the proposed approach. I immediately started to mobilize the internal team. 
Convening the Team 
For that team, I decided to convene a collection of colleagues with varying interests in the 
operating model work. In selecting and approaching the respective members, I was 
attempting to ensure that the team would comprise a requisite variety in terms of vantage 
points, goodwill and adversity.  
 
My aim with the composition of the team was to include people that would be sufficiently 
opinionated to engender robust debate and conflict but at the same time should have shown 
themselves over time to be willing to consider the opinions of others. I approached the first 
meeting of the team with a mixture of expectations and apprehension – I was hoping to, 
during the course of the series of discussions, challenge some of the developing and for me 
unsettling ideas that some executives were forwarding while also exploring and coming to 
a better understanding of some of the issues I was interested in. 
Our First Meetings 
From the very first meeting, the well developed opinions of the respective members were 
quite evident despite the rather polite, exploratory nature of the engagements. What was not 
clear to me was what underpinned the convictions of the members, in other words, what 
were the certainties, concerns and interests that they held? Early on, I started to make 
explicit to the team members my expectations of the work we were expected to do: I was 
adamant that an operating model depicted more than merely an architectural description of 
de-humanized components (like business units and business processes) and their respective 
roles and contributions but should also reflect the human agency in doing business. At the 
same time I tried to introduce my preference to view the work as transformative through 
antithetical, conflict-driven discourse where synthesis may arise in potentially unexpected 
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ways. I contrasted this approach with a formative approach in which we (individually or 
collectively) would introduce a concept that we then forward in a consensus-driven way in 
the hope that we would not have to see our concept discarded or changed significantly, but 
rather unfolded progressively as more and more people come to accept or tweak the initial 
idea.  
 
During the initial meetings I was struck by the complexity of the different narratives 
represented by the various team members. The first three meetings felt to me as if they 
were over in a flash and yet I had difficulty remembering any specific or notable 
conclusions that we had reached. What was happening and how did that experience reflect 
the turbulent process of strategy making? I recall getting up at a certain point during the 
first meeting and attempting to record some of the themes I thought I was hearing. I soon 
gave up and sat down feeling slightly dejected – the discussion was flitting back and forth 
between members and from issue to issue at a speed that made it impossible to do justice to 
the richness of the exchanges in a couple of clipped bullet points. I sensed the importance 
of what was happening but at the same time expected that some of the members might 
demand a more visible representation of progress made. 
 
As we started to bring our first meetings to a close, one member suggested a lose 
framework of what we may possibly mean when we refer to an operating model. His initial 
suggestion was quickly taken up and expanded by the other members so that, by the end of 
the session, we were all looking at a ‘mind-map’ of various issues and factors that we all 
did, in some way or the other, initiated, commented on or allowed to be included. Those 
issues and factors were Decision Making; Power; Financial Architecture; Release 
Management; Ideology; Core Competence; Governance; Components and lastly, 
Interaction between Components. I suggested that each of the members assumed 
responsibility for one or more of the topics. That responsibility would imply that they 
should, over the next few meetings, aim to expand our understanding of why the respective 
topics represented the key issues we were beginning to associate with the notion of the 
Operating Model. I committed to provide them with a cleaned-up version of the mind-map 
in due course. 
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 At this point my overriding impression was one of the various team members announcing 
themselves to the team while attempting to gauge the relevance afforded to them by the 
other members. I suggested that we should afford ourselves the time to thoroughly acquaint 
ourselves with the work that had been or was in the process of being done by team 
members or other parties with a direct bearing on the operating model. Consequently, I 
requested two meetings a week that would continue until such time that we felt we should 
either decrease or increase the frequency of team meetings. At the same time, I initiated a 
process of securing the services of an external consulting company to assist me with the 
task at hand. By implication, I had prolonged the ‘start’ of the work with an additional 
three weeks – a period that I considered to be an important period for us to sense the 
irreversible growing or stagnation of a living process amongst us (Shotter, 2006). 
Processing What Was Happening 
After the first meetings I called for two meetings with two participants to talk and reflect 
on what had happened. Those sessions proved to be helpful in a number of ways – the one 
participant was an external, independent consultant, skilled at allowing me to talk while 
offering affirming or challenging perspectives in a way that I found highly productive. We 
eventually concluded two conversations that I remember as particularly useful at the time: 
one was a reflection on the patterning evident from and between the various members of 
the team; the other was an effort to add more substance and specificity to the list of 
representative topics and issues we had identified at the end of the first two sessions. 
 
It took us the best part of two weeks to arrive at a loose agreement on the topics we should 
attend to if we were to ‘review our operating model’. We agreed that some of the topics 
might in time be integrated into some of the other or might disappear altogether. The initial 
menu of topics was the following: 
? Components: Architectural, hard structural components, including the functional 
organizational entities like business units, specialist or support functions.  
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? Interaction mechanisms: This topic should aim at describing the formal and less formal 
interactional patterns as represented by membership to forums, policy forming entities, a 
partial process map of key activities in the organization, etc.  
? Power: Through this topic we intended to consider the relational manifestation of the 
relative power balance between people and units and how the reciprocal constraints and 
enablement were determined. As an example, the relative balance of power may lean 
towards centralized entities, or towards people with technological expertise, or towards the 
executives responsible for front line units.  
? Ideology: Closely linked to the previous issue, we felt that a thorough debate on what we 
believed about conducting our business in a sustainable way was urgently needed. Amongst 
others, it was clear that the executives from XXX had very specific ideas about how 
business should be approached and was set onintroducing a global operating model. I had 
no doubt that our current social order was increasingly being challenged. 
? Financial Architecture: Through this piece of work we intended to give cognizance to all 
the changes introduced by, amongst others, regulatory requirements, new XXX reporting 
conventions, challenges to current costing models as well as the allocation of profit and 
loss accountabilities amongst the respective business units.  
? Governance: The rules, precedents and principles as well as regulatory implications that 
everyone agree to must be kept and will manifest in the Operating Model.  
? Decision Making: Who made what decisions and how did decisions get taken? The 
inquiry needed to take account of decisions taken by individuals, committee’s and 
automated mechanisms (e.g. credit scoring systems, customer propensity listings) as well 
as locality of decision making, i.e. localized or centralized.  
? Performance Measurement, Performance Management and Incentives: According to an 
external consulting company’s views, it is not only how you run things (the operating 
model) that made the difference but also how hard you run things. Prompted by that view, 
we decided to include the way we measured, managed and incentivised performance as part 
of the initial discussions.  
? Release Management: Discussions on Release Management would focus on our 
understanding, describing and managing how change would be introduced widely 
throughout the organization. Change in this regard would imply the formal and official 
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introduction of new concepts, constructs, processes, products, methodologies, 
regulations/policies, structures, artefacts, enablers and /or capabilities.  
? Core Competence: A number of participants felt that we should inquire into the current 
and desired competence, allowing for both the emergent and formative character of this 
factor. 
 
In keeping with my statements around transformative and formative approaches, I 
appointed and then requested the work stream leads to expand on their assigned concepts 
by writing a Word document of about two pages and then circulate this amongst other 
members for comments. I provided them with the following framework to get them going: 
? What is meant with the focus area? 
? How does this relate to the Personal Bank Operating Model? 
? What is the current status of this focus area? 
? What would we like to achieve in this focus area over the next 3 to 5 years? 
? What would be the perceived benefits and risks in attempting to achieve our aspirations? 
? Are there any immediate benefits that we can aim to achieve over the short term? 
 
The team all committed to deliver their first attempts at the time I proposed. 
Executive Engagement 
I secured a dedicated meeting with A after four weeks of deliberation amongst the team 
members.  At that point the latter had already developed first drafts on the respective 
focuses which I felt I had to talk to A about. As our discussions in the team started to 
confirm my initial assumptions that factors such as our financial and administrative 
processes would be important to consider, I felt it was time to test A’s appetite for those 
issues to be included. I also wanted to gauge A’s resolve on the involvement of an external 
consulting company that would cost a considerable amount of money. With the discussion I 
was hoping to further develop our intention on issues such as how far-reaching the changes 
might be; how public we should conduct the initial work and how many and which people 
A was considering to involve as active decision making participants. 
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From the meeting with A, I was left with four overriding impressions; one, A was adamant 
that the work on the operating model was being done not to fix something that was broken, 
but to reinforce our position as a leader in the local retail banking industry; two, he gave 
permission to contract an external consulting company, thereby giving a more explicit 
sense of his expectations because of the considerable fee the consultants were bound to 
charge; three, he insisted that the initial phase of the work conducted in collaboration with 
the consulting company, be done ‘below the radar’, implying that the less people knew 
about the work and carried on with their jobs, the better and finally, he almost dismissively 
accepted when I insisted on including both the financial and administrative processes as 
part of the initial work.  
An External Partner 
On accepting the task, I considered involving a reputable consulting company for a number 
of reasons: one, I accepted that players within our own company as well as XXX would 
consider me to be biased towards specific assumptions. I therefore required not only a team 
that would represent diverse views but also a relatively untainted and credible partner to 
balance and mediate conflicting views between the members of the team. Two, we were 
interested to hear and see practices from around the world, specifically other developing 
countries, in the hope of  seeing our own challenges afresh. Three, a reputable external 
partner also provided a different quality of political influence, provided that it was people 
selected specifically with that goal in mind, meaning seasoned, articulate and authoritative 
practitioners. 
 
While the team were busy expanding on the ‘menu of topics’ document, we also elicited 
and considered a number of proposals from various consulting houses. Initially, I was taken 
by surprise by the fees they were suggesting but it soon became clear that all the bidders 
were aiming their price within a narrow, comparable band. Amongst the team members, 
different opinions became obvious in terms of their respective preferences. For instance, 
one team member had a longstanding, ongoing relationship with a particular company – 
contracting them for this piece of work would ensure a continuation of his and their efforts 
to bring about an ‘industrialized banking model’. As could be expected, their approach 
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leaned heavily towards process and technology engineering. At the same time, their 
extended work with our organization led us into all the staid and repetitive arguments 
around product, segment and delivery that I felt I was already having with colleagues. The 
other proposals varied from similarly clear albeit different preferences from where to tackle 
the work to more open ended approaches with the prospect of arriving at a ‘built-for-
purpose’ solution. As the various proposals drew to a close, I was left with the decision to 
appoint the partner as there was no clear consensus amongst the team members. 
 
I expected that this choice would potentially have a material effect on how the process was 
going to unfold – I would expect the nature of the conversations to develop along different 
themes as different agents and different topics were introduced. 
 
After a number of discussions with the team, I decided to judge the respective consulting 
houses on the following three criteria (price being not a differentiating factor between the 
respective bidders): one, the extent to which the partner can broaden and renew the 
conversations we were having; two, the level of appropriate and proven experience, 
exposure and access to relevant (financial services, retail, emerging markets) operating 
model work and three, the partner's ability to put forward their opinions with authority and 
credibility. I accepted that, if another member of the team would have to do the same, 
she/he would probably arrive at a different answer. This was however going to be my call 
and I would have to do what I sensed was the most appropriate thing to do.  
Reflections on the Narrative – Three Months after the Fact 
The work on the operating model subsequently continued, this time with the services of an 
external consulting company. After ten weeks we had a final meeting with all the 
executives of the retail bank during which final agreements were reached and a proposal on 
a new design was signed off. Another month has since elapsed during which I have applied 
my mind to the next phase of the operating model episode. Reflecting on the narrative 
account above of the initial phase in the episode, I am left with a number of observations. 
Because I started writing the narrative as the process emerged, I had no idea whether the 
accounts I was writing would in any way relate to the eventual outcomes. My narrative 
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therefore reflected certain efforts that, in the moment, appeared hugely important yet 
rapidly seemed to lose their significance as time moved on. Specifically, I explained at 
length how I started to pursue an executive’s initial request; how I selected and convened 
an initial team; the nature and character of our first meetings; the dynamics amongst the 
members; my insistence on a specific approach to the writing of reports; our initial 
definition of the task at hand and how I appointed an external partner to the project. The 
tone of my writing at the time conveys the seriousness with which I engaged each of those 
events and processes. My anticipation that something significant would come of them is 
almost tangible. Even in retrospect, it remained contestable whether some of those events 
were to have any significant bearing on how the process emerged. It is possible to argue 
that, in ways not directly related to the actual work on the operating model, events and 
occurrences that in retrospect seemed negligible to me, did take on significance in the 
emergence of patterns involving other players. Still, in terms of my own subjective 
experience of the operating model episode, I would now elect to refer to most of this initial 
account as merely part of an introductory phase to the episode. In that way of remembering, 
the seriousness with which I approached certain events now appears a bit misplaced, while 
other instances that were yet to happen appear more significant. In retrospect, the instances 
that I would now consider to be of importance in contributing to what eventually emerged 
would be the following: 
1. I pursued the phone call by A and began to force the development of an argument in 
order to understand and influence the level of A’s resolve. 
2. I invited specific members (whilst refraining from co-opting certain others) to form 
part of an initial team to shape a coherent argument and approach to the work. 
3. We produced a comprehensive Word Document detailing the rationale as well as a 
proposed scope for the work. 
4. I argued and convinced A to involve a reputable international consulting house in 
the process. This immediately raised the profile of the work. 
5. I appointed a consulting house that was relatively unfamiliar to my company. They 
also proposed a non-standardized, emergent approach to the work. 
6. I struggled through a particularly difficult argument with a colleague that left me 
with a clear view on the trappings of the terminology we were using at the time to describe 
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our organizational configuration. This personal breakthrough allowed me to immediately 
deduce the basis for the revised reconfiguration of the operating model. 
7. In protracted work sessions and discussions between members of the team, the 
executive sponsors and the external consultants, a graphic depiction of the proposed model 
started to take shape. In time, various trade-offs get reflected in this depiction – who gets to 
control what; which business opportunity takes precedence over which. In short, the 
graphic depiction, as a social object, started to represent the meaning participants to the 
conversation were busy attaching to their interactions. 
8. I insisted on frequent meetings with various groups of stakeholders, much to the 
dismay of the external consultants. I focused one team member to pester our way into the 
overcrowded diaries of executives. 
9. As A challenged the obscured position of a particular strategic concern in a 
proposed business, we developed an argument that saw a new specialist unit being added to 
the design.  
10. As the initial phase of the process started to draw to a close, I strongly supported 
another executive when he suggested that the final meeting should be led by our own 
people and not the external consultants. 
11. During that final meeting, a specific recurring dilemma was resolved when an 
executive conceded not to insist on a direct reporting line to specialist sales consultants 
dedicated to selling ‘his’ product. 
12. A concluded the meeting with a deliberate check that all the executives agreed and 
were ‘comfortable’ with the concluded principles and model. 
 
Even now, I understand that these twelve episodes may also quickly fade into 
insignificance as they are bound to be overtaken by the next series of activities. In 
reflecting on my narrative in this way, I was alerted to how, despite my solemn 
commitment to act responsibly, in retrospect, many of my actions now appeared trivial and 
inconsequential. 
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MICRO-STRATEGIZING 
In Project 3 I mentioned my interest in the work of a number of authors that are attempting 
to build interest around the notion of micro-strategizing. In their work, those authors are 
drawing attention to the importance of micro activities as equally significant in the 
strategizing attempts of organizations as the popular notion of macro-strategies. 
Specifically, Johnson, Melin & Whittington (2003) have argued that the turn to micro-
strategizing has become almost inescapable. In the following paragraphs I will provide a 
short summary of four of the articles in the series as the basis for my engagement with the 
concept ‘micro-strategizing.’ 
Johnson, Melin & Whittington 
Johnson, Melin & Whittington (2003) expressed their discontent with the continuing 
focus of mainstream strategy literature on macro-level analysis. They argued that the 
macro-level approach seems to be trapped ‘… [in] a cul-de-sac of high abstraction, broad 
categories and lifeless concepts’ (Johnson et al, 2003: 6). This sentiment seemed to 
resonate with my own observations on the apparently de-humanized organizations the likes 
of Porter (1985, 1996) and others seemed to describe. 
 
In a brief critique of respectively the Resourced Based and Institutional theories, Johnson et 
al (2003) concluded that neither seemed to give sufficient recognition to the contribution of 
value by the ‘seeming minutiae of organizations’ (ibid: 7) resulting in a ‘flat featureless 
characterization of resources’ (ibid: 7). Alternatively, the authors argued that a turn to the 
micro explanations of managerial agency could lead to an advanced understanding of the 
challenges faced by those theories. Reflecting on my resolve stated above to draw attention 
to the social emergence of intentions in the micro-temporal structure of the living present 
their argument boded well for the type of synergistic movement in thinking I was hoping 
for. 
 
Similarly, the authors pointed to how progress on two longstanding areas of research – 
Corporate Diversification and Corporate Structures – had been impeded by the limitations 
of macro-analysis. Again, the authors advocated that by turning attention to the actual 
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activity happening in organizations, those debates can be productively advanced. Here the 
authors were pointing to the actual managerial action or inaction aimed at actualizing the 
latent economic value of relationships instead of simply assuming that those relationships 
in and of themselves will generate the intended value.  
 
In their comments on strategy process research, they again argued for a ‘theory of social 
action within the strategy context’ (Johnson et al, 2003: 11). Accordingly, they pointed to 
the need for a closer scrutiny of the role and contribution of managerial agency, allowing 
also for the acknowledgement of the effect of activity at the ‘periphery’ of organizations on 
strategic outcomes. They highlighted the rather ‘overarching design’ of processual 
solutions that they found to be quite remote from what managers actually do on a day-to-
day basis. They critiqued the sharp dichotomy established between ‘process’ and ‘content’ 
and argued that content should be viewed as an ‘inherent and indissoluble part of ongoing 
processes’ (ibid:12). If not, process researchers run the risk of failing to demonstrate 
explicit links to strategic outcomes. Finally, they criticized the often too idiosyncratic and 
particular observations of process researchers and argued for the establishment of ‘patterns 
across similar issues … [to] … build theories with greater leverage in the real world’ (ibid: 
13). 
 
If this movement from macro to micro can be affected, the authors saw the linking of 
macro and micro phenomena, the collapse of the content/process split and the more direct 
translation of research findings into organizational actions as some of the potential benefits. 
However, the authors also indicated a number of challenges to be resolved in work to 
follow, namely, what this view would attempt to explain; how the knowledge generated 
through their efforts is supposed to accumulate; how the design of research approaches 
should enable the accumulation of knowledge by identifying and focusing on particular 
units of analysis and finally, how a close engagement with practice can be found and 
sustained given the near imperative of moving away from objective, retrospective accounts.  
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Samra-Fredericks  
In a study that takes the turn to micro-activities seriously, Samra-Fredericks (2003) 
tracked detailed interchanges between various protagonists during a process of strategizing. 
By deploying an innovative combination of ethnography and 
ethnomethodology/conversation analysis as her methodology of choice, she indicated how, 
during a series of interactions, a specific protagonist became more influential whilst 
another strategist’s impact started to fade. She concluded that it was the former’s ability to 
skillfully display six critical features of strategizing conversations during those interactions 
that contributed to his apparent success. ‘[These features] are the ability to: speak forms of 
knowledge; mitigate and observe the protocols of human interactions (the moral order); 
question and query; display appropriate emotion; deploy metaphors and finally; put history 
“to work”’ (Samra-Fredericks, 2003: 144). The author tracked the specific utterances of the 
respective strategists over four selected interactions, indicating the apparent skill with 
which the successful strategist was able to weave an argument that was eventually accepted 
by the others as what actually happened and was actually happening. That achievement 
would eventually see his preferred idea regarding strategic investments accepted and his 
adversary fired. Samra-Fredericks concluded: ‘[The successful strategist’s] set of intangible 
resources, uniquely combined and through knowing “when and how” to express or deploy 
them, did influence “what the organization will look like” next year and the years after 
that’ (ibid: 167). Through the article the author successfully introduced a vantage point on 
strategy as lived micro-activities that have significant bearing on organizational 
performance. I will however take issue with a number of methodological and principled 
differences in pages to follow. 
Regnér 
In a study conducted from an embedded longitudinal case-study methodology approach 
involving four multinational companies Regnér (2003) focused on the micro activities 
associated with strategy creation at various localities across the different organizations. He 
concluded that strategy gets created both at the centres as well as the peripheries of 
organizations albeit in observably different ways. According to his findings, strategy 
making at the periphery can be described as essentially inductive, that is, managers direct 
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themselves externally in the pursuit of information to sources close to the periphery, e.g. 
customers, competitors, industry consultants as well as and particularly players from 
unrelated industries. Also, exploratory, trial and error behaviour was very evident amongst 
those actors as they continuously attempted to make sense of historical strategic issues, 
often resulting in adjusted or even new interpretations of strategic focuses. As an example, 
in pursuit of an initial strategic directive concerning electro-hydraulic systems, managers at 
the periphery eventually ended up designing and developing a new truck trailer 
surveillance system. 
 
Regnér’s inquiry led him to describe the activities of managers at the organizations’ centres 
as more deductive, with managerial activities focusing more on interpreting the existing 
organizational and industry contexts. Activities were also more directed along established 
lines of inquiry, e.g. formal inquiry frameworks, models and algorithms. Those managers 
were prone to interpret and make inferences based on the historical strategy whilst they 
appear to find it more difficult to relate to a new and/or emergent strategy. At the centre, 
the frameworks and other knowledge structures appeared to be well defined and closely 
tied to prevailing industry trends. These patterns stood in stark contrast with the more 
exploratory and emergent quality of the practices displayed by managers at the periphery.  
 
Regnér concluded that the dissimilar approaches in strategizing activities between 
managers at the centre and those at the periphery often led to considerable differences in 
reasoning, sense-making and interpretation. This obviously led to conflict and tension, the 
worst cases of which usually proved to be vital in furthering the strategic development of 
the organization. In this way, Regnér could identify various instances where an everyday, 
often exploratory event ultimately resulted in a significant change being introduced 
company wide after hard-fought acceptance by strategists at the centre. 
Maitlis & Lawrence 
Through an intense longitudinal study (through direct observation of meetings, interviews 
and extensive data analysis) Maitlis and Lawrence (2003) produced an account and 
analysis of an orchestra’s attempts at defining and executing a long term artistic strategy. 
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The focus of the study was on two aspects highlighted by process research as significant, 
namely organizational politics and discourse.  The authors attempted to describe the 
narrative of how this process unfolded, then analysed the story to try and uncover reasons 
for what they considered to be a strategic failure, i.e. ‘… for a strategizing process to be 
considered a failure it should result in no action or decision at all …’ (Maitlis and 
Lawrence, 2003: 112). This analysis was then followed by an iterative development of a 
conceptual framework they used to interpret events. 
 
The authors defined a strategizing episode as consisting of four interrelated stages: firstly, 
engaging with and taking positions on the issue of importance; secondly, defining the 
concept; thirdly, assigning responsibility and accountability and finally, constructing the 
object, e.g. plan or design. The authors acknowledge the discursive and political nature of 
all of these phases. Through detailed analyses of the data assembled during each of the 
phases, they propose a set of conditions linked to each of the stages that, if present, is likely 
to see the stage end in failure. These propositions follow below. 
Maitlis’ and Lawrence’s (2003) Propositions for failure 
Proposition 1a: An episode of strategizing will be more likely to fail when key actors do 
not interpret the issue as relevant to their situation and as having the potential to 
further their own interests. (Maitlis and Lawrence, 2003: 18). 
Proposition 1b: An episode of strategizing will be more likely to fail if the issue is not 
interpreted and labelled in a way that is legitimate within the existing organizational 
discourse. (ibid: 18). 
 
Proposition 2a: An episode of strategizing will be more likely to fail when the 
organizational politics preclude agreement on the definition of the concept, and there 
exists no actor powerful enough to impose a definition. (ibid: 20). 
Proposition 2b: An episode of strategizing will be more likely to fail when the pre-
existing discursive resources of key actors are highly incompatible. (ibid: 21). 
 
Proposition 3a: An episode of strategizing will be more likely to fail when organizational 
politics do not allow for the assignment of responsibility and accountability in a way 
that benefits key actors. (ibid: 22). 
Proposition 3b: An episode of strategizing will be more likely to fail when the concept 
definition is highly complex and internally inconsistent. (ibid: 22). 
 
Proposition 4a: An episode of strategizing will be more likely to fail when the actor(s) 
assigned responsibility for constructing the object lack political skill or domain-specific 
expertise. (ibid: 24). 
Proposition 4b: An episode of strategizing will be more likely to fail when the concept 
has been defined in terms of the organization’s weaknesses rather than its strengths. 
(ibid: 25). 
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MICRO-STRATEGIZING REVISITED 
Differences in Methodology 
At the outset, I feel compelled to point to the obvious difference in research methodology 
between the approach that the authors favour and that which I will be pursuing in pages to 
follow. I deem this important because these methodological differences are an early 
indication of more fundamental differences between the authors and me that if not made 
explicit, would lead to endless cyclical debates with no resolution possible. 
 
From an epistemological stance (following Myers, 1997) our respective approaches could 
all be described as interpretive with evidence of both the hermeneutical and 
phenomenological philosophical traditions apparent in our respective approaches. Critically 
though, the ‘micro-strategists’ seem to all ‘largely preserve something of the stance of the 
objective observer’ (Stacey & Griffin, 2005: 2), meaning that in all but one instance (where 
Maitlis and Lawrence (2003) acknowledged the effect of their own interests on their 
observations) the researchers viewed their own presence (physical and ideological) during 
the observed meetings, interviews and subsequent analysis of no consequence. This 
approach to research differs fundamentally from the approach described by Alvesson and 
Sköldberg (2000) as reflexive research. This approach comprises of not only careful 
interpretation, but also reflection, where the researcher ‘turns attention inwards towards the 
person of the researcher, the relevant research community, society as a whole, intellectual 
and cultural traditions …’ (Alvesson et al, 2000: 5). Similarly, Stacey & Griffin (2005) 
proposed a methodology that requires iterative reflections on my own experience and to pay 
particular attention to the complexity of the local, micro interactions I am engaged in. By 
engaging research in this way, both the way I think as well as the traditions of thought in 
which that way of thinking is located, are made explicit. The authors suggest that through 
this approach to research, the researcher/practitioner engages iteratively with questions 
pertaining to and therefore potentially transformative of the researcher’s own identity 
(Stacey & Griffin, 2005). 
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Noting this difference in approach right at the outset is important for two reasons: Firstly, 
the difference points to ideological differences that will probably keep on presenting itself 
as I take up the respective studies and conclusions presented by the authors. I will briefly 
deal with some of these ideological differences below. Secondly and related to the first 
point, I am of the opinion that, as we attempt to move the debate around strategy to ‘an 
emphasis on the detailed processes and practices which constitute the day-to-day activities 
of organizational life …’ (Johnson et al, 2003: 3) we have to not only move the focus of 
our research to different instances of organizational life (i.e. ordinary day-to-day activities), 
but also adopt different ways of looking at those instances. 
 
One such a way of looking differently would be for practitioners to adopt a reflexive 
approach to research, thus allowing for their personal participation (whether physically 
and/or ideologically) in the ‘detailed processes and practices’ of the organizational life they 
are investigating. In my view, this approach allows me to legitimately engage in a 
reflection on the micro-interactions happening between people, and the way those 
interactions are intended, assimilated and/or randomly generated by and around at least one 
of the protagonists – me. Thus, I do not have to guess about either what was happening in 
the inner conversations or what effect my presence did or did not have on the respective 
players. From this vantage point I would then offer the following observations on Samra-
Fredericks’ (2003) project: 
• The limitations of the ethnographic and ethnomethodological/conversation analytic 
traditions in capturing other facets of the communication happening between 
participants are noted. It reflected a traditional sender-receiver communication model 
– it would be interesting to explore the ability of the protagonist in focus (in the 
article referred to as Strategist A) to shift his gestures in the moment as he perceived 
and accounted for the ongoing non-verbal responses from other participants – a view 
that is currently lost to Samra-Fredericks’ methodological choice. Writing from a 
reflexive position provides one with exactly that material to reflect on. 
• Samra-Fredericks assumed the position of the objective observer. In proposing an 
approach informed by the perspective of complex responsive processes of relating, I 
would like to keep my exploration open to the effect my own participation might have 
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on the ‘interplay of intentions’. As is evident in traditional approaches to research, 
Samra-Fredericks did not acknowledge her own presence in the meetings and the 
possible effects her own aspirations might have on her own and other’s actions. 
• Without explicitly claiming this to be the case, through Samra-Fredericks’ analysis of 
the events, one is left with the impression that Strategist A was quite calculated in 
doing what he did and that by implication, good strategists should do likewise. What 
Samra-Fredericks’ theoretical assumptions prevented her from commenting on is, 
amongst others, the spontaneous emergence of the analyzed interactions in the power 
relations between the participants. Because of her theoretical vantage point – 
presumably based on rational and formative teleological assumptions that will assume 
the individual to be autonomous – the author did not allow for the social construction 
of the utterances she was observing. As an extreme example, it is quite possible that 
the decision to fire Strategist B resulted from the interplay of intentions that emerged 
amongst all participants, including Strategist B, who might now be enjoying an early, 
wealthy retirement. 
 
If we are to take the ‘turn-to-action’ seriously we also have to seriously reconsider our 
taken for granted assumptions. The discipline brought about by a reflexive methodology 
(i.e. scrutinizing the way the researcher is thinking as well as the traditions of thought 
represented in that way of thinking) can contribute significantly to the rigour of such a shift 
or turn in thinking about strategy.  
 
Another and more encompassing way of looking differently at those instances would be 
from the vantage points offered by less familiar voices than those we have come to 
associate with the field of strategy. Given the context of this project, the most obvious 
example of such an approach is the radically social perspective on strategy developed by 
Stacey (2003). By drawing on the work of the philosopher Hegel and the sociologists Mead 
and Elias, Stacey applied their thinking to interpret the insights offered by the natural 
complexity sciences to human organizations. By positing a new theory, referred to as 
complex responsive processes of relating, Stacey (2003) argues for a comprehensive 
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critique of and shift in our traditional assumptions regarding business strategies and 
organizational dynamics.  
 
In approaching the notion of micro-strategizing from this vantage point, I find myself 
approaching, interpreting and reflecting on my practice along very different lines of inquiry 
than those posed by the authors of the series. Johnson et al (2003) argue for the turn to a 
micro approach for three reasons: one, the modern competitive arena requires of 
organizations to establish and maintain competitive advantage by leveraging off micro 
assets that would be less easy to replicate than the traditional macro competitive positions; 
two, in the intense race for competitive advantage, the need for organizations to respond 
rapidly to competitive opportunities is shifting the requirement for effective strategy 
making from measured, well-defined and centralized to more frequent/continuous and 
decentralized approaches; three, because of these changes, the actors involved in 
strategizing are demanding an approach from researchers and ‘teachers’ to be insightful at 
the micro-level of managerial activity and its effects (Johnson et al, 2003). 
 
My interest in the notion of micro-strategies was awakened because of me anticipating the 
importance of ordinary, everyday micro- (social) activities in the emergence of discernible 
patterns over time in the strategic evolution of an organization. (With ‘social’ I imply here 
a relational view that encompasses amongst others the rational, political, ethical, moral and 
emotional characteristics of human interactions.) Put differently, I accept the Stacey 
proposition of understanding human organizations as essentially emergent, complex, social 
processes of relating, hence my interest in the unpredictable yet recognizable emergence of 
thematic patterns over time. 
 
Returning then to Johnson’s first reason for the turn to micro-strategies, namely the need to 
maintain competitive advantage through the leveraging of micro assets, I would argue that 
competitive advantage is and has always been an emergent social process that comes about 
because of the micro activities already happening in organizations that appear to be 
winning. It has very little to do with a modern need for micro assets and the deliberate 
leveraging of such assets; rather, we are only now better able to understand the importance 
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of micro activities based on the insights provided by the complexity sciences and the 
subsequent re-discovery of the importance of thinkers like Elias (1939, 1970) and Mead 
(1934). Similarly, as for the second reason given by Johnson and his co-authors, those very 
insights are beginning to illuminate the limited value of macro-strategizing and the 
recognition that strategizing amongst people all over organizations has been happening all 
along anyway. Therefore, I am not aiming to take anything away from the importance of 
research on micro-activities/assets or widely dispersed and pervasive strategizing activities 
in organizations. Still I believe we will fail the more ambitious yet perfectly urgent issue of 
exploring and articulating a fundamentally different approach to strategy as emergent and 
to be finally understood in retrospect (Stacey, 2003) if we simply cloak our interest in 
micro events as another stab at formatively upping our competitive advantage. 
 
Their third reason for the turn to micro activity based view of strategy suggests that the 
authors are clearly driven for their work to be regarded as aiding managers and providing 
managers with valuable insights and guidelines for action. In this context, ‘micro-
strategizing’ can become a utility that managers could potentially focus on mastering and 
thus become more effective at strategizing. Although commendable, this aspiration may 
lead the authors to adopt a position from which they unreflectively assume that managers 
can simplistically master and control the flow of ‘the seeming minutiae of organizations’ 
(Johnson et al, 2003: 7). It also seems to imply that for new insights to be useful we must 
be able to demonstrate immediate practical application in the control and mastery of our 
environment. Quite frankly, as I am writing this I do not know if this work will come to 
something useful at all, let alone something with immediate and practical application 
possibilities. But this uncertainty is intrinsic to the exploratory nature of an approach to 
research that acknowledges the principles of emergence. I am desperately hoping for this 
work to come to something useful, but I can also not compromise the integrity of the work 
by forcing utilitarian conclusions steeped in naïve, formative thinking. When Johnson and 
his co-authors then concluded ‘A less ambitious but nonetheless worthwhile aim for an 
activity-based view might simply be to encourage reflexivity,’ (ibid: 16), I find myself less 
hesitant and guarded. I am anticipating that this is a huge undertaking in its own right, as 
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this is partly what would bring about the transformation of the identity of leaders 
participating responsibly in the dynamic emergence of strategic processes. 
Verifying Intention 
I would now like to return to the focus of this inquiry, namely that of inquiring into the 
usefulness of the notion of ‘micro-strategizing’. I could then reflect on the narrated 
episodes as various examples where I attempted to deploy a progression of ‘micro-
strategies’ in order to promote the evolving/emerging intention/s I subscribed to. While I 
am writing this, I am reminding myself of how, in putting it this way (i.e. ‘…I attempted 
[presumably deliberately and rationally] to deploy a progression of micro-strategies in 
order to promote [formatively] the evolving/emerging intention/s I subscribed to), I may be 
prolonging a rational and formative approach to strategy. So, in writing this, I am 
reminding myself of the evolving intention that I now subscribe to through my participation 
in the Doctorate in Management Program. This intention can be described as, amongst 
others, contesting the rational, formative principles espoused by the advocates of Strategic 
Choice theory by exploring strategizing through the transformative, emerging perspective 
of complex responsive processes of relating. As a deliberate attempt then to advance a 
more congruent, emergent approach to this intention, I will revert to the transformative 
reflecting on a piece of narrative. That is, by telling and reflecting on an actual experience, 
I will expect to happen upon insights that I could not rationally foresee and will therefore 
experience a transformative (rather than a formative) movement of intention and ultimately 
identity. 
A Reflective Shift 
In the narrative, I convened a team from various disciplines and functional areas. I would 
consider the selection (and by implication, non-selection of other colleagues) an attempt at 
micro-strategizing on my part. By selecting particular people I was hoping to assemble 
participants representing various, conflicting perspectives. I was keen to engage those 
people and also see them engage each other on some of the thorny issues related to our 
operating approach. At the same time, and more politically motivated, I hoped that that 
particular composition would be seen by different sub-groups within the organization as 
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sufficiently representative of the intentions they represent. It could also be argued that I 
was attempting to, from the outset, make the work visible and all participants aware of 
some of the conflicting, shadow conversations that was bound to arise. In doing this, I was 
not hoping to avoid those obscured conversations or idealistically create a transparent and 
democratic process that could then be applauded from a humanistic audience. With 
reference to the narrative on the Operating Model I engaged the other members of this 
conversation knowing full well that whatever I would hope would emanate from our work 
should be very different from my initial idealized options. For instance, I could say that I 
subscribed to the necessity to allow in our operating model for powerful market focused 
businesses as opposed to powerful product focused business. Even so, I knew that an 
uncompromised version of my preferred intention will be untenable as it would be 
impossible to particularize such a model without people (who may subscribe to another 
intention altogether) working overtly or covertly to compromise or corrupt such an 
intention.  
Through this reflection in the paragraph above, I am becoming aware of how the notion of 
‘micro-strategizing’ appears to direct my attention to singular, individualized interventions 
as opposed to the continuous, evolving social  process of interchanges between multiple 
players. So, even in opting for a verb, the movement in thinking brought about by the term 
micro-strategizing did not lead me to an understanding of the inherently social, emergent 
nature of strategizing. Rather, it seemed to prompt me into recalling past events as those 
initiated by an autonomous individual thinking up various schemes to ‘win’. Similarly, 
Samra-Fredericks (2003) focused on the behaviour of one particular protagonist, 
concluding that he consciously acted with skill and conviction, whilst ignoring the 
relational power tussles and inclusion/exclusion dynamics playing out between the 
protagonists. I acknowledge that the authors of the series probably never intended their 
arguments to be descriptive of a social view of strategizing – they apparently subscribe 
(perhaps in an unreflecting way) to a view of individuals as autonomous. With ‘micro’ the 
authors are attempting to draw attention to everyday, localised (whether at the periphery or 
centre) ‘… managerial activity and those involved in the activity of organizations – 
whether managers or not - …’ (Johnson et al, 2003: 7). The difference in meaning that I 
seemed to have assigned to the term lies in my understanding of the word in a social 
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temporal processual sense whilst the authors are referring more to the notion of agency and 
thereby seem to often turn their focus to activities performed by individuals.  
Emergence and Intentionality 
In their introductory paragraph, Johnson et al (2003) stated the following: 
 
More specifically we are calling for an emphasis on the detailed processes and 
practices which constitute the day-to-day activities of organizational life and which 
relate to strategic outcomes. 
Johnson, Melin & Whittington, 2003: 4. 
 
With the qualification ‘the day-to-day activities of organizational life and which relate to 
strategic outcomes’ Johnson and his co-authors seem to suggest that, one, we can 
differentiate between activities that do and do not relate to strategic outcomes and two, that 
only those activities that (eventually) do relate to strategic outcomes should be considered 
as the focus of this emerging field of research. Continuing my line of speculation, I would 
then assume that it is at least partly as a result of this assumption that the authors in the 
series appear to be comfortable in focusing their research on formal meetings, work 
sessions and interviews. Of course, this suggestion would negate the emergent and 
therefore relative unpredictable quality and level of importance/unimportance of ordinary, 
day-to-day organizational life. Due to the frequency and latent implications of the multiple 
activities happening in organizations it would be extremely hard to know which activities 
should be considered as related to strategic outcomes and which not. It is exactly this issue 
that I am pointing to in understanding the important passages during the operating model 
episode only in retrospect. The fact that I pursued the suggestion by A; how I came to 
select a specific consulting company; the ongoing shaping of our collective understanding 
of what would be proposed – all of that only became more telling in their consequences 
than some of the other passages I narrated in hindsight. 
 
In addition to my misgivings mentioned above, the researchers were often assuming a level 
of intentionality with the various players that I would consider unfounded. Similarly, using 
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the term ‘strategy’ or even ‘strategizing’ conveys a sense of (autonomous) intentionality 
that I would regard as a premature assumption if considered from angles other than the 
formative, rational stance evident amongst these authors. Engaging in a strategizing 
episode may in time see players become more and more deliberate as the socialization of an 
intention becomes more pronounced, but I would argue that there are also other ways of 
explaining the seeming ‘purposiveness’ (Chia & Holt, 2006) of players. Simply because 
micro activities have material effects organizational patterns over time does not imply that 
those activities should now be labeled micro-strategies! 
From Micro-Strategies to Micro-Instances 
My intuitive disagreement with some of the explicit or implicit assumptions made (e.g. the 
individual as acting autonomously) or discomfort with accepting those assumptions without 
due interrogation (e.g. the deliberate disposition assumed with protagonists) seems to 
indicate a very different understanding of strategizing than that proposed by Johnson and 
his co-authors. I am now thinking that the usefulness of the concept ‘micro-strategizing’ 
may be limited to attracting attention to more localised sources of change than the 
traditional macro rational and formative focuses. My developing argument will then be not 
to point organizational players to learn and/or leverage micro-strategies but rather to 
become aware of those micro-instances that occur during the many conversations and/or 
moments of reflection that could become strategically important.  
Micro-Instances of Significance 
Simultaneously, I did however notice how my approach to my work appeared to be 
changing as a result of my reflections on my experience and on the notion of micro-
strategizing. I have become increasingly attentive to potentially significant micro-instances 
during which the meaning we assign to a social object is challenged, confirmed or appear 
to be shifting. I started to notice how, by attending more acutely to my bodily reactions 
during interactions, I was alerted to such potentially important micro-instances of variation 
or inflection by amongst others sensations of frustration, boredom, excitement or being 
jarred. Those sensations often marked the passage of an interaction that seemed to 
introduce a deviation from the understanding I had of our evolving intention. I noticed 
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how, because of these observations, I am starting to attend differently to my work in the 
following ways: 
o I am deliberately trying to increase and sustain the intensity of my engagement in 
conversations. (Amongst others I am more intent on actively shifting my body 
‘into’ the interaction.) 
o I attempt to sustain this intensity by consciously pursuing micro-instances of 
variation or inflection as potentially confirming or transforming of what I am 
coming to understand we mean. 
o I am alert to bodily sensations as cues to explore micro-instances during 
interactions as potentially significant moments in the act of strategizing. 
o I am conscious of how this approach is both exhilarating and draining. 
 
In this way, the work of Johnson and his co-authors (2003) seemed to have contributed (in 
ways different than what either they or I would have expected) to a transforming shift in 
my practice and identity. 
CONCLUSION 
As I set out on the writing of this project, I reflected on the difficulties I was experiencing 
in the movement of my practice. I then looked hopefully at the reconciliatory potential of 
the concept micro-strategizing as a bridge between the rational, formative beliefs of 
colleagues and mainstream strategy theorists on the one hand and, on the other hand, my 
attempts at reflecting the social, transformative and emergent nature of strategy in my 
practice. What then became apparent was that I rapidly picked up on the differences in 
beliefs, methodology and interpretations between the micro-strategizing authors and me. 
Based on my experiences during the operating model episode I found evidence of the 
importance of socially produced micro-instances that did significantly inflect the way the 
process emerged. I did however also reflect on how the relative importance of those 
instances only became obvious in retrospect. This as opposed to the expressed and implied 
findings and aspirations by the micro-strategizing authors that individually conceived 
micro-strategies can be formatively and mostly rationally leveraged to bring about 
deliberate change. These differences now seemed to have stunted my ‘conversation’ with 
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them into an uneasy binary predicament reminiscent of my debates with colleagues at 
work: either they need to acknowledge the fundamentally emergent and therefore ‘not-that-
easily-leveragable’ nature of micro-instances of importance or the debate will go round in 
endless, meaningless circles.  
 
What does this predicament seem to point to? One way of thinking about it would be to 
consider what is happening as the irreconcilable clash of opposing ideologies. I am 
assimilating a new way of believing, drawing ‘newly’ (against the backdrop of insights 
gained from the complexity sciences) on old sources like Hegel, Mead and Elias. Johnson 
and his co-authors are subscribing to a more traditional, often opposing set of beliefs, 
emanating from century-old adaptations and particularizations of the thoughts of people 
like Plato, Descartes and Kant. In doing this they seem to be (perhaps unknowingly, 
perhaps deliberately) confirming that this set of beliefs explains sufficiently and 
comprehensively what goes on when people strategize. In putting it this way I am reminded 
of the way in which Shotter (2006) engages the challenge of dealing with a completely new 
way of embodied perception. 
 
‘For, if our concern is with completely new, novel and unique beginnings, then we 
cannot find them in any repetitions of what has already occurred in us or in the 
world around us as we currently think about it in our intellectual reflections. 
Shotter, 2006: 3. 
 
What I seem then to have been doing through the course of Projects 2 and 3 is refuting the 
‘repetitions of what has already occurred’ (Project 2) whilst confirming and elucidating the 
‘new, novel and unique beginnings’ (Project 3).  
 
In my attempts up to now to participate meaningfully in the conversations at work I 
experienced myself fluctuating between reconciliatory attempts at collaborating with 
colleagues and evangelistic attempts at converting them to a ‘new way’. This conflict was 
also apparent in the questions that I posed at the beginning of this project. But somehow, as 
I am writing this, those tensions now appear to be dissipating; even the impasse that I 
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highlighted a couple of paragraphs earlier between the micro-strategists and me is less 
troublesome when I reflect on my day-to-day practical coping (Chia and Holt, 2006) during 
the operating model process. Gradually, during the course of that episode and my writing 
of this project I have started to take up the ‘struggle’ as Shotter (2006) reflecting on 
Wittgenstein suggests, to focus on ways to go on so that those around me would find what I 
and we are doing ‘intelligible’. It is in that struggle that I started to find relief in my 
‘spontaneous responses to [interactions] in the present moment’ (Shotter, 2006: 114) 
without the requirement of ideological shifts by my counter-parts. It was after all, in the act 
of reflecting on those ‘spontaneous responses’ that I became mindful of how I can engage 
differently during processes of potential significance. 
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 SYNOPSIS AND CRITICAL APPRAISAL 
INTRODUCTION 
During the course of the writing of the four projects my inquiry led me to a deepening 
engagement with Stacey’s (2007) application of the theory of complex responsive 
processes of relating to the practice of strategizing. From the outset, I find his arguments 
provocative and compelling. My experience of this engagement was one of an unrelenting 
shift happening in my own practice. Due to the nature of the methodology, which 
congruently reflects the principles of complex responsive process of relating, my projects 
became an account of this shift in my practice. 
 
My projects also reflected a dissonance with some assertions made by Stacey which I 
subsequently took up through the projects as a way of functionalizing those assertions. So, 
in Project 2 I am, in the process of critiquing the strategic choice theorists through my own 
experience, also testing the validity of Stacey’s consistent criticism of systems thinking. In 
Project 3, it is Stacey’s skepticism about our attempts to predict the future that prompts me 
to inquire into the sensibility of my own tendency to present to myself what is going to 
happen. Those inquiries led me to important shifts in how I approach my practice. 
 
My inquiry has then become, firstly, to account for the emergent and social transformation 
of my practice as strategist and secondly, to locate and critically pursue the theses 
expressed by Stacey that stirred in me a sense of dissonance and incompleteness. 
 
So, as a conclusion to my participation on the Doctorate in Management program, I will 
take another reflexive turn on the work done during the four projects. In doing this, I will 
be probing towards the essential contributions that I would hope to make. Through this 
inquiry I will again interpret and deconstruct the rational and formative assumptions 
pervading main stream theories on strategic management. Also, I will attempt to 
encapsulate in brief the essence that I take from the theory of complex responsive processes 
of relating. As potentially important sources of insights I will also revisit the contributions 
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of Johnson, Melin and Whittington (2003) and others as they engage with a micro approach 
to strategizing. Throughout, I will be looking at ways in which I can further assimilate the 
emergent transformation in my practice as well as deal with the remaining dissonances I 
experience with Stacey’s arguments.  
MAIN STREAM STRATEGY AND ITS DISCONTENT 
An Ideological Trap? 
In reflecting on my practice as a strategist, I came to acknowledge the constant allowances 
I used to make to explain the inadequacies of strategy and strategy implementation. Those 
allowances rested on, amongst others, the accepted argument that the ‘translation of 
strategy into action’ was the second most challenging task as rated by companies in a 2000 
study conducted by The Corporate Strategy Board. Consequently, I accepted that a 
significant number of our strategic aspirations came to nothing. With my colleagues, we 
were content in moving from one strategic round of discussions to the next, leaving in our 
wake a trail of unimplemented and soon forgotten plans. Still, we received innovations like 
Kaplan and Norton’s Balanced Scorecard with much enthusiasm as each apparent break-
through held the next promise of a comprehensive and logically consistent approach to 
ensure ‘the translation of strategy into action.’ 
 
I came to recognize that, in all likelihood, I was trapped with the rest of the traditional 
strategy community in an ideological snare. Stacey (2007) argues that the heritage of our 
predicament could be traced back to the likes of Immanuel Kant and his dualistic 
distinction between a rational and a formative teleology, i.e. why things happen the way 
they do. With the latter, Kant indicated how, in nature, what is meant to become is already 
enfolded within the most primary state, e.g. the acorn already bearing the imprint of the 
eventual tree and therefore displaying a purposive unfolding as if in coherence with the 
mature idea. Kant insisted that this teleology, however, cannot be applied to humans 
because humans are autonomous and free to make choices (Stacey, 2007). Hence, in order 
to understand causality in human organizations, one has to account for the freedom of 
choice that rational and autonomous individuals can exercise in terms of objectives and 
 159 
actions and how those choices interact in the daily events of human communities. Kant 
then left us with two ways of understanding why things happen the way they do – a 
rationalist teleology when dealing with human organizations and a formative teleology 
when dealing with natural systems. Over time and despite Kant’s warning, the theories 
developed by specific schools of systems thinking absorbed and applied both those 
principles to human and natural systems alike. This dualism we have created is today well 
embedded and completely pervasive in how we approach our work in organizations. Stacey 
(2007) comments on how we apply a rationalist teleology when dealing with the activities 
of managers yet revert to a formative teleology when we consider how the plans and 
strategies of those managers will be applied to the rest of the organization. Thus, we act 
daily as if the plans and strategies devised by rational and autonomous managers will be 
coherently unfolded by people with apparently no choice in the matter. 
Compounding Beliefs 
Systems thinkers (Zhu, 2007) will consider this argument coarse and ignorant of 
developments in the field of systems thinking over the last two decades. Yet, through my 
inquiry reflected in Project 2, I am concurring with Stacey’s (2007) observation that none 
of those developments have changed the basic premises of the assumptions underpinning 
the systemic understanding of causality, i.e. the dualism of rationalist causality when 
thinking about understanding and designing the system and formative causality when 
thinking about governing the system. Even more to the point, together with the pervasive 
remnants of Taylor’s (1911) and Fayol’s (1916) scientific management approach and 
principles, in my experience, managers and leaders are today overwhelmingly displaying 
this systemic understanding of organization and causality in their daily practices. In 
addition managers continue to expect a predictable and controlled environment (despite 
consistent evidence to the contrary) through the assimilation of the implicit beliefs 
underpinning the work of mainstream theorists like Porter (1985, 1996), Prahalad and 
Hamel (1990, 1994), Kaplan and Norton (1996), Hamel (2000) and Johnson and Scholes 
(2002): 
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? The realist’s belief that phenomena such as competences, skills gaps, innovation 
processes, competitive edge, etc. actually exist as opposed to being socially constructed 
by people participating in ordinary day-to-day organizational life. Because of this 
assumption, people ascribing to such a belief treat those constructs as consistent and 
stable and therefore events flowing from their interaction, causally predictable (Porter, 
1996; Prahalad and Hamel, 1994; Hamel, 2000). 
? The cognitivist’s belief that people process information through the cognitive mapping of 
regularities and the cybernetic adjustments to those maps by means of negative feedback. 
This belief often obscure the way in which people react in emotional ways to conditions 
of uncertainty, exclusion and inclusion or shifts in the balance of power between people 
(Porter, 1985, 1996). 
? The humanist’s belief in people’s capacity for self-cultivation, self-improvement and 
autonomous self-determination. In managerial practices, this belief manifests 
unchallenged in how people are supposed to be motivated and inspired by ambitious and 
compelling strategic vision statements and/or performance management processes 
focused on individual productivity (Prahalad and Hamel, 1990, 1994; Senge, 1990). In 
the process, how people find comfort, inspiration and/or how they act under conditions of 
duress through the dynamics of inclusion and exclusion or in the participation of the 
construction of meaning (Streatfield, 2001) are not considered. 
Keeping the Approach Alive 
How then is it possible that an approach with so many apparent shortcomings manage to 
survive? The answer is obviously a complex one with many inter-related narratives keeping 
the approach alive. From reflecting on my own practice, the following protagonists are 
important actors in the continuation of this approach to organization. 
Theorists 
Popular theorists in the field of strategy are advocating an approach to management that 
implicitly or explicitly subscribes to the principles and beliefs discussed above. Hence, an 
author like Gary Hamel (2000) invited readers to study the remarkable success stories of 
organizations that joined the innovation revolution and then presented managers with a 
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number of steps that will also take their organizations to similar levels of success. Jerry 
Collins (2001) studied 1,435 companies in his quest to find truly great organizations. He 
eventually found only eleven that complied with his rigorous criteria, yet felt it then 
appropriate to tantalizingly pose a small number of principles to his readers, which, if 
managers apply those to their companies, they would also move on to become great. I 
struggled to find reference to any human being in Michael Porter’s landmark book, 
Competitive Strategy (1980) – the only constructs working in those organizations appeared 
to be abstract phenomena like management, clusters, capabilities and so on - all perfectly 
consistent, ‘leveragable’ and therefore predictable. So it would appear that in those largely 
de-humanized and aggregated organizations, managers should not have too many 
difficulties deploying their strategies. The list goes on – Kaplan and Norton’s (1996) 
Balanced Scorecards and Strategy Maps; Slywotzky’s and Morrison’s (1998) proposals on 
entering and optimizing your company’s profit zone; even Senge’s (1990) work on the 
learning organization allows for managers to determine the systemic archetype at play in 
their organizations and then decide on the most appropriate intervention and locality for 
that intervention to break the hold of destructive patterns. To be able to depict such rational 
and formative approaches to strategy as plausible and valid, these theorists make a subtle, 
but in my view flawed shift, from drawing aggregated, rational conclusions in hindsight 
(via their sanitized business cases) to suggesting that similarly aggregated, rational 
concepts, if applied to the leaders’ attempts at foresight, will ensure the formative and 
predictable unfolding of the future. They persist with the illusion that, by thinking 
rationally and in aggregated terms about the future, the future can also be formatively and 
therefore predictably unfolded. In doing this, they show a disregard for the complex social 
processes through which people in organizations engage with important emerging issues, 
some of which may in time ‘give rise to changes and patterns that no individual person has 
planned or created’ (Elias, 1939: 366). I find it significant that theorists with a more radical 
message like Pettigrew (1973, 1977) and Mintzberg (1977, 1994) were never embraced to 
the same extent by organizations in the free-market economy. 
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Industries 
It is then not surprising that a number of industries have developed key propositions based 
on the assumptions and beliefs that what can be understood rationally can be formatively 
unfolded. Consulting companies and business schools invite their customers through highly 
aspiring promotions like the following: ‘We think it is time for a new framework to 
understand high performance and a methodology to help companies close the gap to 
become high-performance businesses.’ (Accenture, 
www.accenture.com/Global/High_Performance_Business/HighBusiness.htm, October 4th, 
2007), ‘How to unleash the force of the empowered consumer’ (AT Kearney Home Page, 
www.atkearney.com, October 4 , 2007), ‘th Corporate leaders can consciously design and build 
organizations that better nurture talent and knowledge, leading to substantial increases in 
returns’ (McKinsey & Company Home Page, www.mckinsey.com, October 4th, 2007), 
‘change lives; change organizations; change the world’ (Stanford Graduate School of Business 
Home Page, http://www.gsb.stanford.edu/, October 4 , 2007) th and so on and so forth. The 
business models of consulting companies are almost without exception based on the 
cybernetic systems thinking principle of ‘gap-closing’: understand and describe the current 
organizational state as a problem statement, then define a strategic ideal based on global 
best practices and finally determine what steps will be required to close the gap. The 
pattern reflecting the Kantian dualism is obvious – objective, rational consultants and 
executives will determine the reasonable thing to do and will then formatively apply that 
solution to the organization. 
Managers 
Not surprisingly then, managers have largely subscribed to manage their teams in the way 
one would manage the closing of a gap in a cybernetic system. Some are also heeding the 
call to become great visionary leaders and are putting forward reified strategies that often 
become a law onto itself – due to its widely generic slant and the lack of particularization 
everyone seems to be able to justify their latest action as ‘aligned with our strategy’. 
Leaders are also adopting democratic practices in order for their people to feel valued and 
appreciated. Inspired by competitive strategy theorists, they believe the only competitors 
are the companies down the street and that the internal fights over resources and money are 
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at worst temporary and at best to be ignored. They continue to believe that what they are 
doing will truly differentiate their organization from competitors, although evidence 
suggests that those efforts are more aimed at maintaining parity amongst competitors. Still, 
the promise of control and predictability (Zhu, 2007) remains a worthwhile incentive to 
continue managing their teams as (and not ‘as-if’ they are) systems. 
Employees 
Ironically, employees across organizations have been assimilated in this culture where they 
have adopted the belief in the necessity of visions, long term targets and autonomous 
individuals making the difference. Without leaders telling them what the strategy is, staff 
members tend to lose faith in the former, accusing them of not knowing where they are 
‘taking the company’. In times when economic cycles prove to be buoyant, employees 
gratefully accept the accolades bestowed on them; in years when the cycle appears less 
favourable to achieving aggressive sales targets, they willingly accept the chastising and 
shaming of leaders for being lax on the job.  
An Ideology in Need of Functionalization 
From my experience I hold the opinion that this approach to business reflects all the 
hallmarks of a well embedded ideology with rationality, predictability and control 
featuring as cornerstone values. The latter should be understood in Mead’s (1923) terms as 
cult values, in other words, the generalized idealizations that, in business, we are always 
rational and in control. Whilst these values in and of themselves do reflect the ‘most 
precious of [our] social heritage’ as business institutions, I will argue that the 
functionalization of these values through essential conflict is all but absent. We are 
therefore as pointed out by Griffin (2002) experiencing how our unquestioned application 
of these values as universal norms continues to manifest in our silent conformity to this 
dualism. Consequently, our engagement with strategy in particular and organizational 
change in general remains flawed and prone to unexpected surprises. 
 
To suggest that this should all change would of course be to succumb to the very rational 
and formative temptations I have been so critical of in the paragraphs above. As mentioned 
before, more than a theory, I would consider the current popular approach to strategy and 
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change as a reigning ideology, complete with values, norms, heroes, villains and the 
associated practices of handing out praise or shame. Not surprisingly though, small pockets 
of theorists have been posing serious challenges to the reigning orthodoxy about why 
things happen the way they do. 
NEW DEBATES 
Towards the end of the twentieth century a growing number of theorists have started to 
express their disillusionment with the continuing promises of traditional approaches to 
strategy and organizational change. So, while mainstream strategy theorists were still 
debating solutions to the surprising ‘gaps in strategy translation capabilities world wide’, 
those theorists were formulating arguments suggesting that something more profound was 
amiss. 
 
Ever since the late 1960’s and 1970’s, a number of authors have started to challenge the 
rational models favoured by people with a preference for objective frameworks and 
normative analytical calculations. Some of those were authors like Wrapp (1967), 
Mintzberg (1977, 1994), Pettigrew (1977) and Narayanan and Fahey (1982). In his book, 
The Rise and Fall of Strategic Planning (1994), Mintzberg pointed to the evolving and 
unpredictable nature of strategy. He also explored the clearly social course that strategy 
making is subject to but that tends to be ignored by main stream writers and educators. 
Subsequent to these initial positions the work of more theorists started to draw attention to 
the need for a fundamental revision of our assumptions around organizations in general and 
strategy in particular. Of late, a number of authors have drawn attention to ever more 
fundamental revisions of our most basic assumptions. As with all things, these theorists are 
not unanimous in their views – some have called for a radical social theory of ‘emergent 
strategy’ (Stacey, 2007); some are pointing to a ‘move from macro to micro’ as a 
potentially valuable shift in research (Johnson, Melin and Whittington, 2003; Samra-
Fredericks, 2003; Regnér, 2003) while still others are arguing for the recognition of 
strategy as a Heideggerian way of ‘dwelling’ or ‘practical coping’ (Chia and Holt, 2006; 
Chia and MacKay, 2007). In coming to their respective positions, they are drawing on 
sources that reflect the extent of their disillusionment with, not only the traditional 
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approach to strategy, but the very foundations of today’s reigning ideology on how and 
why things happen the way they do. In the next sections I will deal briefly with the key 
arguments from each of these theorists and the meaning I have made of it. 
Complex Responsive Processes of Relating 
During the past three years I have been exposed to the thinking of a specific grouping of 
thinkers. As the faculty members of the Doctorate in Management program of the 
University of Hertfordshire’s business school Ralph Stacey, Douglas Griffin, Patricia 
Shaw, Farhad Dalal and Donald MacLean are all actively contributing to a growing body of 
publications in which they are, together with the students on the program, exploring the 
implications of new (and old) vantage points on management practices. Dealing with 
strategy and management in particular, Stacey (2007) has published an extensive argument 
(now in its fifth edition) on the understanding of strategy as an emergent social process. He 
has developed this argument concurrent with his uncompromising criticism of systems 
thinking as an inadequate and inappropriate conceptual framework to understand the 
organizing activities of people.  
 
I have been working actively as a strategist in the financial services sector for close on ten 
years. The philosophical foundation of my practice can be located in various traditions of 
systems thinking – group, family and psychotherapy; strategic choice and learning 
organization theory as well as resource based theory. It would come as no surprise then that 
the theory of complex responsive processes of relating espoused by Stacey and his 
colleagues as well as their criticism of systems thinking presented me with a substantial 
challenge in how I approached my practice. In brief, the aspects of their argument that I 
found particularly perturbing and/or exciting are as follows: 
 
? Firstly, they argue against the dualistic Kantian inspired application of both formative 
(that means the coherent and purposive unfolding of what is already enfolded) and 
rationalist teleology (autonomous individuals assuming an objective position outside the 
system and then choosing the rational thing to do) and propose a transformative, radically 
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social and emergent understanding of human organizations. What I have come to 
understand with these terms are the following: 
 
o Social: Viewing organizations as essentially collections of human bodies 
interacting in ordinary conversations at their local levels. Patterning this interplay 
between people are not only the overly rational or humanistic utterances assigned 
to people by systems theorists, but also the often erratic gesturing-responding of 
people to patterns of power relating, patterns of inclusion and exclusion, 
ideological themes and the feelings of anxiety and shame aroused by shifts in 
patterns of identity. By implication though, the reasoning capabilities of people 
are not to be denied as a defining characteristic of human interaction. In this 
regard, Stacey (2007) insists that ‘… the human capacity for reasoning remains of 
great importance and has enormous consequences’ (Stacey, 2007: 420). 
 
o Transformative: The always prevalent yet forever incomplete process of social 
organization (Mead, 1923) happening through the ongoing embodied interactions 
between people as they seek to functionalize values and intentions through a 
dialectic process of conflict and (hopefully) resolution in the living present. From 
these interactions, processes and identities are potentially transformed, potentially 
maintained.  
 
o Emerging: Acknowledging the apparently random, yet surprisingly patterning 
shifts and changes in the intentional and other themes between people. For 
strategists, our understanding, acceptance and willingness to participate fully stem 
from us drawing on the analogical implications of insights gleaned from the 
complexity sciences and the rich, corroborating principles espoused by 
sociologists like Elias ([1939] 2000, 1970, 1994).  
 
? Secondly, they argue for a shift in thinking about organizations in spatial metaphors to 
thinking about organizing as a temporal process during which people are, in their 
ongoing interactions, (simply) producing further interactions. Importantly, they oppose 
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the systemic understanding of time as linearly moving from a fixed, state-like past, to an 
unfolding, controllable future where the fleeting (almost negligible) present only appears 
to separate the one from the other. Instead, drawing on Hegel (Stacey, 2007) they 
advocate that we are continuously in a circular, micro-temporal way, constructing and re-
constructing the past and the future in the living present. In viewing the present in this 
way, I have come to question our formative fascination with the future at the expense of 
the vitality of the here and now. 
 
? Implied in their position that organizations should be understood from a radical social 
position they draw on Mead (1923, 1934) to argue that, instead of viewing people as 
autonomous individuals we must understand that individuals and groups are formed and 
simultaneously being formed by each other. In other words, an individual is the singular 
while the group is the plural of the same phenomenon. There can be no human individual 
outside of relationship. 
 
Stacey (2007) states about the perspective of responsive processes that it is ‘a way of 
thinking about what we already do’ (Stacey, 2007: 270). He comments on managers’ 
consistent requests for examples of the successful application of this approach and how 
those requests immediately reflect the frame of reference of systemically inspired theories. 
I assume that he usually then avoids citing the requested examples. 
 
To my mind the moral dilemma presented by the radical perspective he offers cannot be 
sidestepped in this way. (With moral dilemma I am referring to people – like myself – 
inevitably asking, when confronted by a radically different perspective, whether or not 
what we are doing can still be considered a responsible way to go about things.) As already 
indicated by Zhu (2007), Stacey is critical of the thinking-doing divide – and yet here he is 
reproducing it. I also have difficulty understanding how ‘what we already do’ can continue 
unabated while I ‘think’ about it differently. Certainly, in my assimilation of these ideas I 
have noticed shifts (and am continuing to do so) in the way I approach my practice that, 
although hard to describe without sounding contrived, point to a different way of knowing 
and recognizing what is happening. This I believe has then, by implication, already called 
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forth a different way of acting even if it is ‘only’ (drawing on Hegel as dealt with by 
Spencer and Krauze, 2006) the act of knowing. I will explore this issue in more detail 
below.  
 
Next I want to deal briefly with two additional perspectives that also challenge the main 
stream approach to strategy, albeit from very different vantage points. Yet, the authors of 
both vantage points presented me with significant material to reflect on as a way of coming 
to terms with a shift in practice.  
Micro-Strategizing: The Turn to Strategy-As-Practice 
During the course of 2003 Johnson, Melin and Whittington (2003), Samra-Fredericks 
(2003), Regnér (2003), Maitlis and Lawrence (2003) and others published a series of 
articles in which they explore the turn to ‘strategy-as-practice’. Of particular interest to me 
was the focus of their research which Johnson et al (2003) describe as an expression of 
their discontent with the continuing focus of main stream theorists on macro-level analysis. 
According to them, that form of analysis was usually applied to ‘broad categories and 
lifeless concepts’ (Johnson et al, 2003: 6). Instead, he and his co-authors advocated a turn 
to the ‘seeming minutiae of organizations’ (ibid: 7) as a potentially important source of 
value. They hoped that in turning attention to the micro activities of managerial agency 
their work might lead to an advanced understanding of the challenges facing macro-
strategy theories. I anticipated that the notion of micro-activities might yield corroborating 
support to the importance of ordinary, everyday social activities in the emergence of 
discernible patterns in the strategic evolution of an organization. 
 
During the course of Project 4, I attended to their research projects, methodologies and 
conclusions. Upon considering specifically the work of Johnson et al (2003), Samra-
Fredericks (2003), Regnér (2003) and Maitlis and Lawrence (2003) I argued that the shift 
to micro strategies they were hoping to effect remained rooted in the rational and formative 
belief systems that they were criticizing. My critique of their position, delivered from a 
transformative, social and emerging perspective, follows below. 
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Johnson et al (2003) anticipated that the focus on micro activities would enable us to 
identify and leverage micro assets in a bid to outmanoeuvre competitors. In addition, they 
expressed the hope that those micro assets would prove to be a key way in which 
organizations would be able to respond more rapidly and in ways difficult to replicate to 
strategic business opportunities. They anticipated that the ‘move to micro’ would grant 
strategic importance to ongoing micro-activities in the decentralized regions of 
organizations. 
 
In thinking about micro-activities as assets and strategies, Johnson and his co-authors 
(2003) reflected a crude form of rational and formative assumptions about human 
behaviour. For micro-activities to be ‘leveraged’ would assume that those activities could 
be deliberately considered before being applied, again implicitly subscribing to a sequential 
understanding of thinking and then doing. It would also imply that the art of the skilful 
conversationalist can be rationally analysed, adopted and then formatively applied to the 
conversational repertoire of people working in an organization. In a similar vein, Samra-
Fredericks (2003) attended to the micro, communicative actions of a number of strategists 
during an important strategic episode in a company. She concluded that one particular 
protagonist autonomously and deliberately outmaneuvered another through his skilful use 
of micro communicative strategies. 
 
Their conclusions obviously detracted from the social character of the activities observed. 
In pursuing a transformative, social and emergent perspective on the micro activities of 
people, I argued that those activities could not be seen as assets or strategies that can be 
wilfully and one-sidedly leveraged by autonomous individuals. Rather, those activities 
should be appreciated as the inherently social gesturing-responding (Mead, 1934) between 
living bodies acting in the living present. Accordingly, I would consider the apparent 
success of one protagonist as not autonomously brought about by that individual but 
instead flowing from the dynamic interplay of people enabling and constraining, affirming 
and negating each other’s ongoing communicative efforts to participate in the emergence of 
important intentional themes. As Shaw (2002) pointed out, although participants to a 
conversation can be intentional, the actual outcome of the conversation will emerge in ‘an 
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unplanned, unpredictable way, yet recognizable for [participants] to continue response by 
response’ (Shaw, 2002: 31). This then implies that the micro-activities of people should 
rather be considered as, paradoxically, forming the emergence of discernible patterns of 
importance whilst at the same time being formed by those very patterns. Thus, the authors 
cannot, upon finding corroborating traces of individual micro-agency in the emergent 
patterns of an organization’s story, simplistically ascribe those developments to the micro-
agency induced at will by an astute micro-strategist.  
 
Johnson’s interest then appears to be that they should come across practical insights that 
they can offer to managers so that the latter can master and become more effective in the 
skill of micro-strategizing. I do not hold the same expectation – rather, and more in line 
with Johnson’s final (albeit slightly deflated and less utilitarian) expectation, I would 
consider an increased level of self-awareness amongst organizational participants (about 
how important and lasting shifts could be brought about by momentary acts of moral 
resolve, executive indifference, innovative brilliance or other) a worthy outcome to any 
research project on micro activities.  
 
While considering all of the above, I did however become much more attuned to how our 
aspirations, actions and agreements were shaped in micro-instances, resulting in 
subsequent actions which, if nothing more, transpired in different ways from what would 
have resulted from a different turn of events. In this regard I noted, in retrospect, how 
seemingly significant instances are also quickly overtaken and reduced to negligible 
occurrences by following events.  
Strategy as Mindless, Practical Coping 
Chia and Holt (2006) and Chia and MacKay (2007) published two articles in which they 
developed a critical argument against the orthodox view of strategy as essentially a rational 
process. Although I did not take them up during the course of the projects, I consider their 
views an important position that I need to acknowledge and respond to in building my own 
argument and contribution. 
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Drawing on Heidegger’s (1962, 1971) notion of dwelling, they argued that strategy 
emanates in ways that are not as rational and deliberate as the dominant view in 
management literature would have us believe: 
According to this dwelling mode, our agency and identity arise through the actions 
we (mostly unconsciously) deploy, and our strategies, in turn, emanate from an 
internalized modus operandi that reflects our culturally mediated disposition. From 
this dwelling mode, we make two claims: firstly, strategic outcomes do not 
presuppose deliberate prior planning or intention; secondly, strategy is not some 
transcendent property that a priori unifies independently conceived actions and 
decisions, but is something immanent — it unfolds through everyday practical 
coping actions. 
Chia and Holt, 2006: 637. 
 
In their 2007 article, Chia and MacKay argued for the recognition of practices, i.e. the 
culturally and historically shaped regularities detectable as the patterns of activities rather 
than the activities of individuals themselves. It is this field of practices that should be 
considered the ‘starting point for social analysis’ (Chia and Mackay, 2007: 224): 
What it does mean is to assume a post-processual stance which: 1) places 
ontological primacy on practices rather than actors; 2) philosophically privileges 
practice-complexes rather than actors and things as the locus of analysis; and 3) 
makes the locus of explanation the field of practices rather than the intentions of 
individuals and organizations. 
Chia and MacKay, 2007: 229. 
 
They argue that it is through the cultural and historical transmission of those fields of 
practices that individuals can be seen to act consistently and organizationally effective 
‘without (and even in spite of) the existence of purposeful strategic plans’ (Chia and Holt, 
2006: 635). 
‘… human action must be understood in terms of a sociality of inertia – cultural 
transmission, socialization, institutionalization, disciplinary regimes, etc., play a 
crucial role in shaping an actor’s modus operandi and hence strategy outcomes. 
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Chia and MacKay, 2007: 233. 
 
They contrast this unreflective and unselfconscious way in which individuals would mostly 
dwell with moments when that familiar context is interrupted. Only then would people 
become more deliberate and goal-directed: 
Most of human action takes place through this form of mindless practical coping 
and it is only when a breakdown of coping occurs that we then become aware of the 
cognitive boundaries between the actor and the object of action. … The goal-
directed, deliberate strategizing that takes place in a strategic episode … represents 
an exception to the more mundane everyday practical coping that takes place. 
Chia and MacKay 2007: 233 
 
Accordingly: 
… strategy may emerge as a consequence of the inherent predisposition of an actor 
to unselfconsciously respond to external circumstances in a manner that we may 
retrospectively recognize as being consistently strategic. 
Chia and MacKay, 2007: 228 
 
Chia and Holt (2006) and Chia and MacKay (2007) raised an important issue, namely 
acknowledging the importance of the cultural and historical settings of organizational 
events that undoubtedly give rise to habitual forms of human agency. However, in my view 
they go too far in positing that this form of ‘mindless practical coping’ (Chia and MacKay, 
2007: 233, italics added) is what usually happens and that any form of intentional, 
deliberate strategizing is the exception rather than the rule. In following this course they 
have collapsed into an extreme form of social determinism, in which most of our thoughts 
and actions are taken to be mindlessly driven by habit and tradition. Their argument 
suggests that our cultural and historical setting causes what we think and do. This would 
render us little more than ‘mindless’ pawns of the social forces and patterns amongst which 
we live our lives – a view I would disagree with. 
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My views follow that of Stacey (2007) who consistently argues for the paradoxical 
understanding of the way in which the very patterns we appear to be forming through our 
day-to-day interactions are also forming us at the same time. Accordingly, while local 
interactions are continuously producing population-wide conversational and narrative 
patterns, those very patterns are also enabling and constraining what is being done at that 
local level. 
 
It is only by embracing the pervasiveness of this paradox that we are able to overcome the 
either/or nature of the rational and formative dualism so prevalent in main stream theories. 
Without an explicit acknowledgement of the paradoxical nature of organizational life, 
participation in the flat, featureless world of practice-complexes as proposed by Chia and 
MacKay (2007) could be considered to be dull, hopeless and amoral. This portrayal 
certainly does not reflect my personal experience of the choices, tensions, disappointments 
and surprises of work life as narrated in the different projects. It is in consciously 
acknowledging the paradoxes presented by the process of social organization that I find 
myself participating, paradoxically, in a habitual and mindful way (Stacey, 2007). 
THE SUBJECTIVE EXPERIENCE OF SOCIAL, EMERGENT 
TRANSFORMATION 
In the next section I will attempt to articulate the shifts and changes that I have experienced 
in my practice. I am pursuing my argument that Stacey (2007) appears to subscribe to a 
thinking-doing divide when he insists that citing examples where people have successfully 
applied the principles underpinning the theory of complex responsive processes of relating 
will by implication be a contradiction of those very principles. I am also pursuing the 
discovering of changes in my practice for two reasons: Firstly, I am drawn to the possibility 
that those shifts in practice are to be found in our micro actions alluded to by Johnson, 
Melin and Whittington (2003) and Samra-Fredericks (2003). Similarly, the extreme care 
displayed by Shotter (1994) in exposing our momentary utterances and gestures (also 
pointed to by Mead, 1934) serves as another source of interest. Secondly, I recognize in 
those requests by managers my own need; not so much for repeatable examples, but for 
compelling stories that can elucidate a relatively new and radical perspective. 
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 Simultaneously, even though I know that my practice has changed, I have great difficulty 
to articulate those changes in any meaningful way. Part of the difficulty is that when we try 
and capture an idea in the finitudes of a written document something always escapes. 
During attempts to convince colleagues and superiors of the need for a different approach I 
often found me regurgitating philosophical truisms that immediately evoked skepticism and 
cynicism from those discussion partners. They argued that this type of ‘theory’ seems to be 
an elaborate philosophical mask for an inevitable capitulation of responsibility. If anything, 
as my understanding of a transformative, social and emerging approach to strategizing and 
organizational change started to deepen through the iterative processes of knowing, acting, 
writing and reflecting, my resolve to make good on my promises has intensified rather than 
weakened. 
From Rational Formative Strategist to Absorbed Participant 
One of the earliest re-collections I have as a participant on the program is of a conversation 
with Patricia Shaw immediately following an early morning meeting of the faculty and 
participants. She commented on how involved yet silent she experienced me during the 
session. I responded that that was what I did – as a facilitator of change I viewed myself as 
outside the process looking in – observing, reflecting and then commenting on what I had 
seen. She responded that she thought it was possible to think differently about this; that I 
did not have to think about myself as ‘outside looking in’ but rather as inevitably 
participating. I recall how perturbed I was by that interaction, how I wanted to justify my 
‘position’ as perfectly sensible and even required. Today I have a better understanding of 
what I have come to understand she meant. Hegel pointed out how the dynamic of 
Aufhebung or sublation overcomes yet preserves the contradictions (e.g. the differences, 
insufficiencies and incoherencies) of the habitual in the ongoing process of transformation 
(Spencer and Krauze, 2006). Similarly then, I will frame this transformation in identity I 
am experiencing as the process of sublating (i.e. overcoming yet preserving) the practices I 
engaged in as a rational, formative strategist and change consultant while taking up new 
ways of working prompted by coming to know myself as an absorbed participant. 
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Following my conclusions on Projects 2 and 3 I was, on the one hand, left with a profound 
distrust in the idea of the objective, rational observer, whilst, on the other hand, I 
experienced a compelling need to engage fully in the interplay of intentions. So, for a 
while, I stopped facilitating. I stopped wanting to anticipate and orchestrate the movement 
of people through processes of change. Instead, I started simply sitting in meetings, initially 
feeling as if completely detached from the various narratives and aware only of the 
processual movements of the conversations. I had to restrain myself from commenting on 
those observations, instead becoming intent on engaging with the actual arguments; 
becoming absorbed in the to-ing and fro-ing of different positions. Colleagues who knew 
me well found my sudden partisan comments upsetting; instead expecting me to hold to 
neutral ground and serve as catalyst for an aggregated position that will be acceptable for 
all the arguing parties. Still, I persisted in practicing the skill of being opinionated. I 
experienced the conscious commitment to one position whilst silently admitting to the 
perfectly valid counter position. I could recognize my hesitancy and clumsiness in pursuing 
and participating in conflicting arguments in constructive ways – too often I would either 
push too hard or pull back too early. On a number of occasions I experienced the bitter 
taste of defeat when, in spite of my best efforts, an accountable executive would decide 
against my recommendation. This was remarkably different from the rather bland but safe 
utterances of the skilled facilitator – comments that would be aimed at accurately reflecting 
the essence of intricate discussions, pointing to common ground, a synthesis perhaps, in 
which all parties could recognize their arguments even if the final rendition expertly echoed 
the preference of the most powerful. 
 
I stopped attempting to induce broad sweeping changes on the ‘global’ others, looking 
instead at how what we wanted to achieve called forth changes in the habitual patterns I 
and the ‘local’ others found comfort in, right here, right now. If what we were globally 
aspiring to was, for example, the more immediate resolution of issues and less protracted, 
consensus seeking meetings, I considered the very meeting we were engaged in as a test 
case for that broader aspiration – could we conclude that very meeting in a way that 
affirmed the principle we had just committed to? 
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I became acutely aware of the difference in character between meetings structured as 
formalized events focused on feedback and progress reporting and those considered less 
structured and aimed at resolving challenges. Participating in the ritualized patterns of the 
former we appeared to have difficulty escaping the roles of either evaluative critics probing 
the sufficiency of others’ efforts or defensively advocating the sufficiency of our own. 
Seldom did I come to experience or anticipate the sense of collective movement I would 
expect all of us to instinctively covet. I became aware of my growing need to contribute 
and as I started to act into that need, I found myself prompting the intensity of my 
participation along with the following lines: 
? How can I now refocus my temporal attention onto the living present? 
? Are we busy avoiding important but risqué conflicts that contribute to this meeting 
becoming so stale and lifeless? 
? What should be said now that may lead to transforming how we think about what we can 
and cannot do? 
? Am I sufficiently present to initiate or react to instances that may shape the longer term 
patterning of our organization or even my own identity? 
? Am I responding bodily in a way that conveys my sense of responsibility to this 
conversation – both to me and those I am interacting with? 
? If we should stop now, will we know how to go on? 
? Are we morally committed to act or not to act as agreed? 
 
I recall that during the writing of a progression report I happened upon the insight that after 
years of thinking about my practice as that of a (rational, formative) facilitator of change I 
had become numb to my own experience. Part of the transformation I was experiencing 
was a reclaiming of the validity of meaning I was attaching to issues. The experience of 
knowing from the position of a fully absorbed participant (by which I mean the subjective 
experience of being morally responsible for what appears to be transpiring) alerted my 
senses to the sensations of being fully immersed – conviction and doubt; anger and joy; 
anxiety and relief; often in the creative if somewhat disorderly forms of conversational 
knowing (Shotter, 1994). In this, I found confirmation of the perspective on leadership 
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espoused by Griffin’s (2002) as an ethical challenge to continually engage in the ongoing 
conflicts between people as we attempt to functionalize our intentions and values. 
Re-Socializing My World 
Following on from the work done on Project 2, I deliberately started to ‘re-humanize’ 
(Elias, 1970: 64) my world by engaging in ways that would acknowledge that we were 
mostly dealing with the social actions of living people instead of the assumed ‘roll-out’ or 
activation of abstracted and uniform processes. On reflection, I attempted this re-
socialization of my practice in three ways – in the words that I opted for, in axioms that I 
challenged and in rehabilitating how I think about strategies, plans and intentions. 
The Words We Opt For 
In Project 4, I referred to Johnson, Melin and Whittington’s (2003) call for ‘… a shift to a 
sensibility of verbs rather than an assumption of nouns [as] part of the solution’ (Johnson et 
al, 2003: 7; italics added). Even more explicitly and to the point, Elias (1970) called for the 
‘[mental] re-humanizing of all the rather de-humanizing concepts’ like ‘industrialization’, 
‘scientificization’ and ‘democratization’ (Ibid: 64) which all ultimately could be 
understood as the movement brought about by people’s actions in one way or the other. 
 
Thus I started to opt for less abstracted nouns and more verbs to acknowledge the 
pervasiveness of the actions of people, e.g.: 
? ‘What do we need to know?’ instead of ‘Knowledge management architecture’; 
? ‘When last we strategized’ instead of ‘Our strategy states’; 
? ‘Our people selling’ instead of ‘Our sales capability’. 
 
I attempted to introduce a sense of human responsibility by insisting on pronouns wherever 
possible and appropriate, opting less for ‘the’ or ‘a’ and more for ‘my’, ‘his’ or ‘ours’, e.g.: 
? ‘The outcomes of the meeting’ to ‘What we had agreed to’; 
? ‘Exco decided’ to ‘As Exco members you decided’; 
? ‘What is obvious is a propensity not to debate issues’ to ‘I have noted a propensity 
amongst us not to debate issues’. 
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 I became preoccupied with the notion of action – human action. I would endeavour to 
conclude every conversation and every meeting with the question ‘So what do we do next?’ 
I contrast this with the vague expectations I would often leave meetings with that some or 
other process would ‘kick in’ or be ‘rolled out’ that will see to ‘the development of a 
proposition’ or ‘the curbing of impairments’. I found that by insisting on how those 
expectations relate to the actual activities of people got participants to engage in different 
discussions and arguments than the premature sense of comfort that typified the former 
approach. 
Challenging the Axioms We Hold 
I resisted the thoughtless acceptance of managerial truisms that simplistically link human 
performance to cybernetic principles (dealt with in Project 2) like ‘you get what gets 
measured’, or the apparent universally inspiring effect a vision of an end state has on 
people to enthusiastically work to ‘close the gap’. 
 
I advocated a more encompassing view of the social nature of what people do and why they 
might be doing it. For example, I introduced the political aspirations and anxieties of 
executives (as well as our/my own) as naturally occurring phenomena that we had to 
consider as important factors when re-organizing our business. I argued that people are 
deeply motivated by the degree to which they are being made to feel part of a group – often 
more profoundly and more immediately than monetary rewards that will or will not realise 
in the too distant future. 
 
I turned my attention to the internal competition for resources – be they people, money or 
executive attention. I accepted that this competitive struggle was more immediate and 
intense than the much vaunted competition with other organizations. 
 
I became less intrigued by the ‘big picture’ and more attentive to micro-instances (a notion 
arrived at in Project 4) of potential significance. Accordingly, I alerted team members to 
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possible events or occurrences that might prove to be important inflection points in the way 
the process was emerging. 
A Change in Practice … for the Better 
As I now reflect on those changes in how I approach my work, I certainly felt highly 
engaged and morally involved in my work. I had a continuing sense of movement, of 
achieving what we, as the process continued, came to understand we had to do. We 
managed to ‘complete’ a big, complex task within the agreed timelines and to the 
satisfaction of key players. My team members working with me commented positively 
about my leadership and approach to the tasks at hand. Yet, how can I ever hope to 
understand the part the changes in practice that I mentioned above played in all of that? I 
never publicly advocated those shifts in the team/s I was working with as I deliberately 
chose to (simply) participate without ever explaining what I was hoping to do differently. 
Thus, I could not rely on specific collegial feedback on the difference or effectiveness of 
those rather subtle shifts. 
 
Still, my practice has changed – I can, for the informed observer, be seen to be acting in 
different ways than before and that appeared to have contributed to a positive work 
experience.  
Rehabilitating Strategies and Plans 
If we opt to understand our participation in organizational life as social, transformative and 
emergent, our traditional assumptions that the future is predictable and can be created 
according to our plans and strategies are obviously problematic. My subjective experience 
of this dilemma was one of being caught in the middle of two opposing perspectives: on the 
one hand, the views held by most of my colleagues and also assumed in the official strategy 
and planning processes of my organization confirmed this traditional view of a predictable 
future that can be created by the controlled implementation of our strategies and plans; on 
the other hand, I was influenced by Stacey’s (2007) rhetorical questions: ‘Why do people 
prepare long-term forecasts if it is impossible to make useful long-term forecasts? Why do 
they adopt investment-appraisal methods that require detailed quantitative forecasts over 
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long time periods? Complexity theory suggests that it is impossible to make such forecasts 
so why do people carry on doing it?’ (Stacey, 2007: 449). I applied those questions to the 
forecasts inherent in any strategy or plan (e.g. we will grow headline earnings by x% over 
the next three years; we will accelerate product sales in those markets by y% over the next 
six months; we will establish that business to penetrate that market and be profitable in 
twelve months) and found myself doubting the usefulness of those activities when things 
usually transpire different than envisaged in most cases. 
 
Why then, do people continue the practice of writing detailed strategies and plans if the 
bulk of evidence suggests that those plans seldom get realized as documented? I will 
forward three arguments why the practice appears to be alive and well. 
 
We have come to believe that it is the good and right thing to do. In other words, the 
traditional way in which we apply plans and strategies is congruent with the dominant 
rational and formative ideology prevalent in modern day organizations. In the opening 
paragraphs above, I pointed to how this ideology is perpetuated by main-stream theorists 
and organizational agents alike. So, even with evidence of its usefulness lacking, 
organizational theorists and practitioners would rather attempt to find new ways of making 
the practice of strategy and planning more effective than questioning the viability of the 
practice all together. A recent attempt at addressing the shortcomings of this practice is the 
well documented development of the Balanced Scorecard by Kaplan and Norton (1996). In 
organizations I have dealt with, practitioners are acknowledging the emergent nature of the 
business context they are operating in with mechanisms like rolling forecasts (i.e. adjusting 
the annual budgeted forecasts on a month-by-month basis) as well as shortened planning 
cycles (e.g. one company’s executives have now resorted to one hundred day planning 
cycles). I interpret the latter developments as examples of the way in which people are 
pragmatically sublating (i.e. overcoming yet preserving) the habitual way (Chia and Holt, 
2006) in which they deal with strategy and planning. 
 
The formal processes of planning and strategizing have become an intrinsic part of how 
people in modern day organizations make sense of what they are expected to do next. 
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Accordingly, the formal plans and forecasts (be they the long-term strategic aspirations of 
an executive, the project timelines of a project manager or the monthly sales plans of an 
outlet manager) are important components in the more comprehensive organizational 
narratives of why people have meetings; why they allocate money to this cause as oppose 
to that; why some people are considered good performers and others bad; etc., etc. As a 
possible response to his own earlier rhetorical questions, Stacey (2007) suggested that we 
should consider ‘putting a stop to many initiatives and abandoning control systems and 
procedures that are not fulfilling the purposes they are supposed to fulfil’ (Stacey, 2007: 
449). This all sounds rather abrupt. I am sure that Stacey would anticipate that the stopping 
and abandoning of procedures (into which I now include cybernetic approaches to strategy 
and planning) would happen in a social, transformative and emergent way. In my own 
practice I certainly found it difficult to plainly extract the fibres of those cybernetic 
procedures from the social fabric of my organizational experience without running the risk 
of creating destructive anxiety and uncertainty in myself or my colleagues. This tension 
represents the paradoxical experience I alluded to in commenting on Chia and MacKay’s 
(2007) notion of mindless practical coping. 
 
The strategies and plans people document also become their moral and ethical agreements 
about what they will be doing next. Drawing on my experience narrated in Project 4, I 
observed how we used the documented versions of our conversations to verify the 
reciprocal understanding and commitment amongst players. Those agreements did not 
prevent participants to continue with their shadow conversations (i.e. those conversations 
people do not feel able to have freely or openly) (Stacey, 2007) that may have been in 
direct conflict with those agreements. What did happen however was that we could proceed 
with the work in a way that was recognizably in accord with the formal agreements we had 
reached. It is this aspect of plans, namely the implied moral agreements between people, 
which might give rise to plans being treated as fixed and static performance contracts. I 
will expand on this issue in the paragraphs below. 
 
I am therefore arguing that, despite the rational and formative heritage so obvious in those 
practices today we should not consider stopping or aborting the practice of planning and 
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strategizing. What we can do is to look for the social character and functions of our 
practices and artefacts and consider (again) how we may act differently. 
 
Strategizing and planning: an infinite social process 
The activities of strategizing and planning should not (as is now overbearingly the case) be 
seen as our attempts to predictably control the unfolding of a known future nor as a futile 
exercise in the light of the unpredictable, emergent nature of organizational life. Rather, it 
should be viewed as an important yet infinite social process (referred to by Elias ((1978)) 
as the interweaving of intentions and Stacey ((2007)) as the interplay of intentions) that 
people engage in to evoke, inspire and/or coerce human action from living moment to 
living moment. 
 
A Power-Political Statement of Intent 
Contrary to the commercial objectives usually espoused in rational and formative theories, 
strategies are usually also important statements of political intent. In Project 3 I concluded 
that the necessity for intentional conversations about what is to happen is borne from an 
ideological imperative, aimed at the preservation of the preferred order of the people 
having those very conversations. Viewed this way, strategies and plans fulfill an important 
role as the formal expression of the intentions of the powerful. 
 
The documentation of strategies and plans: inviting particularization and further 
deconstruction 
The documented version of this social process, i.e. the strategies and plans, should be 
understood as interspersed, static renditions of our conversations, representing useful 
markers of where we were in our thinking about what should or would be happening next. 
From this perspective I would like to make two observations: 
• Firstly, the publication of a plan or strategy document does appear to call forth more 
concerted attempts at reaching specific interpretations and agreement from players 
than what the mere continuation of the conversations would achieve. In my 
experience, the immanent publication of ‘the strategy or plan’ can lead to intense 
scrutiny and revisions from all involved. Those revisions can range from fine-
 183 
grained adjustments to abrupt and radical changes in course. I am not clear on 
precisely why this happens; perhaps it is because of the potential scrutiny to which 
a public statement (that I am a signatory to) may be subjected to; perhaps it is the 
luxury of retrospectively familiarizing me with what has been said and what the 
more concealed (e.g. power-political) implications might be. Whatever the motives, 
I consider it important to anticipate this phase and then actively work with other 
participants to deepen our sense of meaning and commitment to the plan. 
• Secondly, the documented version of the plan or strategy is but a temporary 
rendition of an ongoing social process. As we look back at our previous attempt, we 
should view the document as the next invitation for deconstructing our logic and 
assumptions and possibly derive new, transformed insights from that analysis. In 
that way, plans and strategies gain texture and a deepened sense of meaning and 
significance amongst those involved. During the process reflected on in Project 4, it 
was through multiple iterative renditions that an initially simple, schematic drawing 
came to symbolize a complex and significant intervention. 
 
Accentuating the omitted themes 
Furthermore, we must accept that those documented artifacts represent but the legitimate 
and formal (Stacey, 2007) versions of the intentions at play. In other words, the shadow 
and informal intentional themes (Stacey, 2007), also actively shaping the conversational 
themes between people, will either not be taken up or will be sufficiently obscured in those 
documents. Ironically, omitting contentious themes from the formal plan often fuels the 
conversations people have around those very themes which, in turn, may lead to those 
themes being legitimized. During a recent episode in an organization I worked with, a 
particularly sensitive issue involving the spending patterns of executives was gradually 
introduced into the formal plans after being initially omitted. That development coincided 
with escalating shadow conversations amongst employees during the initial stages of the 
project. Thus, in producing documented versions of our conversations, we create the 
opportunity for participants to introduce more contentious themes into the formal 
conversational sphere. 
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Ethical and moral agreements 
Finally, the documented version represents an ethical and moral agreement amongst 
parties working closely with that plan as to what they have agreed will be done next. It 
forms the basis of what participants could rightfully expect others to be doing next. It 
should therefore come as no surprise that traditionally, as people concluded the 
documented versions of the plans or strategies, those aspirations are then viewed as fixed 
and treated as the basis for performance contracts. What I am pointing to is that, because of 
the social, emergent and transformative nature of organizational change, what we should be 
held accountable for is not only the rather motionless deliverables contracted at the outset 
(which can become completely irrelevant during the course of the contract) but rather the 
quality of my ethical and moral participation during the course of the process. 
CONCLUSION AND CONTRIBUTION 
Concluding Remarks 
Through my participation in the Doctorate in Management Program I came to an 
understanding of organizational life as the transformative, emerging and thus always 
incomplete process of social organization (Mead, 1923). It follows then that the practice of 
strategizing should also be understood as part of that process and by implication, an 
infinite, social process. After all, whether ‘pursuing a new market opportunity’ or 
‘developing a new distribution platform’, the work that has to be done ultimately gets taken 
up and is particularized by people; is enabled and constrained by people; changes the roles 
and tasks of people; shifts the relative balance of power between people; is supported or 
sabotaged, pursued or countered by people. Even so, I argued that we should not negate the 
value and role of analyzed and formally documented strategies and plans. Rather, we 
should expand our understanding of those practices and documents as important social 
objects that people relate to. If we should become fixated on the art of analysis and 
documentation and/or display a rational and formative disposition towards those plans, we 
are at risk of again and again being surprised by the emergent, transformative nature of 
organizational life. 
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I argued that more important than a document will be the way we continue to participate 
from living moment to living moment in that ongoing act of social organization. Drawing 
on the notion that micro-instances can prove strategically significant, I reflected on my 
experiences during episodes of change and identified specific instances where the act of 
knowing differently, alerted me to changes in my practice. Hence, I am drawn to the 
minutiae of social interactions: attending to my sense of involvement or detachment in 
conversations; the words we use; the challenges we pose; insisting on understanding; 
shifting bodily positions; pushing at obscured conflicts that harbour the risks of generalized 
agreements waiting to erupt in intricate, delicate and complex granularity if attended to 
with more care; anticipating and recognizing those moments when a brief sense of 
excitement or reluctance may prove to be the moment important themes shift course. And 
this is what I will now term strategizing as emergent practice.  
 My Contribution to the Field of Strategic Management 
In the introduction to this study I suggested that my primary contributions to the field of 
strategic management have proven to be threefold: 
 
Firstly, I delivered a detailed account of the emergent and social transformation of my 
practice from viewing strategy as a rational and formative process to understanding 
strategizing as emergent practice. With the phrase I am pointing to: 
• How inherently social and unpredictable the process of strategy-making is, thus 
refuting the cult values of rationality, predictability and control underpinning traditional 
approaches to strategy; 
• How our micro-practices shape significant organizational outcomes from living 
moment to living moment, yet pointing to how those practices and moments of 
significance only become obvious in hindsight. 
 
Secondly, in pursuing the dissonances I registered with Stacey’s (2007) approach to 
strategic management, I took up his apparent negation of the value to be derived from 
people’s efforts to anticipate the future. I hoped to ascertain the sensibility of our 
anticipation, articulation and documentation of the future and, if appropriate, contribute to 
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rehabilitating the practice of strategizing. Through my reflections on my practice and the 
theory-laden interpretation of those reflections I have shown that conversations about the 
future and the subsequent documentation of those aspirations are, apart from being 
essential human tendencies, also important material people attend to in the incomplete 
process of social organization (Mead, 1934). Specifically, the documented strategies and 
plans:  
• Evoke, inspire and/or coerce human action from living moment to living moment; 
• Are important expressions of the power-political intentions of the powerful people; 
• Provide those who care to look with useful markers about where we were in our 
thinking at a moment in the past; 
• Facilitate further particularization of how people should go on; 
• Stimulate debate about the contentious themes omitted from the formal conversations in 
organizations; 
• Become the moral agreements between people on what they undertook to do next.  
 
Thirdly, I explored the nature of changes in my practice that I could ascribe to me knowing 
differently, which I argued already constitutes an act. This was in response to Stacey’s 
insistence that his contribution is ‘a way of thinking about what we already do’ (Stacey, 
2007: 270). Through the work done in Project 4 I have come to recognize the importance of 
micro-events and therefore turned my attention to the seeming minutiae of my practice. I 
indicated how, through knowing differently, I have started to exhibit different forms of 
engagement with my work and colleagues: 
• I experienced a shift in disposition from ‘objective observer’ to absorbed participant; 
• I am consciously opting for words that recognize the essential human nature of 
organizations; 
• I am challenging the axiomatic systemic assumptions we make about people in 
organizations. 
 
I am not proposing these shifts as a list of repeatable and generalizable actions – I offer 
them as a narrative account of a shift in practice. In this way and by virtue of the 
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conversations that this account may evoke, I hope to be actively participating in the 
emergent transformation of a radical social approach to strategizing. 
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